‘The Meditations as Meditation?: The Significance of Reading Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy from a Meditational Perspective’ by WALLACE, SARAH,KATHARINE
Durham E-Theses
`The Meditations as Meditation?: The Signiﬁcance of
Reading Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy
from a Meditational Perspective'
WALLACE, SARAH,KATHARINE
How to cite:
WALLACE, SARAH,KATHARINE (2012) `The Meditations as Meditation?: The Signiﬁcance of Reading
Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy from a Meditational Perspective', Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/6381/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
1 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction                    2 
 
1. Chapter 1:  Introducing Meditation      14 
- Introduction         14 
- Establishing a Connection                                        17 
- Ignatius and Descartes       22 
- Overstating the Ignatian-Cartesian connection               29 
- Conclusion         53 
 
2. Chapter 2:  Meditation over Disputation                           55 
- Introduction         55 
- Distaste for Disputation                                       57 
- The Cogito         71 
- Conclusion         85 
 
3. Chapter 3:  What Meditation means to the Meditations               87 
- Introduction          87 
- Thinking in Progress: Meditation as an Activity     89 
- The Importance of Individual Effort and Participation     99 
- Solitude and Catharsis        107 
- An Epistemological Salvation? Meditation as Transformation           116 
- Conclusion                 125 
 
 
Conclusion                                 127 
           
Bibliography                      135 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me…1 
 
 In his ‘Preface to the reader’, Descartes famously warns his reader about the 
challenges which lie ahead. Though oft-quoted, its significance is not always fully 
recognised. This thesis focuses on the word ‘meditate’, considering the significance 
of the role of meditation within the Meditations. By asking questions as to the nature 
and extent of the influence of the meditational genre on the Meditations, the thesis 
will consider how illuminative the genre is for interpreting the work. Essentially, I 
pose the question: why is the Meditations so called? I suggest that such an 
examination will prove highly illuminative, revealing a deeper significance to this 
important text. 
 
The Meditations: ‘An ingenious exploration of failure’? 
 
In 1637, Descartes wrote in a letter that 
 
Most intelligent people, if they take the trouble not only to read but also to meditate 
in an orderly way on the same topics on which I claim to have meditated myself … 
will draw the same conclusions as I did…2 
 
                                                             
1
 Descartes, ‘Preface to the Reader’, in Meditations on First Philosophy, ed. J. Cottingham (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8 
 
Please note: Subsequent references to this work will use the abbreviated title Meditations. 
 
2
 Descartes, ‘Letter to an unnamed correspondent’, in D.M. Clarke, Descartes: A Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 188 
3 
 
Published in 1641, the last decade of Descartes’ relatively short life (he died, 
aged, fifty-four, in Stockholm, while serving as philosophy teacher to Queen 
Christina),
3
 the Meditations remains widely regarded as a classic in the philosophical 
canon. This is interesting in itself, considering the reception Descartes’ text has had. 
The history of ‘Cartesian’ scholarship has been plagued with heavy criticism, not to 
mention pervasive misunderstanding, crude caricaturising and misrepresentation. By 
shifting the focus onto a different approach to the Meditations – from a 
‘meditational’ perspective – this thesis will offer a more sympathetic reading of the 
Meditations, in order to portray Descartes as a more positive contributor to theology. 
 
John Cottingham summarises well the problem history has had of interpreting 
this often-enigmatic thinker, and is therefore worth quoting at length: 
 
More than perhaps any other subject, philosophy has a tendency to canonize, or to 
demonize, the great figures of its past. Of these two opposite tendencies, over-
reverential hagiography is a lesser danger … than the kind of polemicism that wildly 
caricatures famous dead philosophers in order to dismember their supposed 
doctrines. The fate of Descartes in the twentieth century is a spectacular example of 
this latter process, so much so that the label “Cartesian” has become in many 
quarters almost a term of abuse, designating all the confusions and errors from 
which today’s philosophical champions claim to protect us: an obscurantist 
immaterialism in the philosophy of mind; a suspect foundationalism in 
epistemology; an incoherent subjectivism in the theory of meaning; a blinkered 
optimism in the philosophy of science … a problem of perspective arises; how are 
we to discern the significance of the arguments Descartes advances, and the force of 
the claims he puts forward, when so much of our vision is clouded by the heavy 
accretion of subsequent interpretation and criticism?
4
 
 
In the course of my research on the Meditations, I have encountered similar 
difficulties, and as such, I agree with Cottingham that a fresh approach is called for. 
                                                             
3 See Clarke, 402-407 
4
 J. Cottingham, in Descartes’ Meditations: Background Source Materials, trans. R. Ariew, J. 
Cottingham, T. Sorell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), xiii-xiv 
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Something particularly worthy of comment is a trend I identified while reading some 
of the vast literature there is on the subject of the Meditations; issues are 
compartmentalised and ‘dealt with’, and consequently the importance of the 
interdependency of these elements is underestimated.  Literary considerations are 
either non-existent or sidelined, mentioned in passing but not integrated into the 
interpretation itself; furthermore, such accounts tend to neglect to consider how the 
whole text hangs together. Essentially, the ‘philosophical’ is given priority over the 
‘literary’; the questions of style, form and genre. I think that the main reason for this 
heavily one-sided approach to the Meditations is not necessarily that of a total 
disregard for the ‘literary’ considerations (although the importance of these 
considerations is often underestimated), but rather because many commentaries on 
the text tend to isolate individual philosophical issues, dissecting them in order to try 
and ‘solve’ a problem identified in the text, or provide a new account of why such 
problems threaten the very coherence of Descartes’ project. They are less attentive to 
the approach than they are to the quest to ‘solve’ the perceived Cartesian dilemmas, 
such as the charge of circularity levelled at Descartes, or the difficulties inherent in 
the ontological argument. Such compartmentalisation, as evidenced throughout the 
literature on the Meditations, is damaging to our understanding of the text because it 
neglects to consider the way the text hangs together as a whole, complete entity; how 
it is ‘knit together by a narrative synthesis without which the Meditations would be a 
fragmentary, unsuccessful pastiche of discrete arguments.’5 I argue that responsible 
and fruitful interpretation demands that the part be viewed in relation to the whole. 
 
As such, this thesis will provide an alternative approach, suggesting that a 
consideration of the Meditations as meditation is highly illuminative for a deeper 
understanding of the text. It is not concerned with rescuing Descartes from the 
technical philosophical criticism outlined above; although I will attempt to defend 
Descartes in some capacity, it will not, in the main, be in the technicalities of his 
philosophical argument but rather in the formulation of a recovery project for how 
Descartes should be read. The salvage operation calls for a quite different approach, 
and one which is rooted in an investigation of the title. It is fair to say that if we 
                                                             
5
 E.T. Flood, ‘Descartes’ Comedy of Error’, MLN, Vol. 102, No. 4, French Issue (Sep., 1987), 851 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2905794 (17/03/2011) 
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investigate the Meditations by isolating philosophical problems, then I do not think 
that Descartes can always be rescued. What I do think, though, is that it is time to 
take a fresh – and sympathetic – look at the project of the Meditations. If we reform 
the way we read Descartes, the problems identified may take on a rather different 
hue. 
 
Much of the thesis will take on a character of literary analysis, because it will 
ask questions of the stylistic features of the text, in order to respond to the central 
question of if, and in what way, the style and presentation opted for by Descartes 
render it a ‘meditational’ piece. The Meditations is, of course, a work of philosophy 
(and arguably a masterpiece at that), but it is also a work of literature, and so the 
literary considerations can never be sidelined in favour of a purely philosophical 
focus. Indeed, this introduces a broader theme which will run through the thesis: I do 
not wish to condone a dichotomisation of the ‘philosophical’ and ‘literary’ 
approaches to the text. Rather, I wish to suggest an approach in which these two 
aspects are not only mutually respectful, but also mutually dependent. To this end, I 
will present in this thesis how a literary analysis could take shape, and how this 
might lend illumination to the philosophical ideas contained within the text; not least 
because it is through the mode of expression of these ideas that we encounter, and 
come to understand, them. The style in which Descartes writes, expresses, supports 
and illuminates the ideas, contributing to their structure, impact and elucidation. 
 
Essentially, these considerations are not important simply in order to form a 
more ‘rounded’ account of the text, but because they lend a vitally important insight 
into the very meaning and purpose of the text. A consideration of the influence of the 
meditational genre on the Meditations necessarily involves questions of style and 
form, and will illuminate our understanding as to the possible motivations Descartes 
had for writing the text in the way he did, and for writing it at all. 
 
I want to consider afresh Descartes’ Meditations as a positive contribution to 
theology, by shifting the focus from his arguments and theories to a consideration of 
6 
 
how, and why, he wrote the text in the first place, and what effect this has on the act 
of reading the Meditations, not merely as a reader, but as a participant. This theme 
will run throughout this thesis, informing how we approach the text. 
 
 Flood rightly comments that ‘in spite of all philosophical differences as to its 
meaning, the work retains its powerful hold on your imaginations.’6 In view of this 
Cartesian intrigue, we need to rethink how we approach the text, in order to build a 
more fruitful interpretation of the Meditations. 
 
 
The Meditations as Meditation: Initial Considerations 
 
There exists some research in this area of the meditational influence on the 
Meditations. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, for example, emphasises that 
 
Descartes urges his readers not to interpret the Meditations as a work composed of a 
set of separate and disjoined theses, but rather to follow him in his meditational 
exercises.
7
 
 
 Consequently, the essays in the collection she edits  
 
Focus on a set of specific texts in the Meditations, to analyse their functions in the 
meditational development of the work, bearing in mind the traditional form of the 
                                                             
6 Flood, 848 
7
 A. Oksenberg Rorty, ‘Preface’, in A. Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1986), ix 
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genre of such writing, as well as Descartes’ rational revision of the meditational 
mode.
8
 
 
 Although Oksenberg Rorty’s work offers a helpful insight into how the 
meditational genre plays out in the Meditations, and how it affects our view of the 
philosophical ideas expressed (both are key themes, and as such, I will draw on her 
findings in the course of this thesis), she appears to make an assumption that the 
Meditations are evidence of meditational writing in the first place. As will become 
increasingly clear, I agree that the Meditations are to be viewed as meditational 
writing – but I think it is important to establish a basic connection between this text 
and the meditational genre, before considering how this actually plays out in the 
Meditations. As such, the first chapter of this thesis will be concerned with 
establishing such a connection; this will provide a solid basis on which to build in the 
following chapters, in order to demonstrate how the influence of the meditational 
genre on Descartes’ work is illuminative to our understanding of it. 
 
 Similarly, L.J. Beck has done some significant work on this theme, giving 
attention to the idea of the Meditations as ‘a spiritual exercise’.9 His work will be 
shown to be useful in the middle chapter of this thesis, offering particularly valuable 
insight into the nature and role of philosophy in Descartes’ time, and into Descartes’ 
somewhat puzzling distinction between analytic and synthetic modes of reasoning. 
However, the findings of his chapter on the Meditations as a spiritual exercise, 
although illuminative, do not extend so far as to inform the rest of his work. As such, 
I see potential for taking this theme much further, considering how it plays out in the 
text. 
 
 Furthermore, Zeno Vendler’s article focuses specifically on the influence of 
St Ignatius of Loyola’s influence on the Meditations, 10 through his widely influential 
                                                             
8
 Ibid., xi 
9 See L.J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), 28-38 
10 Z. Vendler, ‘Descartes’ Exercises’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Jun., 1989) 
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meditational work, Spiritual Exercises, published in 1548. Ignatius and his writing 
will be introduced in the first chapter of this thesis, and will serve as the particular 
example of meditational writing that directly – and indirectly – influenced Descartes. 
The thesis will, like Vendler, argue for a textual connection between these two 
particular meditational pieces. However, Vendler’s article is only helpful to a certain 
extent; whilst I agree with his basic premise – that the Meditations evidence the 
influence of the Spiritual Exercises – he can be used as an example of the danger of 
overstating this connection between Ignatius and Descartes. This critique of his 
article will serve as a springboard into how best to appropriate and interpret the basic 
connection between Ignatius and Descartes, and therefore between Descartes and the 
meditational tradition. 
 
 These three writers in particular contribute to the findings of this thesis, and, 
as demonstrated above, each lend a particular aspect of illumination. However, this 
focus on the meditational nature of the Meditation is certainly not representative of 
the mainstream of Cartesian scholarship. True, some writers have nodded to the 
significance of considering the stylistic aspects and genre choice of the Meditations, 
but it tends to be as one consideration among many. Furthermore, the writers 
aforementioned either seem to make the assumption of Meditations being a 
‘meditational’ piece of writing, or treat it as one aspect among many to be studied, in 
order to gain a fuller picture of how the Meditations functions as a text. I want to go 
to the root of the issue of meditation in the text, asking the fundamental question: 
why is the Meditations so called? I want to really put the spotlight on this issue, 
arguing that it is of integral importance for a fair, and full, interpretation. I am calling 
for a fresh approach to the text, considering the nature and extent of the meditational 
influence on the Meditations, and Descartes’ possible motivation for doing so. The 
title of the text can reveal hidden elements to the work. 
 
Furthermore, rethinking the way we read the text challenges us to find 
different ways to judge it, not within the vocabulary of ‘success’ or ‘failure’, but in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231645 (11/05/2011)  
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ways which defy these parameters. The biggest mistake to make with the Meditations 
is to fall prey to the deceptive simplicity of the text. In the preface to his influential 
work on Descartes (a text whose insight will prove to be illuminative throughout this 
thesis), L.J. Beck makes reference to a helpful quotation by Kemp Smith:  
 
The Meditations may seem, on first acquaintance, to hold promise of easy 
understanding. Yet how difficult they are found to be when closely studied.
11
 
 
The text does, indeed, present itself to the reader as accessible; and therein 
lies one of its greatest merits. However, what Kemp Smith is drawing attention to 
here is the wonderfully multi-layered character of the Meditations; it can be read on 
many different levels, but is best appreciated – and understood – as a complex text 
which admits of various interpretations. The problems encountered in the 
Meditations are not ones which lend themselves to simple answers – arguably not to 
any answers, as such, at all – but they are, I argue, lent some illumination by an 
approach to the text that is constantly informed by Descartes’ motivation for writing, 
and his mode of expression. Yet not enough attention is given to what it might 
actually mean to meditate with Descartes, and certainly not of the way that an 
understanding of this has the power to transform the way we understand the text. 
Indeed, to ‘meditate’ with him is, I will argue, Descartes’ invitation to read the text 
in a certain way; we cannot talk of a ‘meditational aspect’ or a ‘meditational 
element’ to the Meditations; rather, meditation is about the very nature, purpose and 
meaning of the text. This centrality of the importance of meditation to the 
Meditations is the driving force of this thesis. I hold it to be of great significance, but 
not yielding any simple (or consistently obvious) results. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
11 Beck, v 
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Mapping the project 
 
To recap: I hold that the way we read the Meditations is important, by way of 
assessing the influence of the meditational genre on Descartes’ text. Essentially, I 
wish to persuade the reader of the worth of this approach, and suggest that is should 
inform the direction of Cartesian scholarship, leading to a more positive evaluation 
of Descartes’ contribution to theology. I want to awaken in the reader a literary 
appreciation for the text, by challenging the text, and asking the questions of form 
and shape as well as content; style as well as the philosophical ideas expressed. 
 
The thesis will, firstly, trace the history of meditation and introduce the figure 
of Ignatius, in order to establish a basic historical-biographical connection between 
Ignatius and Descartes. Vendler’s article will be used as an introduction to the textual 
connection, and will serve as an example of how overstating this connection can be 
misguided, and misguiding. The second chapter will shift the focus onto what 
Descartes writes, regarding why he chose to title the Meditations as he did; here, he 
presents meditation mainly as a viable alternative to disputation, as a mode of 
philosophical argument. Giving Descartes a voice in this second chapter will inform 
the discussion of the third and final chapter, which considers why Descartes might 
have actively chosen the Ignatian meditational genre to influence and inform his 
Meditations. As such, this final chapter is more speculative in character, using the 
findings of the previous two chapters to build a fuller picture of the contribution of 
the meditational genre to how we view, read and interpret the Meditations. As the 
thesis progresses, the case is gradually built up that there is a clear and tangible 
influence of the Ignatian meditational genre on Descartes’ text; and that to approach 
it in this way affects how we interpret the individual elements of the text. The typical 
‘problems’ of the Meditations take on a rather different character when viewed from 
the perspective of treating the Meditations as a piece of meditation writing. 
  
I am assuming the reader has some basic degree of familiarity with the 
Meditations, with the structure of the text and the essential arguments contained 
11 
 
within. However, I hope that it will be accessible in a way that reflects the text itself.  
A key thread running through this thesis will be an emphasis on the importance of 
the reader’s participation in the Meditations; that it is not simply a text to be read, but 
a meditation to be meditated, along with Descartes. He encourages his readers to 
meditation with him, and therefore the exploration of the issues contained within this 
discussion should reflect this active process. The focus here will be on asserting the 
importance of an approach to the text which is informed by its title, and in doing so 
will suggest alternative ways of handling some of the perceived ‘problems’ of the 
text. 
 
Detailing the Chapters 
  
Chapter One is concerned with tracing the history of meditation, from Marcus 
Aurelius, through St. Augustine, and culminating in the Christian spiritual meditation 
of the sixteenth century, and thereby introduces the key figure of St. Ignatius of 
Loyola. It is the Ignatian form of meditational writing in particular that will inform 
the rest of the thesis. The first part of the chapter, therefore, is concerned with 
locating Descartes within the wider tradition of meditation; and to establish a basic 
historical-biographical connection between Ignatius and Descartes. The second 
section will start to look at the Ignatius-Descartes connection in more depth, 
approaching it from an angle of textual analysis. The discussion of the nature and 
extent of the textual connection between Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and Descartes’ 
Meditations – which is a central thread running through the thesis – will be started by 
considering Zeno Vendler’s assessment of how the texts relate to one another. While 
agreeing with some aspects of Vendler’s account, I highlight how a temptation to 
overstate the apparent similarities between the texts can lead to a misrepresentation 
of both authors’ aim, method and presentation. By focusing on two particular 
examples of textual parallels which Vendler cites, the latter part of the chapter 
demonstrates how Vendler stakes too much on the presence of clear and consistent 
parallels, such that the subtlety and complexity of the connection risks being 
disregarded. Oversimplification by overstatement must be avoided, and this warning 
will inform the considerations of the rest of the thesis. 
12 
 
 
Chapter Two shifts the focus to what Descartes himself has to say about why 
his work is titled Meditations; this chapter is concerned with giving Descartes a 
voice. It will draw on the Objections and Replies writings between Descartes and his 
contemporaries, in response to the first edition of the Meditations. Selected thinkers 
highlight any dubious aspects of Descartes’ argument and offer constructive 
criticism; Descartes responds to these comments, defending the arguments within the 
text. As such, it is a helpful place to find out important information about the 
Meditations, from Descartes himself, and therefore this chapter will focus in 
particular on ascertaining why Descartes chose to title the Meditations as he did, and 
what his comments might mean for the project of reading the text. Interestingly, 
Descartes frames the issue in terms of ‘meditation’ constituting a viable alternative to 
that of ‘disputation’. Consequently, the first part of the chapter considers the reason 
behind Descartes’ distaste for disputation, before moving on to consider where this 
fits into Descartes’ more general distinction between the analytic and synthetic 
modes of philosophical reasoning, and the role of the syllogism in Descartes’ 
thought. This chapter, therefore, uses what Descartes has to say about his choice of 
Meditations for his text’s title to create a fuller picture of the epistemological system 
at work in the Meditations. The chapter culminates in the use of the cogito section of 
the Meditations as a case study for putting Descartes’ comments into action, 
assessing how what he writes about the methodology employed in the text affects 
how the reader views the ‘problem’ of the cogito. 
 
Informed by the discoveries of the second chapter, Chapter Three picks up 
the Ignatian strand of meditation introduced in the first chapter, and considers why 
Descartes might have actively chosen the meditational genre to inform and influence 
his Meditations. Meditation will be discussed not simply as a viable alternative to 
disputation (as was the focus in the second chapter), but rather as a positive choice in 
itself. This final chapter has a dual concern: it will examine both how the Meditations 
bears significant relation to the Ignatian meditational tradition; and why Descartes’ 
would seek this affinity. The nature and extent of the connection between the 
Meditations and the Spiritual Exercises will be considered afresh, drawing on 
13 
 
particular areas of textual affinity, such as meditation as a ‘thinking in progress’, the 
creation of an environment conducive to meditation, and the key concept of 
‘meditation as transformation’. 
 
This thesis will conclude, therefore, that Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises have a 
significant influence on the genre, style, form and expression of Descartes’ 
Meditations. To approach the Meditations from the perspective of treating it as a 
piece of meditational writing will be shown to be highly illuminative for a deeper 
understanding of this important text. Such an approach will also lead to a more 
sympathetic interpretation of some of the more problematic areas of the Meditations; 
and while I do not claim to solve any of the philosophical dilemmas and problems 
contained within this complex text, I hope that the reader will be inclined to approach 
these difficulties from the more sympathetic perspective created by understanding 
the meditational mode of the text. Ultimately, I seek, through consideration of all 
these (necessarily) interrelated issues, to convince the reader of Descartes’ position 
as a positive contribution to theology. 
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Chapter One: Introducing Meditation 
 
Introduction 
 
Stohrer asks the key question:  
 
Does the textual evidence in Descartes’ writings warrant the judgement that there is 
a pattern of dependence by Descartes on the methodological principles and 
directives of Ignatius, as developed in the Spiritual Exercises?
12
 
 
 This question will inform the investigation of this thesis, starting with this 
chapter’s exploration of the relationship of Descartes’ Meditations to the 
meditational tradition at the time of his writing, namely in the Spiritual Exercises of 
St. Ignatius of Loyola.  This chapter will form a basic picture of the connection 
between Descartes and the tradition of meditational writing – in particular that of 
Ignatius – which will pave the way for further investigation in the later chapters, in 
order to attempt to understand better the nature and extent of the relationship 
between the two texts, and what Descartes meant by entitling his work Meditations. 
 
To this effect, the first chapter centres around two key sections: the first is a 
consideration of how the relationship between the two texts might have come about; 
by examining historical and biographical factors, I suggest how and why Descartes 
would have been familiar with the Ignatian meditational tradition. The second 
section focuses on how the connection between the two texts might be 
misrepresented, by way of overstating. I examine the danger of drawing parallels 
between Ignatius and Descartes which do not stand up to scrutiny in an examination 
of the texts themselves, and so reveal themselves to be either inconsistent or tenuous. 
                                                             
12 W.J. Stohrer, ‘Descartes and Ignatius Loyola: La Flèche and Manresa Revisited’, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Jan., 1979), 26 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v0/7/17.1stohrer.html  
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I will conclude that the overstatement of the connection is neither a helpful nor 
fruitful way of reading the texts, and of understanding how they relate. Such 
overstatement risks oversimplifying a complex – and often subtle – textual 
connection, and misrepresenting the textual evidence. 
 
However, what does become clear is that there are significant ‘hints’ at a textual 
connection, which, although overstated by some because of being taken literally on a 
superficial level, will prove important – indeed, integral – to our understanding of 
why Descartes chose to present his text in the way that he did. So, the latter part of 
this first chapter looks to one extreme of the interpretation of the connection between 
the two texts. The second chapter will then shift the focus to examining what 
Descartes himself writes about why he titled his work Meditations, before the third 
chapter considers further possible motivations for employing the meditational genre, 
and how this plays out in the text. 
 
Let me now introduce in more detail the structure of this first chapter. The first 
part, concerning historical and biographical factors, will open by roughly outlining 
the key players in the meditational tradition, up until we reach Descartes in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This will enable us to contextualise the tradition, 
and locate Descartes within it; an appreciation of the evolution of the tradition is 
integral to understanding Descartes’ relationship to it, and his employment of it in 
the Meditations. It is vital throughout this thesis that the Meditations is 
contextualised, in relation to the tradition preceding it; Descartes should be viewed, I 
argue, as simultaneously a product of his tradition, and as a transformer of genre. 
Secondly, I will assess how Descartes would have been aware of – indeed, familiar 
with – the Ignatian meditational tradition by considering his Jesuit education at La 
Flèche. If a basic historical connection between Ignatius and Descartes can be 
established, then we are in a solid position to assess what the nature, and extent, of 
the textual connection might be. The third part will briefly sketch the figure of St. 
Ignatius of Loyola, and the form and character of his influential text, the Spiritual 
Exercises.  
16 
 
  
The second section of this first chapter will consider how overstating the 
connection between Descartes’ Meditations and the Ignatian meditational tradition of 
the Spiritual Exercises leads to a reading of the texts that is neither helpful nor 
fruitful for our task. I will refute Vendler’s thesis, which argues that there is a strong 
and explicit textual basis for establishing a relationship between the two texts, such 
that the Meditations is both informed by, and dependent on, the Spiritual Exercises. I 
pick up on the key areas of contention that I have identified; namely, the issue of the 
‘prescriptive’ nature of the Meditations in comparison to the Spiritual Exercises, and 
the presentation of ‘time’ in the two texts. The drawing of parallels which are weak, 
superficial, and which result in tenuousness, evidences a misrepresentation of the two 
texts, based on an overstatement of the connection. In doing this, I do not disregard 
the frequent elements of similarity encountered when reading the texts of Ignatius 
and Descartes side by side; indeed, this will inform the development of my thesis. 
My project here is simply to show that, despite the existence of whisperings of a 
connection, an overstatement of this textual connection is both misguided and 
misrepresentative. What is more, ‘since Descartes made no references to the 
Exercises in his works, the problems inherent in such a hypothesis are 
compounded’.13  
 
We must constantly be looking to appropriate the connection both with 
accuracy and solid contextualisation, resisting the temptation to overstate – and, 
indeed, understate – the links, in order to use the Ignatian meditational genre to 
inform a fruitful reading of the Meditations, and an assessment of what a connection 
between the two might actually constitute. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Stohrer, 14 
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Establishing a Connection 
 
Tracing the Tradition 
 
Flood proclaims that ‘it is a truth universally acknowledged that modern 
philosophy commences with Descartes’.14 I think that to see how this might be so, 
we must examine Descartes’ relation to his past and predecessors, particularly in 
light of the title of his work being Meditations. This will enable us to discern to what 
extent his work can be called stylistically ‘original’, and how much it owes to the 
tradition in which Descartes grew up and was educated. Consideration of these issues 
will form one focus of this first chapter. In order to assess these issues, I will begin 
by briefly charting the historical development of the tradition of meditational writing. 
 
Wherever else his originality may lie, it is certainly not to be found in opting to 
pen a piece of meditational writing. Within the Christian tradition, meditational 
writing traces back to the early centuries of the religion. However, this claim to 
antiquity from Christian devotional writers does not preclude the use of the genre by 
others in ancient society. Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, for example – his 
‘reflections on human life and death in the perspective of eternity’ – have been 
acclaimed as having ‘enduring power to challenge, encourage, or console’.15 This 
autobiographical piece detailing the honest thoughts of this Stoic philosopher-
emperor recounts periods of reflection which lead to expression of self-instruction; a 
shaping and directing of the will is effected by use of the imperative, as exemplified 
in the opening line of Book Two: 
 
Say to yourself first thing in the morning: today I shall meet people who are meddling, 
ungrateful, aggressive, treacherous, malicious, unsocial. All this has afflicted them 
through their ignorance of true good and evil. But I have seen that the nature of good is 
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what is right, and the nature of evil what is wrong; and I have reflected that the nature of 
the offender himself is akin to my own ... a sharing in the same mind, the same fragment 
of divinity.
16
 
 
This working-through of his thoughts, by focused philosophical reflection in the 
form of meditation, in order to effect practical action, is an early exposition of 
philosophy as ‘praxis’.17 The importance of meditation as praxis in regard to 
Descartes’ Meditations will become clear as our exploration progresses and deepens. 
Indeed, Marcus Aurelius’ ‘goal is not victory in debate with himself, but a reformed 
and confirmed attitude directing action.’18 These second-century Meditations are for 
us a useful indication of the early activity of the meditational tradition, in the form of 
an individual’s private musings, reflections and the determinations of one’s will. As 
such, ‘for Marcus, philosophy was the therapy of the soul. In this sense, his 
Meditations are his medications.’19 
 
The other ancient source which I have chosen to briefly draw on is a Christian 
one. St. Augustine’s Confessions has been hailed as a seminal text in the meditational 
tradition. Again, it takes the form of an autobiographical reflection; however, the 
confessional tone produced by the way in which it recounts chronologically a life 
lived, and truths learned, renders it more like a prayer than a piece of self-instruction. 
It lacks the somewhat proverbial character of Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations, opting 
instead to recount the movement from reflection to resolution: ‘in the first place it is 
a confession of the writer’s sin and error, in the second a recognition of God’s 
goodness and truth.’20 Like his Roman predecessor, however, the Confessions charts 
a turn inward in order to discover truths that lie innate in the self, stressing the 
importance of individual effort. Augustine draws on the faculty of the memory to 
recollect, consider and work through questions, resulting in reflections of gratitude: 
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‘My God, let me be thankful as I remember and acknowledge all your mercies.’21 
The closing line of the text, as the culmination of the prayer-like confession, 
expresses the result of the meditation as a resolution of the will: 
 
What man can teach another to understand this truth? What angel can teach it to an 
angel? What angel can teach it to a man? We must ask it of you, seek it in you; we must 
knock at your door. Only then shall we receive what we ask and find what we seek; only 
then will the door be opened to us.
22
 
 
What these two great meditational writers have in common is a burning 
passion for discovering the ‘truth’. Following the classical conception of philosophy 
as a literal ‘love of wisdom’, their use of meditation as both their vehicle and praxis 
is telling. 
 
The understanding of meditation as a type of prayer informed the 
development of the meditational tradition through the centuries, and played a central 
part in monastic life. One thing was especially clear, and integral to the tradition: 
meditation had a devotional goal. As a result of reflection on devotional scenes as 
well as personal experience and confession, this goal entailed effecting a change in 
the person, through a resolution of the will.  
 
 Now that the general background to the meditational tradition has been 
sketched, we must ask what form meditation was taking when Descartes enters the 
scene. It appears that by then, the broad field of ‘meditation’ had crystallised into 
something of a standard form. 
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By the mid-sixteenth century, the Augustinian conception of meditation, as 
an inward turn that relied on the faculty of the memory, was giving way to the 
‘Ignatian’ method of imagistic representation of biblical scenes, in order to focus the 
mind on a particular devotional theme and ensure the meditator’s total involvement 
through dramatization (a key aspect of the Ignatian meditational form that will 
receive fuller attention in the third chapter). It is in this form that Descartes would 
have first encountered the idea and practice of spiritual, meditational exercises. 
Despite some telling similarities between the Augustinian style and Descartes’ work 
(which will become apparent once the important differences between Ignatius’ 
Exercises and Descartes’ Meditations are discussed), it is the Ignatian understanding 
of meditation that I will be focusing on in my discussion; by using Ignatius’ 
Exercises as a point of comparison, I hope to shed some light on what Descartes 
really had in mind when he entitled his work Meditations. I feel it is important to 
identify a particular text which we will be dealing with, from the outset, in order to 
properly contextualise any connection established between Ignatius and Descartes. 
As Rubidge rightly says, 
 
A number of scholars have examined this topic ... Most claim that Descartes was 
influenced by Saint Ignatius of Loyola’s handbook, the Spiritual Exercises. Some 
recent scholars, however, attempt to relate the Meditations to the genre of devotional 
meditations, rather than identifying a specific text or author as the source of 
meditational traits in Descartes’ work.23 
 
There are two main reasons why I believe this comparative study will be 
illuminating for our understanding of the style and form of the Meditations. Firstly, 
the historical and cultural proximity of Descartes to Ignatius points to a direct 
influence of Ignatius’ devotional writings on the formation of Descartes’ text: this 
will be discussed below. Secondly, numerous scholars have speculated on the nature 
and extent of the literary relationship between Descartes and Ignatius, and I hold that 
an attempt at the clarification of this somewhat obscure and confused area of 
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scholarly interest will enable us to understand better what Descartes’ main influences 
were, and therefore his intentions. 
 
At this point, therefore, an important consideration is ‘the question of how 
Descartes, as an intellectual resident of the seventeenth century, would have known 
and understood the devotional genre.’24 I think that the best way of approaching this 
is by splitting it into two questions. Firstly, how would Descartes have known the 
devotional genre? I aim to answer this by way of a biographical assessment of 
Descartes’ early life and education, in order to discern key influences. This chapter 
will deal with this first question. The second question, therefore, regards how 
Descartes would have understood the meditational genre, and this broader question 
will shape the rest of the thesis. I judge this to be a more complex question than the 
first, not least because of the range of opinion surrounding this topic, most of which 
has, really, been inconclusive. By first understanding how he would have known the 
genre, and in particular noting key influences, we are in a clearer position to assess 
how Descartes would have understood the genre. From there, the thesis will consider 
why he might have chosen to employ the meditative genre in his writing. 
 
Before I embark on the attempt to answer the first of these two, interrelated, 
questions, it is useful to consider how ‘meditation’ would have generally been 
understood in the time directly preceding Descartes’ era of writing. I think the 
following two definitions, both offered by key players in the meditational tradition of 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, encapsulate the understanding of the 
tradition at the time when Descartes was becoming aware of it. Firstly, the Jesuit, R. 
Father Vincentius Bruni, defined ‘meditation’ as  
 
Nothing els but a diligent and forcible application of the understanding, to seeke, and 
knowe, and as it were to tast some divine matter; from whence doth arise in our 
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affectionate powers good motions, inclinations, and purposes which stirre us up to the 
love and exercise of virtue, and the hatred and avoiding of sinne.
25
  
 
The religious motivation and devotional tone is evident, expressing clearly this 
tradition’s particular and uncompromising field of focus. This totalising experiential 
quest is driven only by a devotional desire.  St. François de Sales’ definition is 
therefore illuminating; by ‘meditation’, he understands ‘an attentive thought iterated, 
or voluntarily intertained in the mynd, to excitate the will to holy affections and 
resolutions.’26 The age-old meditational formula of ‘attentive thought’ leading to the 
changing of the ‘will’ is one which is a central premise of Ignatius’ Exercises, and 
will be shown to also inform Descartes’ Meditations. 
 
Ignatius and Descartes 
 
 It is important to consider how Descartes would have been familiar with the 
devotional work of St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556). Historically speaking, the 
suggestion of a connection between Descartes and the preceding meditative tradition 
is well-founded; Ignatius’ work represented the culmination of a meditational 
tradition that had been active for centuries, as illustrated above. Therefore, when 
considering the nature and extent of the literary connection between Ignatius and 
Descartes, it is important to keep in mind that Descartes, despite his reluctance to 
credit his influences, is inescapably a product of his tradition; although I will argue 
that certain literary aspects of his work display some form of originality due to their 
unusual nature, I am keen to stress that Descartes achieves this by a masterful 
blending of tradition and novelty, borrowing selectively, yet effectively, from the 
tradition in which he was steeped as a youth. 
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The purpose of this section is to establish, through contextualisation, a basic 
historical connection between Ignatius and Descartes. To do this, we need to look to 
Descartes’ early years and education in order to form an outline of how he would 
have come to know the work of Ignatius. From there, we can start to build on this 
basic connection to paint a gradually more detailed picture of what constitutes this 
relationship, and what we can conclude from it. 
 
An Enduring Education 
 
Beck reminds us that ‘it will repay us well to be puzzled at least by the word 
‘meditation’’.27 I think we need to be puzzled in a twofold way. Firstly, as will be 
explored later on this chapter, ‘meditation’ is a vague term, which denotes a wide 
and varied genre. For now, I am treating ‘meditation’ to mean what it meant to 
Descartes, in terms of how he would have understood it from his intellectual and 
religious background, in the early seventeenth century. As the thesis continues, 
‘meditation’ will come to mean a variety of things, depending on its usage; this 
broadening of its meaning will be vital in discerning not how Descartes was familiar 
with the meditational genre (that is the aim of this present section), but why he chose 
to employ it to shape the Meditations. Secondly, we must be ‘puzzled’ in the sense 
that due attention must be paid to the fact that Descartes’ text is labelled Meditations; 
this feature should alert us to something curious at play.  
 
At this stage, to discover what Descartes would have understood by the term 
‘meditation’, we need to look at his Jesuit education; this will enable us to 
comprehend what the devotional genre meant, in both theory and practice. Descartes 
attended La Flèche College from 1607; founded in 1604, this Jesuit college placed, 
alongside the curriculum of classical languages, philosophy and theology,
28
 an 
emphasis on ‘the spiritual development or religious training of the students’, which 
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culminated in an annual week-long retreat.
29
 Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises was the 
prescribed text for the retreat, to be closely followed throughout the week, directing 
the activities of the students. It was here, therefore, that Descartes would have 
become familiar with the devotional meditative text of the founder of the Jesuits, 
and, poignantly – as Stohrer points out – ‘at the very time that he was experiencing 
his first exposure to formal philosophical reflection’.30 The intertwining of these 
spiritual and philosophical themes in Descartes’ thought would prove to be highly 
significant. 
 
The important point to note at this stage, however, is that ‘the central feature 
of these exercises was the regular hours devoted to the practice of meditation.’31 I 
think we can surmise from this that the week of retreat, as the central focus of a 
Jesuit education, would have shaped Descartes’ understanding of meditation; what is 
more – and crucial to our exploration of Descartes’ relationship to the existing 
meditational tradition – is that Descartes would therefore have actively participated 
in this Ignatian style of meditation. Hence I agree with Beck’s conclusion that ‘we 
may fairly assume that the pattern of those six-day retreats must have coloured his 
associations of the word meditation.’32 Having had a Jesuit education steeped in 
meditation, Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises clearly left an impression on Descartes. For 
now, I will sketch the legacy of Ignatius. 
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Ignatius and the Spiritual Exercises 
 
Descartes would have known Ignatius as  
 
A saint, recently canonised, and celebrated throughout the world (with a splendid church 
soon to be dedicated to him in Rome), the founder of the most powerful religious order 
in Christendom, one of the giants of the Counterreformation, and precisely through his 
Exercises, a fountainhead of its new spirituality.
33
 
 
Born a Spanish aristocrat, briefly a soldier, and latterly the founder of the Society 
of Jesus in 1539, Ignatius drew on his own spiritual experiences in order to write the 
Spiritual Exercises, published in 1548. Spanning four weeks, but adaptable to shorter 
periods of time (Descartes would have been involved in a retreat lasting just one 
week),
34
 the Spiritual Exercises are best defined by Ignatius himself: 
 
By the words “Spiritual Exercises,” we should understand any method of examining our 
own conscience, and also of meditating, contemplating, praying mentally and orally, and 
finally of dealing with any other spiritual activities ... In the same way that walking, 
travelling, and running are corporal exercises, so preparing and disposing the soul to 
remove all inordinate attachments and, after they have been removed, searching and 
finding the will of God about the management of one’s life and the salvation of the soul 
are spiritual exercises.
35
 
 
The Spiritual Exercises are something of a ‘handbook’ of spirituality, through 
which we are led by Ignatius himself.
36
 As well as the text of the Exercises itself, 
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Ignatius supplies his reader with ‘annotations’,37 ‘some rules to be observed’,38 and 
‘some useful notes,’39so that the directors of retreats could follow their meditational 
master by way of a devotional manual.
40
 In this way, its core accessibility comes to 
characterise this meditational text; it is inclusive, ‘hav[ing] frequently been adapted 
in response to the backgrounds and circumstances of individual retreatants,’41and yet 
provides clear, step-by-step guidance, in prescribing a course of meditation, in order 
to effect a change in the individual. The changing of one’s will was evidently a 
central tenet of what meditation had become by this time; meditation was a method 
‘by which man is led to the possibility of conquering himself and deciding on a way 
of conducting his life that is free from harmful attachments’.42 
 
It is, of course, of paramount importance to understand that these Exercises are, 
essentially, Christian devotional meditations with an uncompromisingly religious 
theme. Furthermore, ‘the Exercises do not stand alone in their kind, but represent a 
summary and synthesis of efforts since the twelfth century to reach a precise and 
widely accepted method of meditation.’43 It will be vital that this is kept in mind as 
we delve deeper into the exploration of the literary relationship between Ignatius and 
Descartes. The aims of the two writers are fundamentally different.  As an attempt to 
build the edifice of a new philosophy on solid foundations, rather than an explicitly 
religious devotional text, Descartes’ work represents a key divergence in subject 
matter. 
 
Some Key Features 
 
There are a few key features characterising the Ignatian meditation that I think it 
helpful to briefly describe, in order to get a better idea of what constitutes the 
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Exercises. Firstly, it is set out clearly and methodically; Beck, for one, praises its 
‘logical coherence’.44 Covering four weeks, each day has its own itinerary, both 
explaining the wider theme, and detailing the specific instructions. Drawing on his 
own personal experiences, Ignatius ensures he is an attentive guide by providing a 
work of systematic precision. Its rigid structure, and the tone of instruction – for 
example, ‘a repetition has to be made of the previous Exercises’45 – give it something 
of a prescriptive character. Whilst Ignatius allows for individuals to complete it at 
their own pace – that ‘the Exercises must be adapted to the condition of the person 
who is making them’46 – beyond this concession, there appears to be little or no room 
for individual expression or the altering of the forms of the meditations themselves. 
As such, the Spiritual Exercises very much give the impression of being a manual to 
work through, under the direction of Ignatius, the guide, within the set amount of 
time that any given individual has put aside for retreat. 
 
A second remarkable feature is how the individual meditations revolve 
around, and centre on, the traditional Christian conception of ‘the three faculties’ of 
the soul: the memory, the understanding, and the will.
47
 Hatfield helpfully sums up 
the function of each: the memory, ‘including imagination, is used to contemplate 
various subject matters, such as original sin, hell, or the passion of Christ’; the 
understanding ‘draws implications on the object lesson’. All this is done ‘with the 
end of raising affections in the will ... and strengthening its resolve.’48 
 
The employment of the three faculties of the soul are reflected in the structure 
of the individual meditations in the Spiritual Exercises; each ‘exercise’ opens with a 
‘preparatory prayer’ and a number of ‘preludes’ (thereby using the faculty of the 
memory for ‘mental re-creation’), progresses into a number of ‘points’ (thereby 
employing the faculty of understanding), and culminates in a ‘colloquy’ (using the 
faculty of the will) to express a changing and redirection of the will from start to 
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finish. Ignatius instructs that sometimes the colloquy will ‘be like the conversation of 
a friend with a friend, or of a servant with his lord’,49 and at other times, it will take 
the form of unfettered praise and thanksgiving:
50
 the content is very much dependent 
on the theme of the individual meditation. 
 
The third distinctive feature is that the Spiritual Exercises are strongly 
imagistic. They have a particular emphasis on the imagistic representation of biblical 
episodes, enabling something of a ‘dramatisation’ of the meditational state. A prime 
example of this feature is the First Exercise of the First Week; the meditation opens 
by the instruction to bring about  
 
A certain mental re-creation of the place. It should be observed in this regard that 
during any meditation or contemplation of a corporal entity, for example of Christ, 
we shall see with a sort of imaginary vision a physical place representing what we 
are contemplating, for instance a temple or a mountain where we could find Christ 
Jesus or the Virgin Mary, and everything else that is related to the theme of our 
contemplation.
51
 
 
 Directly related to the theme, this technique of mental imaging ensures that 
the faculty of the memory is employed; the ‘mental re-creation’ enables the 
meditator to engage their imagination by visualising a scene and thereby wholly 
connect with the theme. However, whilst the Ignatian meditation actively employs 
the use of images, as central to his method, Descartes unreservedly scorns their 
illusory nature. Such differences will inform how we assess the relationship between 
the two writers. 
 
This is not an exhaustive account of the features that characterise Ignatius’ 
Spiritual Exercises, but it highlights some important ones. This is particularly 
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because they will assume significance, in terms of shedding light on the nature and 
extent of Descartes’ indebtedness to Ignatius. 
 
 This section has asked the question of how Descartes would have been aware 
of, and indeed familiar with, Ignatius’ key text, the Spiritual Exercises, by looking at 
Descartes’ Jesuit education, as a formative experience. It also introduced the 
character of Ignatius, and noted some central features of the Spiritual Exercises, 
which will be important considerations as the thesis progresses. I can conclude that 
the connection between the two writers is well-founded, and therefore a valid area of 
exploration in assessing the literary character of Descartes’ Meditations. Having used 
historical and biographical considerations to establish a basic connection, the 
question we now need to ask, therefore, is how are we to begin to understand the 
relationship between the two meditators and their respective ‘meditations’? 
 
 
Overstating the Ignatian-Cartesian Connection 
 
Having established a basic historical-biographical connection between 
Ignatius and Descartes, we now move on to the second section of this chapter, which 
will be concerned with beginning to assess the  nature and extent of the connection 
between the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. By approaching the issue from 
a negative angle, in this section I will be putting the spotlight on the problems 
created by overstating the connection between the two texts. 
 
 Vendler’s interpretation, I will argue, provides an example of how the 
overstatement of the Ignatian-Cartesian connection leads to the danger of 
misrepresentation of the texts.
52
 Vendler argues for a close connection between the 
Ignatian meditation and Descartes’ Meditations, claiming that Loyola’s influence on 
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the Meditations is ‘not just a matter of some similarities, but of basic conception, 
aim, strategy, and literary form.’53 As will become increasingly clear in the course of 
this thesis, I agree with Vendler’s general assessment of the Ignatian influence on the 
Meditations – that ‘the discovery of the Ignatian background of the Meditations 
ceases to be of mere historical interest.’54 – and I think that he draws attention to an 
important aspect of how we read Descartes’ work, that ‘it has important 
consequences for the philosophical understanding of Descartes’ principal work.’55 
 
 However, I claim that the way in which Vendler expounds the Ignatian-
Cartesian connection is misguided, and demonstrates too heavy a reliance on the 
Ignatian connection to inform his reading of the Meditations. The crux of the issue is 
encapsulated by Beck: ‘the contents of the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations 
are obviously different, nor is the final aim of the saint and the philosopher the 
same.’56 
 
Vendler’s study centres on the drawing of five broad parallels between 
Descartes’ Meditations and Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises. The first of these claims 
argues that ‘the structure and some of the basic moves of the first four Cartesian 
meditations conform to Loyola’s scheme for a meditation.’57 Secondly, Vendler 
holds that the end goal of the Meditations is ‘not merely to convince the reader of the 
truth of certain propositions,’58 but to effect a change of will. I agree with this 
proposition, and will develop this argument later on in the thesis. The third parallel 
drawn concerns the ‘choice’ at the end of the Fourth Meditation which constitutes the 
“climax” of Descartes’ text. Once again, I hold this view to be valid, and concurrent 
with Ignatius’ parallel emphasis on ‘choice’ in the Exercises. Fourthly, Vendler 
claims that Descartes’ creation of the demon and wax hypotheses are rooted in the 
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employment of Ignatius’ mantra of ‘age contra! (go against!)’,59 to act as ‘a 
counterweight to our inordinate inclination[s].’60  
 
The final broad parallel drawn by Vendler concerns how we view the 
Meditations; as akin to Ignatius’ Exercises, Vendler argues that Descartes’ 
Meditations is the way by which Descartes ‘fulfil[s] his mission in life’, due to the 
‘mystical experience-dream-pilgrimage-period of solitude’ pattern ‘mirrored’ by 
Ignatius.
61
 Essentially, I agree that this basic Ignatian pattern forms a parallel that is 
difficult to overlook – indeed, I have outlined these autobiographical similarities 
earlier in this chapter – but, as I am constantly keen to stress, I believe that the way 
in which each writer perceived their respective project, is fundamentally divergent. 
Whilst God arguably forms the centre of the Cartesian system in Meditations (though 
clearly this is dependent on how we view issues of apparent circularity, as will be 
discussed later on), and Descartes appears eager to emphasise his loyalty to the 
established ecclesiastical authority of his day, I am reluctant to accept the thesis that 
Descartes’ Meditations is a devotional piece, especially not in the ‘Ignatian’ sense. 
Indeed, in its crudest and most basically sketched form, it could be said that the 
difference in project between the two writers is thus:  Ignatius, in his meditational 
Exercises, aims to produce a prescriptive handbook of orthodox spirituality; it is a 
devotional piece. Descartes’, conversely, is challenging the universally accepted 
norm, – the ‘preconceived opinions’62 – embarking on the project of ‘deal[ing] with 
the foundations of First Philosophy in its entirety.’63 While aspects of his work may 
be ‘devotional’, in some sense, his aim of pure reflection and devotion is clearly not 
aligned with that of Ignatius. 
 
Thus, some qualification is called for. My discussion of Vendler’s presentation of 
apparent Ignatian-Cartesian parallels will focus on the following questionable points, 
in order to illustrate that Vendler’s approach is misguided, as it exaggerates the 
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connection between the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. I will refute, firstly, 
Vendler’s claim that the Meditations, like the Spiritual Exercises, is prescriptive; and 
secondly, his claim that the ‘days’ of the Meditations are parallel to the ‘weeks’ of 
the Exercises. Furthermore, I will hone in on a few specific aspects within these 
points, which, I believe, need to be subjected to closer scrutiny. It is these in 
particular which are of concern to me, in my attempt to form a picture of what the 
connection between the two writers looks like. 
 
 By highlighting these two particular aspects of Vendler’s argument, I will 
use them as a springboard into examining why such paralleling of structure, form, 
tone and content is problematic; simply put, why it is not tenable to paint this picture 
of the textual connection. I will consider in turn the issues of ‘prescription’ and the 
presentation of ‘time’ in the two texts. It is vital to note that this analysis is not 
intended to dismiss a connection entirely – indeed, quite the converse; I suggest that 
acknowledging a connection between the Ignatian meditational tradition and 
Descartes’ Meditations is central to our understanding of his work – but rather to 
think about how to make such comparisons fruitful, to inform how we view the text 
as whole. However, to overstate the connection is to approach the complex issue in a 
misguided way. 
 
In this section of the chapter, therefore, I focus on the aspects of Vendler’s 
analysis that do not stand up to scrutiny. The (dual) aim is to show how the 
temptation to overstate the connection between Descartes’ Meditations and the 
Ignatian Exercises is, firstly, based on some fundamental misapprehensions of 
Descartes’ project; and, secondly, can lead to a misrepresentation of the relationship 
between the two writers. I hope to be more roundly representative of Vendler’s 
article when exploring possible reasons for Descartes’ choice of the meditational 
genre, later in this thesis. For now, I will use what I see as central errors in Vendler’s 
article to illustrate where scholars on one end of the Ignatian-Cartesian relationship 
spectrum go wrong. 
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The Problem of Prescriptivism 
  
Vendler claims that ‘Descartes views the Meditations not just as a text to be 
read and understood, but as a prescription for mental exercises to be performed by 
the reader.’64 I firmly believe, along with Vendler, that the Meditations are not just a 
text to be read, but rather an exercise to be performed. However, I object to 
Vendler’s specific claim that Descartes’ text is prescriptive.  
 
Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises are clearly prescriptive; as aforementioned, they 
are set out as a devotional manual, clearly and purposefully structured, to be used as 
a sort of ‘handbook’ on spiritual retreats. This clear purpose explains the instructive 
tone that characterises the work; the retreatant is given a set amount of time to work 
through the exercises laid out by Ignatius, with every moment accounted for. Whilst 
it can be adapted for the needs of different types of people, the basic instruction is the 
same. The exercises are to be followed closely and faithfully, in order to reach the 
(uncompromising) goal of a change of will and, thereby, outlook and lifestyle. This 
prescriptive tone which arguably characterises the Exercises often serves to render 
the text rather rigid.  
 
At the outset of each exercise, for example, Ignatius sets out what topic will 
be covered, and in what way; as an illustration of this observation, the Second 
Exercise of the First Week is presented as ‘a mediation about sins that, with the 
preparatory prayer and two preludes, includes five articles or points, and a colloquy 
at the end.’65 What is required for the preparatory prayer, and then the two preludes, 
is stated (the first prelude being, in this case, a ‘mental re-creation’ of a place, 
followed by the second, ‘made by asking for what we are looking for here’). (As an 
aside, it must be noted at this point that I am not disputing that the individual 
meditations in Descartes’ Meditations evidence affinity with these Spiritual 
Exercises; now, I am simply pressing the point that Ignatius’ Exercises are, to some 
                                                             
64 Vendler, 198 
65 Ignatius, Spiritual Exercises, [55], 21 
34 
 
extent at least, characterised by their prescriptive nature, as evidenced in the structure 
of the particular exercises). With constant precision, the content of each ‘point’ is 
detailed in the same instructive manner as the preparatory prayer and the two 
preludes. Finally, the content and nature of the ‘colloquy’ is spelt out, often using the 
instruction, ‘the characteristic of the colloquy is to be like...’,66 the detail depending 
on the theme of the individual exercise. For example, for the First Exercise of the 
First Week, Ignatius prescribes that  
 
The colloquy will be made by imagining Jesus Christ in front of me, attached to the 
cross. Then I should look within myself for the reason why the infinite Creator 
Himself became a creature, and deemed it worthy to come from life eternal to a 
temporal death for my sins … furthermore, the characteristic of the colloquy is to be 
like the conversation of a friend with a friend, or of a servant with his lord … at the 
end, the Our Father will be said.
67
 
 
There appears to be little room for free expression, even in the colloquy, 
which is the expression of praise which the meditation culminates in. I find this 
contrasts dramatically with the colloquies found in the Meditations. As will be later 
discussed, the basic structure of the individual meditations in Descartes’ text can be, 
at least loosely, paralleled with the Ignatian meditational pattern, for the individual 
exercises in his spiritual manual. However, if, as emulative of the Ignatian 
meditational order, Descartes’ individual meditations end in a colloquy, of sorts, then 
I cannot see much affinity between them. Vendler claims, for example, that the 
colloquy at the end of the Third Meditation
68
 is ‘his most beautiful Colloquy: one 
that could have been written by St. Ignatius himself.’69 I have to disagree with 
Vendler’s assessment here, regarding the colloquies in the two respective works. 
Yes, Ignatius instructs the retreatant to conclude each exercise in a colloquy of 
reflection and praise; and yes, the first four of Descartes’ meditations, at least, end in 
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something which resembles a colloquy. However, the key difference between the two 
texts, in this respect, is the tone of their respective colloquies. 
 
 Descartes’ colloquies appear as considered, yet natural-seeming, periods of 
reflection, forming a neat way of ending one meditation, and setting the scene 
effectively for the next. These colloquies, besides their structural role, have literary 
impact; their tone varies from one meditation to the next, depending on what 
reflections he has on the day just passed (the colloquy ending the First Meditation, 
for example, is all doom and gloom – in ‘fear that [his] peaceful sleep may be 
followed by hard labour when I wake, and that I shall have to toil not in the light, but 
amid the inextricable darkness of the problems I have now raised’70 – whereas the 
colloquy ending the Second Meditation is focused on the need to engrain the lessons 
of the day ‘more deeply in [the] memory’).71 The ending of the Third Meditation is 
particularly worthy of mention for our purposes. Widely perceived as the ‘epiphany’ 
of the Meditations, this colloquy acts as the culmination of the strenuous efforts of 
the first three meditations; what has been established now leads Descartes to  
 
Pause ... and spend some time in the contemplation of God; to reflect on his 
attributes, and to gaze with wonder and adoration on the beauty of this immense 
light, so far as the eye of my darkened intellect can bear it.
72
 
 
This experience is clearly a deeply personal one, and Descartes does not hold 
back in his praise-filled contemplation of the God he holds to be at the centre of his – 
necessarily unified – system. Descartes is not self-consciously prescribing to his 
reader how they should or will necessarily react to the establishment of key 
arguments that Descartes feels he has put forward convincingly, culminating in this 
point of epiphany; rather, he seems to be anticipating that such a reaction to this 
situation might take the form of a colloquy of praise and adoration. Where Ignatius 
actively instructs his retreatant in how to respond according to the development of 
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the meditation, Descartes is recounting a personal experience, in personal terms, in 
relation to the whole text. When his reader chooses to ‘meditate with [him]’, he is 
conceiving his quest in terms of following Descartes’ personal journey, and – 
Descartes hopes – reaching similar ecstatic conclusions. Furthermore, the reader 
cannot help but feel involved in the experience, due to the supreme eloquence of the 
colloquy, particularly as it gains much of its – both literary and philosophical – 
impact from its relation to the meditations preceding it, and from the speculation of 
what will follow from it. 
 
When compared to this free-flowing expression of enlightenment on 
Descartes’ part, Ignatius’ colloquies appear rather contrived. As the work of the first 
three meditations can be viewed as culminating in this highly emotionally charged 
moment, its drama assumes even more effect. Ignatius’ colloquies, however, are 
relatively standardised from the start, and therefore seem to lack the impact of 
Descartes’ ‘moment of enlightenment’ at the end of the Third Meditation. Towards 
the end of one particular exercise, Ignatius writes: 
 
I should burst out in an exclamation, due to a vehement commotion of emotions, 
wondering deeply at how all creatures (mentioning each singularly) have sustained 
me for so long and have kept me alive until this exact moment…73 
 
 While there appears to be a close textual affinity between this part of the 
Exercises and the culmination of the Third Meditation in Meditations – both display 
an intense and dramatic expression of praise, in fulsome language – what sets them 
apart is that Descartes’ colloquy has a quality of spontaneity that Ignatius’ seems to 
lack. The fact that he has instructed his reader to react in this way, to mark the 
culmination of the particular exercise, prevents it from having the natural occurrence 
and highly personal character of Descartes’ moment of discovery and subsequent 
free-flowing praise. 
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Furthermore,  although these meditational exercises are rooted deeply in the 
saint’s personal experience (as discussed earlier in this chapter), the prescriptive tone 
which characterises each exercise results in one getting the impression that the 
instructive element triumphs over any personal expression of enlightenment. If the 
retreatant is told exactly what their reaction to this exercise must be, and therefore 
how the colloquy should look, it rather detracts, somewhat ironically, from the 
individual reflection and praise element that is integral to the exercise. 
 
I think that, presented with this comparison, de Blacam’s exploration of the 
Ignatian motivation will prove illuminating.
74
 de Blacam notes ‘the soldierly 
austerity of his writing’,75 suggesting that the commanding tone, communicating 
clearly the essentials of the exercise, derives from Ignatius’ military background (we 
recall that the Spiritual Exercises were written by Ignatius during a time of recovery 
from an injury sustained in military service
76
). The Spiritual Exercises thereby 
represent ‘the work of a man of action turning to the battles of the soul.’77de Blacam 
extends this analogy; in Ignatius’ assuming authority, the clearly prescriptive tone 
which Ignatius employs can be paralleled to something of a ‘military style’, such that 
the text is ‘a volume of standing orders for a spiritual army.’78 This is a helpful way 
to view the prescriptive tone we encounter in the Spiritual Exercises, because not 
only does it bring in the historical-biographical threads of Ignatius’ story, but it also 
paints a picture of how Ignatius himself might have understood his transition from 
soldier to saint: the expression of this transformation of role is expressed in effective 
literary form in his meditational work. 
 
Consistently expressing his instructions with clarity and minimal rhetorical 
flourish, the one performing the exercises is left in no doubt of the nature, theme and 
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itinerary of the task ahead of them, in each individual meditation, which, together, 
comprise the Spiritual Exercises as the handbook. I would agree with de Blacam’s 
assessment that 
 
The plan of meditation of each “Exercise” reads like the orders of the day, or the 
orders for an action, written by a commanding officer for his well-disciplined men to 
follow out. All has been considered and planned, to the last detail, and what is to be 
done set forth with the minimum of words.
79
 
 
Descartes, too, was a soldier – firstly, in the army of the Netherlands; and 
later, in the army of the Catholic League, in the Thirty Years War,
80
 a ‘critical period 
in his life’81 – but whatever the similarities in their military backgrounds, the 
soldierly tone struck by Ignatius is anything but imitated by Descartes (although it 
would seem that Descartes’ thought thrived under military conditions82). Descartes’ 
text, I would argue, is quite the contrary; it has a fluidity and a dynamism that 
Ignatius’ lacks. The narrative form of the Meditations, in stark contrast to the list of 
instructions which constitutes the Spiritual Exercises, gives the meditation what 
Flood calls ‘formal dynamism’.83 Flood helpfully notes that  
 
What commentaries ... typically neglect to report is the fact that these arguments are 
knit together by a narrative synthesis without which the Meditations would be a 
fragmentary, unsuccessful pastiche of discrete arguments.
84
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This integral holistic aspect will be explored further in the next chapter; for 
now, it is sufficient to note that an appreciation of the narrative dimension of the 
Meditations should inform how we view its relationship to the Ignatian style of 
meditation, with its stark, prescriptive presentation.  
 
Not only does it arguably rely on this dynamism for its very coherence, it also 
bestows on the text a lack of prescription; the form is, by its very nature, looser than 
that of Ignatius’ exercises, and because it is not presented as a treatise or list of 
propositions, it resists prescription by virtue of its fluidity and lack of commanding 
tone. Furthermore, this idea goes full circle; I would hazard to suggest that this 
dynamism is due to the lack of prescription; his aim is not to prescribe, but to 
describe, doing so in the hope that selective readers will have the tenacity, willing 
and natural intellectual curiosity to follow and discover his conclusions for 
themselves. 
  
This leads us on to an important area of consideration in examining how the 
Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations relate to each other. It seems to me that 
whether either text is prescriptive, or not, in tone, is linked to the aspect of 
accessibility that further widens the gulf between Ignatius and Descartes. Vendler 
writes that ‘Ignatius insists that the full Exercises are not for everyone’;85 however, 
as we noted earlier, Ignatius permits – indeed, suggests – the adaptation of his 
meditational exercises to meet individual retreatants’ various situations. In his 
‘Annotations’, Ignatius clearly states that 
 
The Exercises must be adapted to the condition of the person who is making them, 
for example, according to his age, his education, and his aptitude, in order not to 
demands from someone who is uneducated, of weak spirit, or in poor health more 
than what he can handle without inconvenience and can assume for his profit. 
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Equally, just as anyone becomes interiorly better disposed, that which will help him 
the most must be offered to him.
86
 
 
 Ignatius goes on to say: 
 
Likewise, if he who gives the Exercises sees that someone is of a feeble nature and 
limited in his capacities, so that only mediocre progress and fruits could be expected 
from him, then it would be more than enough to prescribe to this one some of the 
above lighter Exercises...
87
 
 
I quote Ignatius as length here because this passage encapsulates Ignatius’ 
attitude towards his readers; his standards are high, and he expects strong individual 
effort, but it appears to be enough that a prospective meditator is willing and 
dedicated, regardless of their intellectual standings, among other factors. Descartes, 
conversely, does not appear to suffer fools gladly. As expressed in his ‘Preface to the 
Reader’, his standards are uncompromising:  
 
The judgement of many people is so silly and weak that, once they have accepted a 
view, they continue to believe it, however false and irrational it may be ... I do not 
expect any popular approval or indeed any great crowd of readers. On the contrary I 
would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from all preconceived 
opinions. Such readers, as I well know, are few and far between.
88
 
 
This mark of exclusivity which defines the Meditations from the outset may 
shed light on why Descartes’ text does not assume a prescriptive form or tone. If 
Ignatius is pitching his Exercises to an audience of varying intellectual levels, 
education, health, and so on, then the prescriptive tone of his exercises assumes vital 
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importance; his Spiritual Exercises are universally accessible, and so need to be 
easily accessed by way of form as well. Acting as this ‘commanding officer’,89 
Ignatius presents his readers with a clear itinerary to follow, and a pattern to emulate. 
Since Descartes from the outset specifies the type of reader he expects to follow him 
– an elite class of intellectually driven individuals – his role of guide is one of 
description, not of instruction; he relies on their already-existing and already-equal 
level of intellectual commitment and ability to follow him, and find for themselves 
the truths which lie innate in the human mind. 
 
It has become clear, therefore, that to parallel the Spiritual Exercises and the 
Meditations on the basis of a shared tone of prescription is misguided. Obviously 
keen to resist presenting his ideas as a treatise, or a list of propositions, Descartes’ 
use of narrative dynamism, and the apparent free-flowing spontaneity of his 
colloquies, are in stark contrast to the rigidity of the Ignatian meditational form.  
Essentially, Ignatius’ exercises take the form of a prescription, with their 
commanding, instructive tone, whereas Descartes gives us something looser and less 
prescriptive to work with. Furthermore, it was noted that the issue of prescription is 
linked to that of accessibility; both writers employ different levels of prescription in 
order to convey their project in different ways, depending on who is the anticipated 
audience. The prescription – and lack of – thus takes on a literary function, and the 
writers use it to very different ends. 
 
The Structural Parallels, Regarding Time 
 
 A second parallel I wish to pick up on is Vendler’s alignment of the use of 
time in the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. Vendler states that ‘like the 
Exercises, the Meditations are divided into ‘days’’90; furthermore, he argues that the 
‘days’ in the Meditations parallel the ‘weeks’ of the Spiritual Exercises. My concerns 
with this alignment – which Vendler says is ‘a superficial but very telling 
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similarity’91 – are twofold; firstly, it is not completely clear that Descartes does 
divide his Meditations into literal ‘days’, and secondly, even if he does, I argue that it 
is done to very different effect to what Ignatius intended in the Spiritual Exercises. 
Essentially, the reader could interpret the ‘days’ in the Meditations rigidly, as 
denoting literal days, but I suggest that to interpret the days thus is to miss an 
important deeper – and subtler – element at work in Descartes’ text. 
 
Firstly, then, I do not think that Descartes ‘very clearly, and very explicitly’ 
allots days to the Meditations, in any literal sense at least. Superficially, the evidence 
does indeed point to Descartes envisioning ‘days’ as the providers of structure in the 
text, denoting individual meditations. Vendler details the references to ‘days’ in the 
Meditations – the ‘pertinent passages’92 – and he rightly notes that this suggests the 
existence of ‘days’ in the work, like in Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises. It is therefore 
fitting to briefly outline, like Vendler,
93
 these key points of reference. 
  
The First Meditation refers to a ‘today’, in which Descartes has ‘expressly rid 
[his] mind of all worries and arranged for [him]self a clear stretch of free time.’94 
The ending of this first meditation suggests the end of a day, with references to 
‘sleep’; with this nod to night time, Descartes expresses, as the culmination of a 
day’s doubting of his previously established opinions, a  
 
Fear that [his] peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labour when [he] wake[s], 
and that [he] shall have to toil not in the light, but amid the inextricable darkness of 
the problems [he] ha[s] now raised.
95
 
 
 In a similar fashion, the Second Meditation opens with a reference to 
‘yesterday’s meditation’, as an expression of despair – ‘I can neither put [those 
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doubts] out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them’ – yet also one of resolve: 
‘nevertheless I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I 
started on yesterday’.96 The start of the Fourth Meditation refers to ‘these past few 
days’,97 in order to summarise what has been explored, and established up until this 
point; ‘today’s meditation’ ends with a reflection on what has been established in this 
fourth ‘day’.98 ‘A few days ago’,99 which features in the opening paragraph of the 
Fifth Meditation, is used as a way of casting the mind back to the original doubts 
which constituted the first meditation, and from that, looking forward to see what 
progress can now be made from this current point: to ‘see whether any certainty can 
be achieved regarding material objects.’100 Once again, the Sixth Meditation makes 
reference to ‘the last few days’, whereby the ‘exaggerated doubts ... should be 
dismissed as laughable’ because of what has been established as solid by Descartes’ 
process of meditative reasoning.
101
 
 
It will not escape one’s notice that there appears to be no explicit reference to 
time – in the form explicated above – in the Third Meditation. This is telling; if the 
use of ‘days’ in the Meditations is to be aligned with that in the Spiritual Exercises, 
surely consistency is needed, in order for a parallel to be drawn. While it is tempting 
to draw a parallel on the basis of five out of the six meditations referring to ‘days’, 
the absence of time references in the third meditation preclude this parallel from 
constituting a valid ground on which to build a connection between the structural 
elements of the two texts. Furthermore, Descartes does not say anything explicitly 
about the presence of days; unlike the Ignatian form, Descartes does not entitle the 
individual meditations ‘Day One...Day Two...Day Three’, and so on. The examples 
given above are just vague references to time from which a pattern of ‘days’ could be 
inferred. I am not denying that the evidence points to some sort of day-defined 
structure of the Meditations; I simply dispute that it is enough to constitute a textual 
connection. The parallel drawn by Vendler, in an attempt to emphasis the influence 
of the Spiritual Exercises on the Meditations, is neither consistent nor extensive 
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enough to constitute a substantial alignment of the two texts. I would suggest that if 
Descartes intended his Meditations to be defined by individual days, then he 
probably would have made explicit mention of it at some point; or at least made sure 
that the pattern of days was followed by, and evidenced in, each individual 
meditation. While Ignatius divides his Spiritual Exercises into weeks, into clear 
sections of time– forming, arguably, the heart of his system – by making constant 
reference to ‘weeks’, and entitling each week ‘First Week ... Second Week ... Third 
Week...’ and so on, Descartes’ text lacks these explicit points of reference by which 
one could suggest that he intends to be purely literal when talking about time. 
 
I would suggest that this lack of extensive parallels regarding the time frame 
of the Meditations, and that of the Spiritual Exercises, shows that any division of the 
Meditations into days, whilst arguably identifiable through the other five 
meditations, is not of central importance to our understanding of the text. What is 
becoming clear is that time is used more for literary purposes than acting as 
references to time-specific happenings. My claim is that the ‘days’ suggested in the 
Meditations do not exist to be taken literally, but rather to constitute a stylistic 
feature and a literary device. 
 
Secondly, therefore, I do not think it really matters whether Descartes intends 
his ‘days’ to be taken literally, as he uses his hints at time to very different effect to 
Ignatius’ attitude towards time in the Spiritual Exercises. I agree with Beck that, in 
the Meditations, the ‘diurnal division is ... fundamentally a literary device’.102 
 
 Because of the specificity, rigidity and prescriptive nature of the Spiritual 
Exercises, I suggest that the clear division of the exercises into days and weeks are 
necessary for the project. Ignatius’ text is, as we noted earlier, highly structured; he 
needs this set sequence and time frame in order to prescribe clearly to his followers. 
The ‘weeks’ give the whole exercise its structure, as they determine both the theme 
of the meditation (for example, the First Week centres around the ‘Consideration of 
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Sins’; the Second focuses on the ‘Life of Jesus Christ’; the Third on ‘the Passion’, 
and the Fourth and final week revolves around the ‘Resurrection and Ascension’),103 
and how the exercises might be adapted for the variety of retreatants Ignatius 
anticipates. Ignatius does mention that ‘although these four parts are called Weeks, 
they do not necessarily have to be seven or eight days long’;104 my point, therefore, is 
not that we should understand the whole exercise to last a month (in contrast to the 
loose sense of time I have identified in the Meditations), but rather that the use of 
‘weeks’ and ‘days’ in the Spiritual Exercises determine the structure and form, and 
allow it to be the closely guided – indeed, prescriptive – meditational handbook that 
it is. Essentially, Ignatius has a need for specific timings to guide the text – even if 
slight deviation, according to personal situation, is permitted – in a way that 
Descartes has not. Indeed, we could look to Descartes’ own experience of the 
Ignatian retreat to inform this point; it seems that the retreat participated in while at 
La Flèche lasted only a week. The exercises are therefore adapted to fit within the 
specified time restraints of Holy Week; the detailed structure of these exercises owes 
it coherence to the time frame set in place in relation to the whole programme of 
exercises. The whole point of the Spiritual Exercises being the way they are, I would 
argue, is that the retreatant is provided with a clear guide, working through a set 
itinerary, dependent on days and weeks, albeit flexible within these guiding 
parameters. 
 
 Descartes’ work, on the other hand, as aforementioned, alludes more loosely 
to a series of ‘days’ in the Meditations. The point deriving from this is that the 
references to time interspersed throughout text, and the division of the text into 
individual ‘meditations’, have a primarily literary function; any literal interpretation, 
while arguably valid, is not centrally relevant to his task. 
 
No one, of course, supposes that there necessarily passed twenty-four hours between 
the time of Descartes’ writing one meditation and his writing the next; we wouldn’t 
be in the least surprised to discover that the Second Meditation had been written 
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immediately upon the heels of the First, or that five weeks had passed between the 
times of their writing. “Yesterday” is not deictic with reference to any time of 
writing.
105
 
 
Without wishing to divert the course of this discussion by considering, as 
Kosman does, the ‘fictional’ element of the Meditations, I wish to use Kosman’s 
comment on time to inform our understanding of what Descartes means by his 
suggestion of ‘days’ in the text.106 Rather than a literal representation of the ‘days’ of 
Descartes’ personal meditational experience, or a prescription for others, it seems 
that Descartes’ references concern a general sense of continuity. As noted above, the 
lack of specific reference to particular ‘days’ is made up for, as it were, with other, 
vaguer, references to time, such as ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, and so on. It has been 
established that these references are insufficient to align the texts of the Spiritual 
Exercises and the Meditations; now it remains to be established what function these 
references do fulfil. 
 
It is clear from the outset that Descartes is not looking to write a devotional 
manual of spirituality, but the grounding of a new metaphysics. The functions of the 
references to time are literary devices which also hold, I believe, philosophical 
significance. It is a cleverly conjured bit of technique from Descartes that he might 
loosely employ an element of Ignatian meditation, and use it to his purposes; the 
expounding of his philosophical ideas. I will explore this further by suggesting that 
there are two – interrelating and interactive – functions of the allusions to time in the 
Meditations: firstly, the provision of clarity and lucidity of presentation. The division 
of the Meditations into individual meditations – done so by the hinting at ‘days’ in 
the text – ensures that the reader can easily identify where they are in the exercise, 
and is provided with natural breaks, so as to reflect on a theme before continuing on 
to the next meditation. The second function is the provision of continuity and 
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cohesiveness in the text as a reflection of Descartes’ project. It is this second function 
that I want to explore in more depth. 
 
The allusions to time imbue the Meditations with a sense of both continuity 
and cohesiveness. By giving the impression of a succession of days, a continuity of 
project is created; in ‘today’s’ meditation, Descartes reflects and builds on the work 
of the meditation of ‘yesterday’, in order to ensure the cumulative nature of the 
project. By conveying to the reader in this way that progress has been made, 
Descartes ensures a sense of continuity, and thereby ensures the communication of a 
cumulative argument. Indeed, this idea of the building of an argument, created by the 
literary device of ensuring continuity within the text and between the individual 
meditations, mirrors – and thereby simultaneously expresses – the building of the 
‘edifice’. Descartes’ statement at the opening of the First Meditation, regarding the 
need ‘to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations’ 
in order to find a sure basis for knowledge,
107
 uses the imagery of an edifice to 
enable the reader – and probably also Descartes himself – to visualise the need for a 
sure foundation of knowledge on which to build, in order to create a systematic 
presentation of the sciences. The constant cross-references made between the 
individual meditations serve, firstly, as a reminder to the reader that Descartes’ 
system-building is cumulative process, requiring strong continuity between the 
different elements; and secondly, as a way of ensuring that the reader is following in 
the steps of Descartes, and treating the project as necessarily cumulative.  Thus, 
continuity is provided through Descartes’ playing with the idea of time. For example, 
Descartes’ declaration that ‘nevertheless [he] will make an effort and once more 
attempt the same path which [he] started on yesterday’ – is a way of establishing 
continuity, employing the metaphor of following a path. Time is here used as a 
literary device to enable progression, and to carry the reader with him. As a guide, 
Descartes carries his reader with him on this journey of progression, ensuring that the 
continuity provided by the references to time gives the text a momentum, increasing 
both its natural propulsion – as a meditational process – and the force of his project 
to persuade and convince. 
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Foundationalism and Coherentism in the Meditations 
 
Furthermore, the continuity provided by the allusion to ‘days’ in the 
Meditations also bestows on the text a sense of cohesiveness. By the very nature of 
the work, if the individual meditations were presented as separate parts, with no 
indication as to how the constituent elements interact or build on each other, I think 
Descartes’ system would lack coherence. It requires something to guarantee that the 
system is held together and is progressing in a cumulative way. Alluding to elements 
of time in the text prevents fragmentation. This is especially important in light of 
Descartes’ unstinting emphasis on the unification of themes within his system; 
indeed, his whole project could be said to centre on this unification. Indeed, 
Descartes states in his ‘Preface to the Reader’ that ‘those who do not bother to grasp 
the proper order of my arguments and the connection between them, but merely try 
to carp at individual sentences ...will not get much benefit from reading this book.’108 
Descartes is here pointing to the importance of the holistic and unified nature of his 
text. Flood puts it well, in relation to this integral aspect of Descartes’ thought in the 
Meditations: 
 
The intelligibility of the work as a whole, its success as a piece of philosophy, and ... 
its significance for Western philosophy all depend upon the unity of the Meditations 
as a narrated whole.
109
 
  
I am aware that I expressed above the importance of understanding the 
cumulative nature of the text in a foundationalist sense, and yet am now drawing on 
the vitally unified character of Descartes’ system. What I mean to do by this shift in 
emphasis is to draw attention to the shifting emphases in the Meditations, in terms of 
epistemological method: at play is a movement from a foundationalist emphasis to 
assuming more of a coherentist-type structure. To unpack this a little, I suggest that it 
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does not matter whether the work remains consistently foundationalist throughout, in 
line with what is alluded to in Descartes’ statement of intent, regarding the ‘edifice’ 
of knowledge. That Descartes’ intention is to ‘demolish everything completely and 
start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all’110 is 
uncompromisingly foundationalist, serving to introduce the foundationalist scheme 
that would ensue. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy offers a helpful 
definition of foundationalism as an option in epistemology, as 
 
The view that knowledge and epistemic (knowledge-relevant) justification have 
a two-tier structure: some instances of knowledge and justification are non-
inferential, or foundational; and all other instances thereof are inferential, or 
non-foundational, in that they derive ultimately from foundational knowledge or 
justification
111
 
 
Furthermore, foundationalism ‘receives an extreme formulation in Descartes’ 
Meditations … [it] requires that foundational beliefs be certain and able to guarantee 
the certainty of the non-foundational beliefs they support.’112 Indeed, the cumulative 
effect created by the way in which the first few meditations hang together ensures 
that the foundations are laid. The first two meditations follow faithfully (and 
necessarily) this foundationalist scheme, with the dream argument, the demon 
hypothesis, and the test of the wax following each other in quick succession, each 
building on the conclusions of the last. However, once the cogito and the ‘Trademark 
Argument’ for the existence of God (of the Third Meditation) begin to interact, 
giving rise to the famous allegations of circularity within the acclaimed 
‘foundationalist’ project, the foundationalist project suddenly does not seem so 
foundationalist after all. This could spell the end of Descartes’ project at this point, if 
strict fidelity to foundationalism is the reader’s expectation. However, on a more 
sympathetic reading, it could also spell the moment of transition from one 
epistemological option to another; because the elements of the cogito and the 
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existence of God appear interdependent, what may actually be happening is that they 
evidence something of a shift towards coherentism. Coherentism can be defined as: 
 
In epistemology, a theory of the structure of knowledge or justified beliefs according 
to which all beliefs representing knowledge are known or justified in virtue of their 
relations to other beliefs, specifically, in virtue of belonging to a coherent system of 
beliefs.
113
 
 
 I think that if we keep in mind throughout our reading that Descartes is 
aiming for a systematic project of unification in his establishment of First 
Philosophy, the hints at a shift from foundationalism to coherentism in the course of 
Descartes’ project become more plausible. Furthermore, this will receive expression 
later on in the thesis, as a possible defence of the Meditations against the charge of 
circularity. Of course, Descartes would not conceive of his task exclusively in terms 
of these two abstract options; furthermore, he would not view them as dichotomous. 
Rather, at work is a shift in epistemological emphasis from the foundationalist to the 
coherentist. 
 
The foundationalist project thus appears to give way to coherentism, but this 
does not undermine the validity of his system: not in itself, at least. As expressed 
above, Descartes provides an interesting fusion of foundationalism and coherentism. 
His project relies, in its infancy, on establishing solid foundations; later on, as the 
scheme grows in confidence, it comes to rely, for its comprehensiveness, on more of 
a coherentist system. The common conception of the difference between 
foundationalism and coherentism is expressed thus: 
 
Foundationalism portrays justification as having a structure like that of a building, 
with certain beliefs serving as the foundations and all other beliefs supported by 
them. Coherentism rejects this image and pictures justification as having the 
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structure of a raft. Justified beliefs, like the planks that make up the raft, mutually 
support one another.
114
 
 
However, I find this house/raft dichotomy too crude a distinction to act as 
representative of the complex epistemological structure at play in the Meditations. 
On the contrary, I find the image provided by Flage and Bonnen a helpful 
illustration, when they talk of the existence of ‘lateral supports’ within Descartes’ 
system. The foundationalist ‘house’ imagery is retained, but is given something of a 
coherentist aspect: 
 
Whatever else might be said about the house of knowledge built on a Cartesian 
foundation, the method requires that the various elements which are discovered 
should be systematically integrated, and that one should clearly perceive how the 
various elements of the epistemic structure support one another.
115
 
 
 What I have just been discussing is a very basic presentation of a complex 
conception of the relationship between foundationalism and coherentism within the 
Meditations. It is useful, though, if only briefly, to highlight how Descartes’ project 
is ‘not just a discrete set of philosophical puzzles’, but ‘an integrated structure of 
thought’.116 As such, it illustrates how a perceived dichotomy between 
foundationalist and coherentist epistemological systems is misguided, and 
misguiding. That ‘historically, coherentism is the most significant alternative to 
foundationalism’ is important;117 the prevailing attitude seems to be that of pitting 
foundationalism and coherentism against each other. This risks shutting off a whole 
option in understanding Descartes’ thought sympathetically (which, of course, is a 
key element in this thesis), and, as will receive greater attention later on, this could 
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be an important part of attempting to rescue Descartes’ project from fatality by 
circularity. 
 
Furthermore – and to return to the theme from which we briefly diverged – 
the allusions to ‘days’ in the text act as a sort of adhesive, holding the different 
elements together in a single, unified system of philosophy.  What I have argued 
through this divergence is that this technique is also reflective of the epistemological 
shift from foundationalism to coherentism that I see as identifiable – if rather subtle – 
in the text. Holding the elements together, the references to time imply an aspect of 
interrelatedness within the system that allows, again, for the progression of the 
meditational piece. 
 
Connectives and Continuity 
 
What is more, we would do well to look at the use of other words which 
Descartes uses to act as points of reference. While the references to ‘days’ are, 
ultimately, inconclusive – although we have established that they have a useful 
literary function – Descartes provides his reader with other references to order, so as 
to ensure the continuity discussed above. Using, phrases such as ‘now’, ‘to begin 
with’, ‘next’, ‘at this point’, ‘it remains for me to consider...’, and so on, Descartes 
provides us with constant referents, so we can keep our place. This is an important 
way of Descartes fulfilling the guiding function which we established earlier to be an 
integral feature of the Ignatian meditational form. Descartes may not be prescriptive 
– at least, certainly not to an Ignatian extent – but he ensures that his reader is 
suitably guided, and helped through the stages. It is a written piece, after all, and 
Descartes appears sensitive to what might be perceived as authorial responsibilities. 
It is these referents which bestow orderliness on the text; not in an obvious, 
superficial sense – like the labelling of ‘days’ would create – but in terms of how 
Descartes guides his reader. Whilst we are very much reading Descartes’ text – or, 
more accurately, performing those exercises – as individual meditators, as a result of 
self-effort (on which Descartes places uncompromising emphasis), our very 
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participation on this journey at all depends on our being taken on it by a guide: the 
author.  
 
The argument thereby seems to rely on what Lang calls ‘connectives’, and 
these connectives further reflect the structure of the argument; in this way, they 
bestow another dimension of coherence on the development of the project.  Once 
more, these connectives mirror the building of the argument, emphasising the 
aforementioned cumulative aspect which is integral to the Meditations. As Lang 
states, ‘the order of proof is inseparable from the determination of its force’.118 It is 
these subtle literary devices – often so subtle that they could easily go unnoticed – 
that hold the text together, fulfilling a guiding function, providing clear referents 
with which to map the text, and allowing the ideas to be presented in a mutually 
coherent way. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The twofold aim of this opening chapter was, first of all, to establish a basic 
connection between St Ignatius of Loyola and Rene Descartes; and secondly, to 
demonstrate the danger of overstating the textual connection between Ignatius’ 
Spiritual Exercises and Descartes’ Meditations. In doing this, it serves as an 
introduction to the issues at stake in considering issues of style and genre in the 
Meditations. To this end, the first part of this chapter outlined the history of 
meditational writing from ancient times to the sixteenth century; it introduced the 
writings of Ignatius, and its key features; and suggested how Descartes would have 
been familiar with the Spiritual Exercises. The second part of the chapter considered 
how the connection between the two texts could be misrepresented by overstatement; 
through a critique of Vendler’ thesis – which argues for a very close connection 
between the two texts – it has been established that overstating the textual connection 
                                                             
118 B. Lang, ‘Descartes and the Art of Meditation’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1988), 23 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237529 (17/03/2011)  
54 
 
is misguided.  As such, the focus of the chapter moved from the historical-
biographical to the literary. 
 
However, Vendler’s emphasis on the literary connection between the 
Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations drew attention to an important point: that 
there does appear to be some connection between the two texts. This constitutes a 
central tenet of my thesis. In critiquing his claim, however, I was demonstrating that 
his overstatement of the connection is not helpful in determining the nature of the 
relationship between the texts. Drawing superficial parallels is not the most fruitful 
way to interpret what is already presenting itself as a subtle and complex literary 
connection. That there is some connection between the texts is, by now, clear; from 
here on, the thesis will consider the motivation for, and the nature of, this connection; 
and the connection with the wider meditational tradition. 
 
Consequently, the scene is set for a more thorough investigation into the 
influence of the Ignatian meditational genre on the Meditations. The following two 
chapters, therefore, consider how best to appropriate the connection between the 
Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. As such, the next chapter will give 
Descartes himself a ‘voice’; by examining his correspondence with his 
contemporaries concerning the style and structure of the Meditations, it will focus on 
what Descartes says, regarding his choice of style and genre. This will shed light on 
his possible motivations for favouring the meditational mode; namely, that it is a 
viable alternative to ‘disputation’, the mode of philosophical argument favoured at 
the time of writing. The third – and final – chapter will build upon the findings of the 
second chapter, and shift the emphasis from what we can derive from Descartes’ and 
his contemporaries’ findings on the text to more of a speculative reconstruction of 
what it might look like to read the Meditations as ‘meditation’, presenting a case for 
why Descartes might have actively chosen the meditational mode to inform and 
present his work; not simply as a viable alternative to other philosophical modes of 
argument, but as valuable and fruitful in itself. 
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Chapter Two: Meditation over Disputation 
 
‘The very fact that someone braces himself to attack the truth makes him less suited to 
perceive it’.119 
 
Introduction 
 
In investigating the dual question of the extent to which Descartes is indebted 
to the Ignatian meditational genre, and his possible motivations for doing so, looking 
directly at what Descartes himself has to say, regarding his choice of genre, seems a 
good place to start. The Objections and Replies – intended to be read alongside the 
text of the Meditations itself – yields much fruit which is valuable to the 
investigation at hand; and it does so in two senses. Firstly, the sections from 
Descartes’ Replies (compiled by Mersenne120), regarding the issue of Descartes’ 
choice of genre, present us with a reason in itself: that meditation is superior to, and 
therefore a way of shunning, disputation. This will be the concern of the first part of 
this chapter. Secondly, one can infer from this section of the Replies more 
information about Descartes’ attitude to genre, and his reasons for thinking thus.  
 
This is why I wrote ‘Meditations’ rather than ‘Disputations’, as the philosophers 
have done, or ‘Theorems and Problems’, as the geometers would have done. In so 
doing I wanted to make it clear that I would have nothing to do with anyone who 
was not willing to join me in meditating and giving the subject attentive 
consideration.
121
 
  
 This chapter will focus directly on what Descartes has to say regarding his 
choice of style, using as its starting point the above quotation. What is interesting 
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about his comments is how the issue of style is framed not in terms of asserting the 
positive value of meditation for his system, but rather in terms of his attitude towards 
the dominant methodology of philosophy at the time of his writing. As such, his 
comments regarding choice of style are not concentrated on ‘meditation’ itself, but 
rather on the motivations for seeking an alternative. To this effect, this chapter 
proposes that one could read Descartes’ choice of style as an assertion of 
independence from the dominant modes of ‘disputation’ or ‘theorems and problems’. 
Therefore, it will explore his attitude towards the epistemological options available 
to him at the time, in terms of the dominant modes of reasoning which characterised 
philosophical investigation. 
 
The chapter will open with a focus on the reasons behind Descartes’ apparent 
antipathy towards disputation in particular, before moving into a broader 
consideration of Descartes’ understanding of distinction between analytic and 
synthetic types of philosophical reasoning. This distinction is central to Descartes’ 
conception of his philosophy, but is presented in somewhat obscure terms. I will seek 
to clarify this obscurity, and by doing so, explore how a working interpretation of 
this important distinction sheds light on how Descartes intended the Meditations to 
be read. 
 
Descartes’ attitude towards syllogistic reasoning – a stalwart of the 
disputation mode – and its place in his system will then be assessed. Finally, the 
above elements will be used to inform a case study of the cogito, in terms of the 
method of its establishment in the Meditations. That Descartes vehemently denies 
any claims that the cogito is formed syllogistically will prompt a consideration of 
why syllogism would not be a viable epistemological option. The role of ‘intuition’ 
(held in contrast with ‘deduction’), and the issue of the movement of knowledge 
from the ‘particular’ to the ‘general’, will serve as reasons to support Descartes’ 
insistence that syllogism is not the way by which the cogito is established. 
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 The chapter will pay close attention to the primary sources of Descartes’ 
comments on his choice of style, in order to paint a more helpful picture of what his 
understanding of style constitutes, and how it is expressed. I will quote Descartes 
extensively in this section; I think this is important, in order to reveal the subtle 
nuances and crucial qualifications that form his case for meditation. As 
aforementioned, sections from the Replies will be drawn upon as a key source for 
what Descartes himself claimed to be the reason for naming his text Meditations. 
Indeed, in understanding why Descartes sought an alternative option to the dominant 
modes of philosophical reasoning of the time, light is shed on the reasons why 
‘mediation’ specifically was chosen as the style of his work. This will be the concern 
of the third chapter. What he understands by these different modes of reasoning is 
highly illuminating for our consideration of his choice of the meditational genre for 
his writing. The third chapter, therefore, will be concerned with constructive 
speculation as to why Descartes wanted to associate himself with the meditational 
tradition of writing. This speculative account relies on examining the subtler 
‘echoes’122 of the meditational style in the text of the Meditations, looking at how his 
use of it plays out in various ways in the text. As such, this second chapter will 
consider what Descartes says explicitly about style; and the next chapter will, 
effectively, shift from the explicit explanations to some other, more implicit, reasons. 
 
Distaste for Disputation 
 
To repeat the quotation above, Descartes is seen to be getting to the heart of 
the issue: 
 
This is why I wrote ‘Meditations’ rather than ‘Disputations’, as the philosophers 
have done, or ‘Theorems and Problems’, as the geometers would have done. In so 
doing I wanted to make it clear that I would have nothing to do with anyone who 
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was not willing to join me in meditating and giving the subject attentive 
consideration.
123
 
 
Interestingly, the striking thing about this passage is that Descartes frames his 
reason in terms of what he does not want to be perceived as, and what he does not 
wish to be associated with. Here, Descartes is making a point about disputation, 
rather than about meditation. The issue is thus framed in negative terms – what is 
wrong with disputation – rather than presented as a positive assertion of the merits of 
using the meditational style in itself. In time, we can glean from this some thoughts 
about the positive value of meditation – but let us start, as Descartes does here with 
meditation in the “negative” context of shunning the disputation form of 
philosophising. 
 
The first thing to mention is that ‘Disputations’ are clearly presented as the 
dominant mode of philosophising at the time that Descartes would be writing the 
Meditations. Descartes seems keen to draw a clear distinction between his style and 
that of the ‘philosophers’ and ‘geometers’, and assert the superiority of the 
meditation over the disputation. The implication here would seem to be that 
disputation is not to be associated with a willing attitude, or ‘attentive consideration’. 
Essentially, it is portrayed as somewhat incompatible with the ‘serious’ thinking 
Descartes likes to refer to – and which he would like his work to be associated with. 
The way in which he frames the issue here, therefore, leads us to view his choice as 
one motivated by disfavour towards alternative modes of presentation, rather than 
favour towards ‘meditation’ itself. As will become clear, there is probably far more 
to the story than this; and I begin to argue in the latter part of this chapter that 
Descartes’ motivation for choosing meditation as a mode of writing is to be viewed 
more  as a positive decision, as it was compatible with the Cartesian project. Indeed, 
I argue that his choice of ‘meditation’ has a vital integrity for the text. 
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For now, though, it is important to consider why Descartes surrounds the 
mode of disputation in particular with negative connotations, rather than assert the 
positive value of meditation; and why he frames the issue in negative terms at all. 
The key question is, simply put, what does Descartes dislike – or distrust – about 
disputation as a form of reasoning? To define disputation: 
 
A disputation identifies a specific philosophical or theological issue for discussion 
and provides the structure for an informed and reasoned judgment about it ... With 
the arguments on both sides of the question in hand, the master is then ideally 
positioned to deal with both the conceptual issues raised by the question and the 
hermeneutical problems presented by the historical tradition. Academic philosophers 
held disputations in their classrooms and at large university convocations, and they 
used the form for the literary expression of their ideas.
 124
 
 
The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction 
 
What is most relevant to our purposes here is to note that ‘disputation’, as a 
dominant method of philosophical reasoning at the time of Descartes’ writing, falls 
within the broader category of the general form of reasoning that Descartes refers to 
as  ‘synthesis’.125 To suggest that his work is akin to a ‘disputation’ would be to 
express allegiance – indeed, submission – to the synthetic mode of reasoning. 
Descartes draws a distinction between two forms of reasoning, analytic and 
synthetic, stating that  
 
As for the method of demonstration, this divides into two varieties: the first proceeds 
by analysis and the second by synthesis.
126
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Although this distinction will be important in informing us as to the 
motivations of his disinclination towards forms of writing such as ‘Disputations’ –  
an example of the ‘synthetic method of writing’127 – what must be taken into account 
(and borne in mind throughout this section of the chapter) is that it is difficult to find 
in Descartes’ writings a clear account of how he understands this distinction, beyond 
his favouring the analytic method. Beck offers a sympathetic view of this, suggesting 
that Descartes’ account of the distinction is symptomatic of a more general problem 
in epistemology: he comments that ‘analysis … is a very influential word, but that 
does not mean that it is a very clear notion. Descartes himself uses the word 
loosely’.128 While I agree with Beck’s observation, I still find it surprising that 
Descartes can afford to use the word ‘loosely’, considering he makes it clear that his 
use of analysis in the Meditations – as an alternative to synthesis – is of central 
importance for writing this work in the way that he did.  
 
Turning to Descartes’ comments on the analytic-synthetic distinction, 
therefore, he describes the synthetic method as one which  
 
Demonstrates the conclusion clearly and employs a long series of definitions, 
postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if anyone denies one of the 
conclusions it can be shown at once that it is contained in what has gone before, and 
hence the reader, however argumentative or stubborn he may be, is compelled to 
give his assent.
129
 
 
The analytic method, on the other hand,  
 
Shows the true way by which the thing in question was discovered methodically ... 
so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, 
he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had 
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discovered it for himself ... if he fails to attend even to the smallest point, he will not 
see the necessity of this conclusion.
130
 
 
It is a ‘rather obscure distinction’ that Descartes presents to his reader – and, I 
would add, one which resists any straightforward interpretation.
131
 Furthermore, the 
helpfulness of this distinction is limited by an identifiable bias; he claims that ‘this 
method [synthesis] is not as satisfying as the method of analysis, nor does it engage 
the minds of those who are eager to learn’, and that analysis, on the contrary, ‘is the 
best and truest method of instruction’, without really telling his reader why. 
Consequently, perhaps we would do better to look elsewhere for an elucidation of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction, in terms of how it is to be understood in Descartes’ 
work. To draw on the twentieth-century writer Gueroult’s work on Descartes, I find 
his understanding of the distinction helpful. He comments that it is 
 
Properly understood as a distinction between two orders of presentation, namely the 
order of knowledge ... and the order of being. The order of knowledge, or the 
analytic order, follows the order of things as they are known … [whereas] “the order 
of being, or the synthetic order ... proceeds in quite a different way … presenting 
things in an order that reflects the real dependencies that things have with respect to 
one another, independent of our knowledge of them.
132
 
 
The lack of clarity characterising Descartes’ use of the terms ‘analysis’ and 
‘synthesis’ means that our interpretation of their role in the Meditations must be – at 
least partly – speculative. What is clear, however, is that the distinction between 
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analysis – as ‘the best and truest method of instruction’133 – and synthesis is central 
to Descartes’ justification of method. 
 
Descartes’ description, and Gueroult’s clarification, seem to amount to an 
understanding that the Meditations in analytic mode would begin with the cogito, 
whereas a synthetic account would start with God, because Descartes comes to 
realise that his system of philosophy and everything in it, and established by it, has 
God as its cause, something which for Descartes is not discovered in itself until the 
Third Meditation. The importance of the analytic method to Descartes is that it 
underlines how crucial it is for his project that things are presented in the order in 
which he has discovered them; not how they might be presented in a method 
informed by hindsight. As Beck puts it, analysis is ‘not merely a setting-out of truths 
already discovered – but is, on the contrary, an account of the actual road of 
discovery. Analytic argument reflects the creative work of the author’s mind’.134 
 
Furthermore, that analysis ‘shows the true way by which the thing in question 
was discovered methodically’ highlights a theme which runs through this thesis; that 
there is a strong, and necessarily, cumulative nature to Descartes’ project, and that 
the order of discovery is therefore very important to the project’s intelligibility. That 
‘synthesis, on the other hand, does not follow ‘the natural order’ of discovery, but is 
a logical arrangement of the truths already discovered by analysis’ points to why 
Descartes regarded analysis as the truest method of discovery.
135
 As will be explored 
in more detail in the third chapter, the idea of the Meditations as ‘thought in 
progress’ is integral to the project (particularly in the context of assessing the 
influence of traditional meditational practice on the text). Furthermore, Descartes 
would therefore – consequently – regard analysis as the truest method of 
presentation, in view of the importance of the text gaining its power and impact from 
the element of reader participation in the project. This was briefly alluded to in the 
first chapter, and will be seen to play out further in the third chapter. 
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 What is becoming clear, therefore, is that analysis as method is of central 
importance to the structure, style and progress of the Meditations. Indeed, if we take 
into account alternative understandings of the method of analysis, we can see why 
Descartes was so keen to stress the distinction between the analytic and synthetic 
modes of reasoning: the method of ‘analysis’ has an inherent stylistic and attitudinal 
consideration.  Grayling understands it thus:  
 
Although there is no defining method of analysis, there can be said to be a defining 
manner ... any careful, detailed and rigorous approach which throws light on the 
nature and implications of our concepts.
136
 
 
 Generally speaking, ‘analysis’ as a term can be used  
 
To express allegiance to rigour and precision ... philosophical analysis is best 
understood by analogy with analysis in chemistry, as being a process of investigation 
into the structure, functioning, and connections of a particular matter under 
scrutiny.
137
  
 
Though referring to ‘analysis’ in general, the above comment can apply to 
Descartes’ reasoning as well. By asserting the supremacy of the analytic over the 
synthetic method of reasoning, perhaps Descartes is emphasising to his reader the 
importance of the way his text is read. I mean this in two ways, as there is an 
interrelating dual aspect to Descartes’ understanding of the analytic method, in 
relation to the Meditations. First of all, the foundationalist tenor of Descartes’ 
project, particularly in the opening few meditations (as explored in the first chapter), 
requires that the reader considers each point step-by-step, and as a point in itself, 
which relies only on what has already been firmly established. Where the synthetic 
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method would seek to – essentially – retrospectively validate a proposition stated, the 
analytic method works on a ‘real-time’ plane of discovery, such that the elements are 
gradually built up. And, as will be seen presently, this method allows Descartes to 
identify the Archimedean point of the cogito. Basically, Descartes’ foundationalist 
project can be seen to rely on the method of analysis. Secondly, in presenting 
analysis as preferable to synthesis, Descartes is making a subtle statement as to the 
attitude he expects from, and looks to engender in, his readers. Because analysis 
denotes an attitude of detailed attentiveness to each individual point in an argument, 
the reader must strive for such an attitude that is fitting to this method of 
philosophical discovery. If the reader ‘is to derive the full benefit from [Descartes’] 
work’, they must demonstrate ‘detailed scrutiny’, as well as an appreciation of the 
whole,
138
 meaning that each point must be approached with attention to detail and an 
attitude of serious scrutiny, if the work is to be really understood, at least in the way 
in which Descartes wishes it to be. What this means for analysis in terms of 
meditation will be explored later on in this chapter. 
 
The relationship between these two points appears to consist in that if one 
reads with the right attitude – of detailed, serious attentiveness – then they will be 
reading in such a way that the foundationalist project can progress in the way 
Descartes envisaged. Put another way, the attitude required, and the project laid out, 
can be said to mirror each other; as such, the text itself and the very act of reading are 
mutually reflective elements. Furthermore, this observation illustrates a wider point, 
which I have been alluding to throughout this thesis; that method, style and attitude 
are necessarily interactive and interdependent elements in Descartes’ project in the 
Meditations. 
 
 
Furthermore, the way in which Descartes describes the superiority of a 
method of analysis over that of synthesis reveals to us again an emphasis which 
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pervades Descartes’ writing both in, and regarding, the Meditations. For him, 
analysis is ‘the best and the truest’ way because 
 
If the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, he will 
make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it 
for himself.
139
  
 
And this, for Descartes, is the aim of writing the Meditations: to encourage 
his reader to look within and discover the same conclusions for himself. When we 
turn our attention, in due course, to the individualistic emphasis in the Meditations, 
this will manifest itself as a central element to Descartes’ motivation for writing this 
text. This emphasises the strong experiential tenor to Descartes’ Meditations. The 
Meditations charts the personal discovery of things, and so, on this reading, the 
foundationalist character which propels the project as a whole, from the outset. 
 
Tried and Tested 
 
 What is more, Descartes seems to be speaking from experience when he so 
emphatically expresses his allegiance to the analytic method over and against the 
synthetic. Indeed, Beck suggests something of a biographical reason as to why 
Descartes displays such antipathy against disputation in particular as a form of 
reasoning: 
 
During his final three years at La Flèche ... Descartes would have been present at, and 
probably taken part in, the disputations, the actus, set dialectical battles with a defendens 
and impugnans, the whole elaborate and courteous exchange of syllogisms, distinctions, 
contradistinctions, and subdistinctions in defence or attack of set theses ... his 
condemnation of the syllogism as sterile and useless is well known, and it is obvious 
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why he wished to avoid any confusion whatsoever between his own method of 
philosophizing and the disputation or actus syllogisticus.
140
 
 
We know that, beyond his ‘preparatory studies’, Descartes spent three further 
years at La Flèche, in order to complete the course in philosophy. It was a heavily 
Aristotelian philosophical education, the teachers educating their students under the 
dictum, ‘in matters of any importance let him not depart from Aristotle’.141 That ‘the 
Syllabus required professors to respect Aristotle, even when they did not follow his 
teaching, and to refrain from presenting novel or dangerous views to their 
students’,142 evidences an apparently conservative and narrow approach to 
philosophy that was employed in this seventeenth century Jesuit educational 
establishment. Indeed, this seems to have – perhaps unsurprisingly – engendered in 
the young Descartes a need to thoroughly question, to challenge. An exploration of 
the context of the genesis of his opinions regarding methods of philosophical 
reasoning sheds valuable light on the content of Descartes’ views, particularly those 
found in the correspondence following his writing of the Meditations; such an 
exploration, therefore, is necessary. These three years of philosophical study at La 
Flèche were to form his opinions on what he saw as the shortcomings of philosophy 
as it was understood in the early seventeenth century. Clarke notes that 
 
Descartes’ teachers were required to work within the principles and concepts proposed 
by Aristotle, and they were equally required to communicate to their young pupils the 
teaching of the Catholic Church as it was defined by Rome.
143
 
 
 As such, it makes sense that this emphasis on the dominance – and authority – of 
Aristotelian philosophy developed in Descartes a suspicion of, and a distaste for, the 
prevalent methods of reasoning in philosophy: at La Flèche, they had been tried, 
tested, and , by the young Descartes, found wanting. This is particularly clear in the 
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case of logic, a central element of this traditional, Aristotelian, philosophical 
education: 
 
When I was younger, I had studied a little logic as part of philosophy ... I noticed that, in 
the case of logic, its syllogisms and most of its other rules are more useful for explaining 
to someone else what one already knows than for learning them or even ... for speaking 
uncritically about things that one does not know.
144
 
 
As a method of discovery, the dominant modes of philosophical reasoning were 
found by Descartes to be simply inadequate; and discovery was what Descartes was 
in search of. This quotation brings us on to an important issue in the consideration of 
Descartes’ choice of meditation as a way of refuting disputation, within the wider 
area of synthetic reasoning. 
 
‘Doomed to sterility’? Descartes and Syllogism 
 
Syllogistic reasoning formed an important part of disputation; as noted above, the 
disputations Descartes would have participated in at La Flèche were formed of an 
‘elaborate and courteous exchange of syllogisms, distinctions, contradistinctions, and 
subdistinctions in defence or attack of set theses.’145 It is becoming increasingly clear 
that Descartes’ attitude towards the use of disputation in philosophical reasoning was 
one of antipathy. Where ‘syllogism’ itself fits into this consists in his needing to 
distance himself, in the Meditations, from the disputation style of reasoning, of 
which syllogism was a key element. 
 
A stalwart of the disputation method, syllogism is an Aristotelian-derived 
method, best defined by Aristotle himself, as 
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A discourse in which, a certain thing being stated, something other than what is stated 
follows of necessity from being so.
146
 
 
A typical Aristotelian example of syllogistic reasoning would be the following 
process: 
 
‘All men are mortal; Greeks are men; therefore Greeks are mortal’.147 
 
In its classical form, a syllogism is composed of a universal premise, a particular 
premise, and a conclusion, in this order. When the particular premise is added to the 
universal premise, the conclusion is what is deduced from this calculation. 
Williamson lends illumination to Aristotle’s definition by explaining that 
 
A syllogism may be defined as a piece of reasoning analysable into: 
1. three categorical propositions such that the third (the conclusion) is presented as 
following from the first two (the premises), and 
2. three terms such that one of them (the middle term) is common to the premises, the 
second is common to the conclusion and one of the premises, and the third is 
common to the conclusion and the other premiss.
148
 
 
What must be clarified at this point is that Descartes does not dismiss outright all 
use of syllogism in philosophical reasoning, and there are times when he would even 
employ it himself. The second argument for the existence of God, in the Fifth 
Meditation, is a prime example of this. Using a form of the ontological argument 
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originally conceived of by Anselm, Descartes argues from an analogy with the form 
of a triangle that God must, necessarily exist: 
 
It is quite evident that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than 
the fact that its three angles equal two right angles can be separated from the essence of a 
triangle, or than the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley.
149
 
 
Indeed, Descartes explains in his Replies how this particular piece of reasoning 
works. Provoked by another’s apparent misunderstanding, he expounds his theory in 
syllogistic terms: 
 
My major premiss was this: ‘That which we clearly understand to belong to the nature of 
something can truly be affirmed of that thing’ ... the minor premiss of my argument was: 
‘yet it belongs to the nature of God that he exists.’ And from these two premises the 
evident conclusion to be drawn is the one which I drew: ‘Therefore it can truly be 
affirmed of God that he exists.’150 
 
Whether it is a methodology subconsciously engrained in him by the rigorously 
scholastic philosophical education he received at La Flèche, and therefore 
unwittingly expressed in the Meditations, or whether it is a purposeful move, 
consciously employing syllogistic methodology where he deems necessary in his 
philosophical project, is far from clear; Descartes is notoriously difficult to pin down 
when it comes to identifying a straightforward conception of method.  
 
Such considerations as noted above are not central to the point at hand in any 
obvious way, but they do serve an important purpose, in illustrating that Descartes 
did have a place – indeed, an important one – for syllogistic reasoning within his 
philosophical system as expounded in the Meditations. As such, it shows that we 
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must be careful, in our assessment of Descartes’ apparent attitude towards what he 
would have known as the traditional, dominant methods of philosophical reasoning, 
that we do not frame him as hypocritical, as he employs a method he seems to 
deplore. What is important at this point is that it is a very specific aspect of 
Descartes’ Meditations that is being focused on here, our discussion is being formed 
by Descartes’ Replies, regarding particular aspects of his Meditations.  
 
Besides, Descartes’ use of syllogistic reasoning becomes more plausible as the 
Meditations progresses. This relies on an initial suspicion of syllogism that we see 
play out in the formation of the cogito. Once this foundational point of knowledge 
has been established, the building up of the edifice can use epistemological 
techniques that do not require self-validation (as the establishment of the cogito did), 
but rather only need rely on what has gone before: what has already been established. 
As will become clear in our consideration of the formation of the cogito (below), 
syllogistic reasoning was not a conceivable option for Descartes, if he was looking 
for a self-evident, self-validating foundational point to his system; but it becomes 
more conceivable as the foundational system is built up. 
 
To say, therefore, that the Meditations as a whole evidences Descartes’ antipathy 
towards syllogistic reasoning would be inaccurate; it is the first few meditations in 
the text which evidence an insistence on Descartes’ part not to be associated with, or 
his procedure of discovery framed as, syllogistic reasoning. This really comes into 
play when we look at the formation of the cogito in the Second Meditation. As such, 
it will be used as something of a case study, to determine how Descartes’ 
understanding of, and attitude towards, syllogistic reasoning informs his process of 
philosophising.  
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The Cogito 
 
A consideration of the formation of the cogito will illuminate why Descartes was 
often resistant to his work being labelled as syllogistic reasoning. It will also 
illuminate the different aspects of methods of philosophical reasoning which have 
been touched on so far in this chapter, to show why Descartes was keen to find an 
alternative to dominant philosophical methodology.  
 
The establishment of the cogito is a pivotal moment in the Meditations; the 
discovery that his thinking gives rise to his existence is expressed by Descartes as the 
foundational point he has been searching for. In order to fulfil the foundationalist 
project stated at the outset – ‘to demolish everything completely and start again right 
from the foundations ...to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and 
likely to last’151 – Descartes 
 
Must define the set of self-evident beliefs and show that its membership is both 
certain and extensive enough to support the rest of our knowledge about the world. 
His claim to certainty about his thought and existence is the initial move in his 
attempt to do so.
152
 
 
To do so, Descartes conveys this key moment thus: he states that it is 
impossible for it to be that 
 
I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything 
very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.
153
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Descartes has reached this point by applying extensive doubt to his thinking, 
working under the premise that ‘anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will 
set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false’, until he reaches a point which 
either reveals ‘something certain’ or being ‘certain that there is no certainty.’154 The 
role of doubt is something that will be considered in more depth in the next chapter; 
this is simply a brief outline of how the cogito is established, at a basic level. Since 
Descartes has purged his mind of all preconceived opinions, and is engaged in a 
provisional but extensive distrust of the senses, his quest is to find one fixed, 
immovable point by which he can attain some certainty; and from this, rebuild the 
edifice of knowledge, having as its foundation a stable point of surety. He ‘can hope 
for great things if [he] manage[s] to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain 
and unshakeable.’155 Descartes therefore stakes a huge amount – indeed, at this stage 
at least, the survival of his project of metaphysical discovery – on the establishment 
of the cogito, as he believes it to constitute the Archimedean point in his thinking, 
and the universal point of departure. As such, ‘Descartes’ claim to certainty about his 
thought and existence is central to his general program in epistemology.’156 
 
Although a central notion to the Cartesian project in many different ways, 
what is important to our discussion here – how Descartes is, initially at least, hostile 
to the concept of syllogistic reasoning being associated with his philosophical project 
– is how vehemently Descartes denies that the cogito is established by way of 
syllogism. In insisting that syllogistic reasoning should not – indeed, could not, if the 
cogito was to have any coherence – be used to produce the cogito, he separates 
himself further still from the dominant tradition of philosophical reasoning, which he 
would have encountered in his education at La Flèche, and the expectations of which 
he would encounter through his correspondence after writing the Meditations. The 
strength of the expectation to adhere to this method of proposition-making was 
arguably what led to the strength of Descartes’ insistence that the foundations of his 
system be properly foundational, and therefore inhospitable to the syllogistic 
method. Indeed, it was inconceivable to him that his Meditations could progress if 
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the Archimedean point was established in this way. Therefore, the question of why 
the nature of the cogito precludes the employment of syllogistic reasoning will be the 
concern of the remainder of this chapter. 
 
The point I want to make here, in line with Descartes’ claims, is that the way 
he establishes the cogito and communicates it to his reader relies precisely on its not 
using syllogistic reasoning. His argument hangs together in such a way that for him 
to reason the cogito in syllogistic fashion would, in the context of his project, be 
incomprehensible and – effectively – nonsensical.  
 
When we become aware that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion which 
is not derived by means of any syllogism. When someone says ‘I am thinking, 
therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a 
syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the 
mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, 
he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premiss ‘Everything 
which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case 
that it is impossible that he should think without existing. It is in the nature of our 
mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular 
ones.
157
 
 
To begin to understand what Descartes means by this defence of his method 
against the onslaught of syllogistic expectations, it is helpful to break this down a 
little, by identifying two key points raised by Descartes in this rich, but dense, 
quotation. 
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The Role of Intuition 
 
Firstly, the establishment of the cogito as the foundational knowledge 
Descartes takes it to be relies on its being a piece of intuitive knowledge rather than a 
deduced one. If it is to be a ‘primary notion’, in the context of Descartes’ 
foundationalist project, it must be ‘self-evident’ and therefore known only by ‘a 
simple intuition of the mind.’158 
 
To unpack the key terms of this statement, one needs to recognise what 
Descartes meant by something being intuitively known. In Descartes’ words, 
‘intuition’ is ‘the indubitable conception of a clear and attentive mind which 
proceeds solely from the light of reason’, i.e. it does not depend on any 
presuppositions, premises or, indeed, any prior knowledge at all. 
159
 The concept is 
best explained when held in contrast with ‘deduction’: ‘intuition is distinguished 
from deduction by the fact that it does not involve a movement of thought through a 
series of inferences and by its immediate self-evidence’.160 Deduction, on the other 
hand, is ‘the inference of something as following necessarily from some other 
propositions which are known with certainty’, i.e. deductive knowledge depends on 
presuppositions, premises which are known with certainty. Descartes does not, up 
until this stage, know anything with certainty, and therefore the cogito is not built, 
and therefore not reliant, on any pre-existing knowledge and therefore not on any 
premise. In Descartes’ words, ‘the items which are put forward first must be known 
entirely without the aid of what comes later’. This is a central tenet of Descartes’ 
foundationalist programme in the Meditations; at this point, therefore, the principle 
of the cogito derives its credibility only from what has gone before – what has 
already been established with certainty – which is to say, a blank slate. That the 
cogito is known by way of intuition, and not deduction, is thus vital to the Cartesian 
project. Essentially, therefore, for the cogito to be ‘self-evident’, therefore, relies on 
its being intuitively known, rather than known through a process of deduction.  
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Descartes states that ‘the first principles themselves are known only through 
intuition, and the remote conclusions only through deduction’.161 This distinction 
between intuition and deduction is thus a cornerstone to Descartes’ philosophy in the 
Meditations, as it demonstrates why the cogito, as intuitively known and self-evident, 
is so important. Essentially, its intuitive and self-evident nature means it can 
constitute the foundation that Descartes has been in search of; his project can 
progress from there, as it is the first step to building the new edifice of knowledge: 
‘having completed the systematic undermining of his earlier beliefs, Descartes begins 
to rebuild his epistemic world.’162 
 
A key element of the cogito, in terms of it being intuitive, is that it constitutes 
a single thought. The cogito could easily be read as one proposition (I exist...) that is 
the consequence of another proposition (I think...), and therefore not as properly 
intuitive or self-evident, and therefore not truly foundational – at least not in the way 
that Descartes is aiming for. Even to conceive of the cogito as composed of two parts 
of one proposition is to divide it too much. Descartes is keen, therefore, to emphasise 
that ‘I exist’ is not inferred from the premise ‘I think’, but rather constitutive of the 
same proposition (I am thinking, therefore I exist...), being simultaneously intuited; 
in one movement, the knowledge of his thinking becomes the knowledge of his 
existing. The points, although in some respect retrospectively divisible into two 
components, cannot be conceived of as separately intuited parts of the proposition, 
for if this were so, they would not be intuited in any proper sense. Markie conveys 
the issue neatly: 
 
Descartes presents his immediate inference from his thought to his existence as a 
single piece of knowledge; it is the first principle of his philosophy. His point seems 
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to be that in one act of intuition, he grasps the premise and immediately infers the 
conclusion.
163
  
 
A key aspect of the cogito as intuition, therefore, is that ‘I think’ and ‘I exist’ 
are simultaneously intuited, and therefore form a single, self-evident and properly 
basic proposition, which can act as the self-validating Archimedean point Descartes 
understands – indeed, needs – it to be. Hence what is vital to consider in the case of 
cogito is how the movement from thought to existence can constitute a single, 
intuitive moment: it rests on its being simultaneous. To quote Markie again: 
 
Descartes intuits the self-evident proposition that he thinks and simultaneously 
immediately infers that he exists. His knowledge that he thinks is intuitive in the 
primary sense of being self-evident and entirely noninferential; his knowledge that 
he exists is intuitive in the extended sense of being immediately inferred from the 
simultaneously intuited premise that he exists.
164
  
 
He goes on to explain that 
 
The knowledge of his thought is intuitive since it involves his grasping a self-
evident, noninferred premise, and his knowledge of his existence is intuitive since it 
involves his immediately inferring that he exists from the simultaneously intuited 
premise that he thinks ... Descartes presents his immediate inference from his 
thought to his existence as a single piece of knowledge; it is the first principle of his 
philosophy.
165
 
 
 This issue of the role of intuition in Descartes’ writing – particularly in the 
context of its distinction from deduction – has been one of contention, and there is 
clearly much more that could be discussed on this topic. However, these technical 
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issues do not form the central concern of this thesis, and as such, will not be lingered 
upon. It is enough to appreciate on this basic level that the distinctions Descartes 
makes, and takes pains to emphasise, are vital to an understanding of the motivation 
behind his project as a whole, and more particularly, behind his choice of style. This 
chapter has explored the proposition that Descartes chose meditation simply as an 
alternative to the ‘disputation’ style of philosophical reasoning which prevailed at the 
time of Descartes’ writing. In using the cogito as a focus (establishing the existence 
of the self as a thinking thing), it has become clear that, because of Descartes’ 
distinction between intuition and deduction, the foundations of his project are rooted 
in an insistence that the syllogistic reasoning commonly found within disputation is 
not a provider of certainty. These foundations being intuitively known precludes the 
use of syllogistic reasoning: 
 
Thought consequently comes first; the next determination arrived at, in direct 
connection with it, is the determination of Being. The 'I think' directly involves my 
Being; this, says Descartes, is the absolute basis of all Philosophy.
 
The determination 
of Being is in my 'I'; this connection is itself the first matter. Thought as Being and 
Being as thought - that is my certainty, 'I'; in the celebrated Cogito, ergo sum we 
thus have Thought and Being inseparably bound together.
166
 
 
The Particular and the General 
 
The second way in which the cogito is shown to preclude syllogistic 
reasoning is the phrase ‘it is in the nature of our mind to construct general 
propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones.’167 This is important to 
Descartes, as he is arguing against  
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The supposition that knowledge of particular propositions must always be deduced 
from universal ones, following the same order as that of a syllogism in Dialectic ... It 
is certain that if we are to discover the truth we must always begin with particular 
notions in order to arrive at general ones later on (though we may also reverse the 
order and deduce other particular truths once we have discovered general ones).
168
 
 
The cogito functions as above: it works from the particular to the general. 
Descartes has established the cogito simply by way of his own experience, and works 
from this particular to a general: the proposition that one’s thinking is inextricably 
connected to one’s existing, and the knowledge of one’s thinking inevitably gives 
rise – simultaneously, and equally intuitively, as discussed above – to the knowledge 
of one’s existing. Again, the experiential tenor of the Meditations comes to the fore, 
as Descartes moves from the findings of his own experience to the establishment of a 
general theory; indeed, a general theory that he claims to be the foundations of a new 
philosophical system. It is not necessarily that the general derives from the particular, 
but the particular gives rise to the general, because of the order of thinking as it 
happens – in ‘real time’. 
 
This aspect of the cogito’s establishment would not be possible if the cogito was 
established by way of syllogism, which is, of course, what Descartes strongly denied. 
If his project was in line with the common ‘supposition’ that ‘knowledge of 
particular propositions must always be deduced from universal ones,’ then the 
universal knowledge of the cogito would give rise to the particular experience of the 
individual, which would undermine the very meaning and importance of the cogito 
within the Meditations. To do this would involve working on presuppositions of 
certainty, found in the ‘universal’. At this point of the Second Meditation, of course, 
the principle of the cogito can derive its credibility only from what has gone before, 
and what has already been established. Descartes therefore objects to  
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Claims that when I say ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ I presuppose the major premise 
‘Whatever thinks exists’, and hence I have already adopted a preconceived opinion ... the 
most important mistake our critic makes here is the supposition that knowledge of 
particular propositions must always be deduced from universal ones, following the same 
order as that of a syllogism in Dialectic.
169
 
 
The suggestion, then, that the knowledge of the particular must be deduced from 
that of the universal  is nonsensical to Descartes’ system; not only would it severely 
undermine the experiential element of the text and the reader participation idea 
which is at the heart of the meaning-making of the Meditations, it would also 
undermine the foundationalist nature of the work, since presuppositions would be 
used, to build knowledge that is based on working from the universal to the particular 
– and yet their certainty has not yet been established. It is central to Descartes’ 
project that the order of knowledge progresses from the particular to the universal; 
indeed, it is inconceivable to him that a properly foundationalist project could 
proceed with this order of reasoning. The cogito, therefore, relies on the particular 
giving rise to the universal, and not the other way around. Descartes’ insistence that 
this ‘supposition ... following the same order as that of a syllogism in Dialectic’170 
amounts to, at the very least, a statement that the era’s prevalent methods of 
reasoning are not suited to his project; or, more seriously, a direct attack on the 
coherence of scholastic methodology. Either way, it is becoming increasingly clear 
why Descartes was keen to find a style of writing that would enable him to separate 
himself, for the foundational stages of his project at least, from the dominant modes 
of disputation and its ally of syllogistic reasoning. 
 
Importantly, however, Descartes does qualify the aforementioned statement 
that knowledge should progress from the particular to the universal, by writing that 
although to begin with – at the outset of the project – particular notions come first 
and give rise to the general, ‘we may also reverse the order and deduce other 
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particular truths once we have discovered general ones’171. Whilst this could be 
considered a concession to traditional reasoning methodology, and therefore 
somewhat defeatist, I think that it is quite the opposite. Firstly, it is merely a 
possibility, but not one that is entertained here, in the context of the establishment of 
the cogito; it remains vital that the cogito be established by a movement from 
particular to the general, not least because of the ‘real time’ way in which the cogito 
is experienced and established by Descartes, which he then communicates to his 
reader so that they in turn can experience this Archimedean moment in the process of 
the Meditations. Secondly, and relatedly, the point of Descartes’ qualification seems 
to be that in the wider context of his philosophy, the idea of moving only from the 
particular to the universal is not a fixed one; it is simply immovable in the 
establishment of the cogito.   
 
This is arguably why the use of syllogism becomes more of a plausible 
epistemological option for Descartes as the Meditations progresses, as considered 
earlier in this chapter; while the first point of knowledge – the cogito – was built 
from a necessary transition from the particular to the general, subsequent points of 
knowledge can be established by a reversal of this process, such that they evidence a 
transition from the general to the particular, as is clear in parts of the text. Once the 
Archimedean point of the cogito has been established, in its self-evidencing, self-
validating way, the way is opened up for different processes of reasoning to be 
employed, whilst retaining credibility. Propositions subsequent to the cogito are 
indeed built on presuppositions, but ones which stem from the fixed, stable point of 
the cogito. This is plausible because they are built on an intuitively known, self-
evident knowledge of the particular, which can now give rise to the general. It is in 
this way that the edifice of knowledge is built up and the Meditations, as (firstly, at 
least) a foundationalist project, can progress. Descartes does not argue that there is 
only one way of gaining knowledge – that it must be intuitive and self-evident – but 
simply that only this method of intuition will work for the foundation of the system. 
It is only for the first piece of knowledge that syllogism cannot fit, in order to be 
properly foundational, as Descartes so uncompromisingly searches for.  
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Of course, the question that arises from this conception of the processes at 
work in the Meditations is that of circularity. Articulated by Antoine Arnauld in the 
Objections, and seen as problematic by many others since, the circle has been 
identified as the fatal flaw in Descartes’ system. To quote Arnauld’s accusation: 
 
You are not certain of the existence of God, and you say that you are not certain of 
anything, and cannot know anything clearly and distinctly until you have achieved 
clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God. It follows from this that you do 
not yet clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, on your own 
admission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of an existing God; and 
this you have not yet proved in the passage where you draw the conclusion that you 
clearly know what you are.
172
 
 
Arnauld then goes on to ask, 
 
How the author avoids reasoning in a circle when he says that we are sure that what 
we clearly and distinctly perceive is true only because God exists.
173
 
 
Descartes’ response to this charge of circularity is based on the role of 
memory; God is not the guarantor of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ (as Arnauld 
understands the dilemma), but rather the guarantor of memory. Therefore,  
 
We are sure that God exists because we attend to the arguments which prove this; 
but subsequently it is enough for us to remember that we perceived something 
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clearly in order for us to be certain that it is true. This would not be sufficient if we 
did not know that God exists and is not a deceiver.
174
 
 
What I want to do here is to suggest briefly an alternative defence of 
Descartes against the charge of circularity. On a more sympathetic reading of 
Descartes, I suggest that the circle does not really pose a problem for the Meditations 
– and certainly not one that is fatal to the project. This is because of what we know 
about analysis, as explored above, and thereby Descartes’ method for both forming 
and presenting ideas. It was established above that his preference for the analytic 
method over the synthetic is rooted in his emphasis on the importance of reading the 
text in ‘real time’, as if the reader is discovering it for themselves. This idea will be 
articulated more fully in the third chapter, but what it means at this point is that to 
read it as a ‘thinking in progress’, in its essentially cumulative character, is to focus 
on the key moments such as the cogito and the trademark argument for God’s 
existence in its proper context, rather than merely retrospectively. To do this means 
that the charge of circularity becomes less problematic. The cogito is established, as 
a pivotal foundational moment; and as Descartes’ thought process develops, the 
argument for God’s existence is established, in the third meditation. These are 
natural stages in the process of thought that drives the Meditations. To read it as 
Descartes intended – as an individual, re-enacting his journey, is to appreciate the 
cumulative nature of the text’s unfolding. As such, the two elements constituting the 
circle – the establishment of clear and distinct ideas, and the trademark argument for 
the existence of God – act as stages in the argument. It is only when the text is 
viewed retrospectively, isolating certain elements, that the charge of circularity can 
be levelled at Descartes. It is therefore an unfair accusation, as it neglects the very act 
of reading that is so vital to the Meditations. 
 
Furthermore, as explored in the first chapter, the epistemological emphasis in 
the Meditations appears to shift from foundationalist to coherentist. On such a 
reading, the charge of circularity is not a threat to Descartes’ project; to go further, it 
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perhaps strengthens it. The establishment of clear and distinct ideas, and the 
argument for God’s existence, can both be foundationalist claims in their own right, 
due to the cumulative nature of discovery; but as the Meditations progresses, they 
develop a coherentist relationship to each other in terms of how the whole system, 
once complete, hangs together. Their interdependency, therefore, need not be 
‘viciously’ circular, but rather evidence of the epistemological evolution of the 
project’s methodology. 
 
 What both these points show is that as an argument in itself, presented in 
isolation, the charge of circularity is indeed problematic; however, in the context of 
the text as a whole (and in the context of Descartes’ comments regarding method), it 
demands a more sympathetic interpretation. 
 
In returning to the main argument of this chapter, therefore, bringing these 
various strands of thought together, there are three identifiable reasons why 
Descartes did not wish the cogito to be associated with syllogistic reasoning. Firstly, 
as established above, to use syllogism in the formation of the cogito would be 
unsound, in terms of what the cogito is and what it represents for Descartes’ project 
as a whole. If it were to be a syllogism, then we would have to presuppose the truth 
of a universal premise, ‘Everything that...’, but this is premature, and Descartes is not 
in the habit of making presuppositions, particularly at this early, crucial stage in his 
project. Essentially, syllogisms rely on presuppositions; this strikes the wrong note in 
the process of the Meditations. Foundationalism is a central tenet of Descartes’ 
thought, and is the model of reasoning on which his project relies. The cogito, 
therefore, must be properly foundational. To appear to be engaging in syllogistic 
reasoning in order to establish the fundamental truths of his system would be to 
betray the self-stated foundational objective of his project. Williams phrases this 
succinctly:  
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The point that [Descartes] is making is not just that he does not as a matter of fact 
conduct a syllogistic inference, but that he is in no position to, since such inference 
would rely on a premiss which he is in no position to know.
175
 
 
Secondly, if the cogito were established by way of syllogism, it would 
undermine the cumulative tenor of his thought, as it relies on a progression and 
building; what is more, this cumulative element relies on the reasoning process 
taking place in the present, and not as a retrospective validated proposition. That ‘the 
cogito ... is not a proposition to be argued, but rather a truth to be discovered’ 
touches on a key theme – that the Meditations evidences thinking in progress – is 
something which will be explored in the next chapter.
176
 
 
Thirdly – and this is something which will play out in more detail in the next 
chapter – Descartes’ antipathy towards the use of syllogistic reasoning in establishing 
the cogito would seem to be as much about attitude as anything else. The way in 
which Descartes refers to the dominant mode of disputation implies that he holds it 
in low regard, as it is for those who prefer ease of acceptance to the rigour of analytic 
thinking; disputation therefore carries connotations of complacency, as ‘when the 
synthetic method of writing is used, people generally think that they have learned 
more than is in fact the case.’177 Hence synthesis as a method ‘is not as satisfying as 
the method of analysis, nor does it engage the minds of those who are eager to learn, 
since it does not show how the thing in question was discovered.’178 
 
That Descartes framed the question of style in terms of what is wrong with the 
dominant epistemology of the day is perhaps, therefore, a way of Descartes 
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emphasising the need for particular types of people to undertake his project; he 
‘wanted to make it clear that [he] would have nothing to do with anyone who was not 
willing to join me in meditating and giving the subject attentive consideration.’179 As 
will become clear in the following sections of this chapter, Descartes’ places an 
uncompromising emphasis on the need for individual effort in the meditational quest 
for first philosophy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Descartes’ comments regarding his choice of style have been illuminating. 
What has been established in this chapter is that Descartes’ choice of meditation as a 
style is framed not in terms of asserting the positive value of the meditational genre, 
but rather in terms of Descartes’ negative assessment of the role of the prevalent 
epistemological options of the time; he therefore seeks an alternative method. This 
motivation to identify a preferable alternative to disputation was traced to his 
emphatic distinction between the analytic and synthetic methods of philosophical 
reasoning, and the way in which his attitude towards syllogism plays out in the 
Meditations, particularly concerning the cogito. Cartesian scholarship is full of 
discussion as to whether Descartes – unwittingly or not – did actually use syllogistic 
reasoning to establish the cogito, or, indeed, created a syllogism by doing so. My 
point here was not about discussing the validity of Descartes’ anti-syllogistic claims 
surrounding the establishment of the cogito, but rather to emphasise the vehemence 
with which Descartes stresses that the cogito is not established by way of syllogism. 
It thereby constitutes an assertion of independence from the dominant tradition of 
syllogism-centred philosophical disputation. Why Descartes was keen to seek an 
alternative to the dominant modes of reasoning of the time has become clear during 
the course of this chapter. 
 
So what needs to be done now is allow the findings of this chapter to inform 
our assessment of why Descartes actively chose the meditational genre as this 
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alternative, and move away from this choice being defined in a negative manner (as 
it has been so far, in terms of Descartes’ antipathy towards disputation). We have 
seen why he sought an alternative to disputation – but why meditation as a suitable 
alternative? It will become clear that we can tell a substantial amount from 
Descartes’ attitude to the prevalent philosophical methods of the time as to why he 
chose meditation as the style of his text. The next, and final, chapter will consider 
why he might have ‘positively’ chosen the meditational genre, and it will argue that 
meditation provides Descartes with a style suited to the communication of his aims, 
expectations, and philosophical ideas. Furthermore, in doing so, we can pick up 
again the question of the Ignatian connection, now the choice of genre has been 
contextualised by use of Descartes’ own words; and attempt once more to establish 
the nature and extent of this connection, now we are informed by Descartes’ own 
philosophical motivations. 
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Chapter Three: What Meditation Means to the Meditations: Towards an 
Understanding of the Influence of the Meditational Style on Descartes 
 
Introduction 
 
Informed by the discoveries of the previous chapter, this chapter will now shift 
the focus to a consideration of why Descartes opted to employ the meditational style 
in his Meditations – not simply as a viable alternative to disputation, but rather as a 
positive choice in itself. This chapter will therefore assess what value Descartes 
placed on the meditational style. Therefore, this chapter considers afresh the issues 
raised in the first chapter, that of the nature and extent of the Ignatian meditational 
influence on the Meditations. The note of caution struck in the first chapter is still 
relevant, of course – and it should inform our findings. However, this third chapter is 
more constructive, in terms of how we can interpret the Ignatian meditational 
influence on the Meditations, in order further to illuminate our understanding of the 
text. The first chapter established that there is clearly an Ignatian influence on the 
Meditations, but the chapter’s focus was, firstly, to establish a basic historical-
biographical influence between Ignatius and Descartes; secondly, to introduce the 
idea of a textual connection between the Spiritual Exercises; and thirdly – and 
relatedly – to demonstrate the danger of overstating this connection. 
 
With this warning against overstatement in mind, this chapter will pick up again 
the strand of Ignatian meditation, shifting this time to a more ‘positive’ consideration 
of the evidence for an Ignatian presence in the project of the Meditations. I will argue 
that there are affinities between the two texts which merit the conclusion that there is 
a significant – but complex – connection. This third chapter will move away from the 
subject of the first chapter, which was with the more superficial claims about the 
existence of a textual connection between Descartes and Ignatius. Instead, it will be 
focused on significant affinities between the Meditations and the Spiritual Exercises, 
which are rooted in a deeper level of similarity. It will be concerned with those 
elements which ‘appear to prefigure a particular procedural nuance or insight later 
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developed by Descartes’.180 Drawing on some ‘identifiable issues of mutual 
concern’,181 the aim of this chapter will be, in line with the previous two chapters of 
the thesis, to establish possible reasons for Descartes’ entitling his work Meditations. 
Working closely with both primary texts, I will argue that the Ignatian influence is 
clear, and therefore to read the Meditations as ‘meditation’ in this sense informs the 
text as a whole and is thus of central importance to an informed, accurate and 
considered reading of the Meditations. However, this affinity between Ignatius and 
Descartes’ text consists not in any simple, straightforward or obvious imitation of 
form or style; it is far subtler than this, and is found in the many layers of style and 
meaning within Descartes’ text. That said, the subtle way in which the Ignatian-
Cartesian textual connection is played out in the Meditations should not lead us to 
underestimate the significance. 
 
Essentially, this chapter has a dual concern, which is necessarily interrelated. It 
will examine both how the Meditations bears significant relation to the Ignatian 
meditational tradition; and why Descartes’ would seek this affinity. The chapter 
opens with the exploration of the idea of meditation as something of a ‘thinking in 
progress’, before moving into a consideration of how this might be achieved, and 
how Descartes uses elements of the Ignatian meditational style to do this; these key 
elements are, first of all, the emphasis placed on the importance of individual effort 
and reader participation; and secondly, the value of solitude and the creation of a 
suitable environment in which meditation can take place. The strands will be drawn 
together in the final section, which focuses on the important element of meditation: 
‘meditation as transformation’. This will create a clearer idea of how the genre of 
meditation plays a central and vital role in the creation, conception and expression of 
his project, rendering the process of the Meditations transformative. 
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Thinking in Progress: Meditation as an Activity 
 
 The way in which Descartes explains his choice of ‘meditation’ as a style in 
the context of his antipathy for disputation can arguably tell us something about why 
he actively chose the meditational style, rather than viewing it simply as a viable 
alternative – for which there might have been many candidates. 
 
 That Descartes argues against the conception that philosophical reasoning is a 
strictly formulaic process shows that not only does this style not suit his 
foundationalist project – as previously established – but also that it does not fit with 
the type of thinking process that Descartes both adheres to, and evidences, in his text. 
Furthermore, the thinking process expressed in the Meditations seems to also be 
something which he seeks to engender in his readers. It was discussed in the previous 
chapter that ‘the cogito is not a proposition to be argued, but rather a truth to be 
discovered’,182 and this proves particularly apt when exploring why Descartes made 
a positive decision to choose meditation as more than merely a viable alternative to 
disputation; in exploring how this idea plays out in the text, we can begin to build a 
picture of the reasons why Descartes would have wished his work to be associated 
with traditional meditational reasoning, especially in the context of a comparison 
with the Ignatian meditation of the Spiritual Exercises. By noting significant 
affinities with aspects of the Ignatian meditational text, it becomes clearer why 
Descartes wished to use this genre. That the cogito is ‘a truth to be discovered’ 
indicates that the cogito is, in some way, a process in itself; it is not the detachable 
product of alienable components of reasoning, but rather a reasoning process in 
itself, and in such a way, the end is, effectively, found in the means. Meditation, as a 
process, suits this project. As such, it is this element of discovery which will form the 
focus of this first section of the chapter. 
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 That meditation is a process – indeed, an activity – is something deeply 
rooted in the concept of meditation itself. Referring back to the opening lines of the 
Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius understands the phrase ‘Spiritual Exercises’ to mean 
 
Any method of examining our own conscience, and also of meditating, 
contemplating, praying mentally and orally ... In the same way that walking, 
travelling, and running are corporal exercises, so preparing and disposing the soul to 
remove all inordinate attachments, and after they have been removed, searching and 
finding the will of God about the management of one’s life and the salvation of the 
soul are spiritual exercises.
183
 
 
As a totalising experience, it is clearly, therefore, something that one does, 
rather than a subject one studies. The retreatants embark on this retreat in order to 
‘labour vigorously’ through a series of challenging exercises, from which they will 
derive spiritual benefit.
184
 The Exercises are a clearly presented, prescribed set of 
activities; the retreatant does not reflect abstractly on a series of propositions, but 
rather involves themselves in an activity which demands the full use of their senses 
(as will be explored below), and the whole of their being. This central element of the 
Ignatian meditational genre will play out in various ways, and impacts on diverse 
elements of the Ignatian and Cartesian meditations – that it is an individual activity 
for which self-effort and motivation is required; that it is a process of personal 
transformation; that particular settings and circumstances are required for this 
process – and these concerns will form the content of this chapter. For the time 
being, however, what is important to highlight is the wider, more general point, that 
these meditations are exercises. 
 
In a similar way, it is clear from the outset of the Meditations that Descartes 
understands his work likewise. The instructions and warnings to his reader, regarding 
attitude, point to the conception of the work as a process, an activity; his reader is 
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embarking on a subjective, highly involving process, rather than an objective 
consideration of a proposition to be argued. That he ‘would not urge anyone to read 
this book except those who are able and willing to meditate seriously’ suggests that 
the very act of reading is a process, an activity in itself, rather than a passive event. 
Indeed, in recalling Descartes’ explicit explanation of his choice of genre – 
meditation as preferable to disputation – he frames the issue in terms of the type of 
reader he wishes to avoid, ‘anyone who was not willing to join me in meditating and 
giving the subject attentive consideration.’185 He implies by this that a high level of 
involvement is required, and one that is not to be taken lightly. In the act of 
meditating, the reader will be embarking on the project themselves, taking part in a 
process, and experiencing this type of reasoning as an activity. 
 
At the heart of Descartes’ project in the Meditations is a strong feeling that 
philosophy in its proper form must involve one getting their hands dirty, that 
  
Philosophy is not a class-room subject of instruction but a special kind of activity; 
and that, accordingly, nobody can really begin to understand it except by being 
induced to indulge in the actual exercise of it, by grappling with the problems under 
the guidance and help of a more experienced thinker, but, nevertheless, in the last 
resort, thinking the problems out for himself.
186
 
 
Perhaps, as Beck suggests, Descartes’ conception of philosophy as an activity 
was ‘as old as Socrates and happily vigorous at the present day’;187 or perhaps it is 
the product of experience, of a struggle with the dominant style of disputation that 
characterised his early encounters with philosophical reasoning, as a result of his 
conservative, scholastic education at La Flèche. The interest here lies in how 
Descartes manages to communicate this idea of philosophy-as-activity to his readers, 
and his way of expressing to them ‘the special way in which his work should be read 
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and studied.’188 In drawing upon the Ignatian conception of meditation as an activity, 
Descartes employs this style of writing as a way of making clear the motivations, 
aims, and expectations of his project in the Meditations. That Ignatius and Descartes 
share this disposition towards thought being an active process demonstrates how the 
influence of the Spiritual Exercises is becoming evident in the Meditations. 
 
Lang’s distinction between ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ proves helpful here, in her 
astute comments about the nature of using the meditational style within philosophical 
writing: 
 
The genre of the meditation, like the act of meditation, turns out to be a doing as 
well as a saying, and the doing is in fact broader than saying, much broader if saying 
is regarded primarily as asserting a series of otherwise independent propositions ... 
Descartes was concerned not only to say what he had to say but, by means of the 
saying, to establish what was said, first in his own life and then in the life of the 
reader who was thus to be no mere observer but an agent in the same process.
189
 
 
This element of participation will be of concern later in this chapter. At this 
stage, it is important to note that the ‘doing’ is at the heart of the meditational style, 
and at the heart of Descartes’ conscious choice of genre for his text. The saying 
would appear to gain its effect from the fact that it is a ‘done’ thing as well as a ‘said’ 
thing; in such a way, the ‘doing’ has an affirmative quality and valuably enables 
Descartes to express his ideas with vigour, one that is constantly renewed by the 
independent ‘doing’ process of every new reader. 
 
The question I now want to ask is how Descartes creates this ‘doing’ effect in 
the Meditations, emulating the activity that characterises the Ignatian meditation, in 
order to make his own text an activity in itself. One possible answer to this question 
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can be found by looking beyond the implications found in the preface to the text, and 
rather into the text itself.  
 
The Present Tense 
 
Descartes’ Meditations is written largely in the present tense. A consideration 
of this element yields interesting results, and ones which are central to our 
understanding of Descartes’ invocation of the meditational genre. The use of the 
present tense has a threefold effect: firstly, a sense of inclusion is established; 
secondly, the present tense provides and enables a sense of continuity allowing the 
cumulative nature of the project to be fulfilled; and thirdly, the vividity created by 
the use of the present tense ensures that the process is a lived, ‘real time’ activity. 
 
Firstly, then, on one level Descartes’ use of the present tense has an inclusive 
role, as it is highly involving of the reader. By reading Descartes’ ideas in the present 
tense, the reader can, in some way, live the experiences for themselves, whilst being 
subtly guided by the narrator through the process. This technique gains impact from 
the effect it has on the reader, as there is a subtle act of persuasion at play here; the 
reader, in being drawn into the narrative, is intended to feel as if they are forming the 
ideas presented for themselves and thereby participating in the act of creation, of 
discovery, of breaking new ground and establishing sound ideas. 
 
Take, for example, the opening of the Second Meditation. Descartes describes 
how 
 
It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me 
around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top.
190
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The use of such vivid metaphor and imagery here is powerful. Descartes has 
selected an image to which his reader can relate; and which, by this stage, his reader 
should probably be feeling themselves. It has the combined power of accessibility 
and empathy which allows Descartes to subtly form a relationship between author 
and reader, through the role of the narrator. Furthermore, this example emphasises 
the central importance of the autobiographically experiential element to both texts. It 
matters that Descartes has felt this despair, just as it matters that Ignatius’ 
prescriptions of spiritual exercises are based on experience; it is as if they provide 
some element of credibility, and makes the experience very real to the reader. In 
Descartes’ vivid description of what he felt at this stage in the process, the reader can 
compare their own feelings and reactions at this point, and thereby be actively 
participating in the meditational experience. 
 
What is more, in following these thoughts, the reader is brought to the point 
of the establishment of the cogito: 
 
Let [the evil demon] deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that 
I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything 
very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.
191
 
 
That this Archimedean moment is described in the present tense – that the 
cogito is established in the present tense – makes it an unavoidably pivotal moment. 
Arguably it would still be a pivotal moment if it were not written in the present tense; 
but I have an inclination that the reader is somehow – perhaps subconsciously – 
brought into play by the use of the present tense, constituting an involvement in this 
important moment. For Descartes, the ideal situation would be that the reader, having 
followed the author’s directives, would have used the text as guide to the process: a 
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process which they would have created for themselves by using the Cartesian-
recommended techniques of ‘turning inward’ to discover the innate ideas lying in 
every human mind. Therefore, the discovery of the cogito is not one exclusively for 
Descartes; indeed, it derives its very meaning from its universal accessibility, and 
from the process of an individual’s discovery. In this way, the text actually seeks an 
involved, active reader from which the process derives its very intelligibility; there is 
an immediacy created by the use of the present tense, by which the ideas become 
new possibilities once again: the reader discovers for themselves what Descartes 
discovered for himself. This ideal is an identifiably Ignatian one; the Meditations, 
like the Spiritual Exercises, are exercises to be performed and experienced – as 
Ignatius did; as Descartes did – not passively considered from a distance. 
Involvement is key because just as Ignatius’ exercises ‘are not abstract; their author 
lived them and put them to the test of experience, his own as well as others’’,192 
Descartes places an emphasis on the avoidance of abstraction. To abstract ideas 
would be to distance oneself from immediate involvement in the ideas themselves, 
thereby rendering the whole exercise static, sterile and objective, all of which 
Descartes sought to avoid. Essentially, the Meditations depends on total, subjective, 
involved activity. 
 
The second – and necessarily related – role of the present tense is to create a 
sense of continuity that will ensure that the text retains a cumulative character. The 
reader’s active involvement in the text, brought about at least in part by the use of the 
present tense, ensures that the reader is experiencing a sense of continuity. By 
providing this sense of continuity, Descartes ensures that the progression of the text 
remains cumulative; the reader, living the reasoning process in ‘real time’, forms 
ideas steadily and cumulatively, in line with the foundational aim of the project, and, 
as has become clear throughout this thesis, the cumulative nature of the process gives 
life and meaning to the project. Its significance, therefore, cannot be underestimated. 
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Descartes’ reaction to the suggestion that the Replies to the Objections 
(following the writing of the Meditations) be included within the text of the 
Meditations is illuminating, as it demonstrates Descartes’ own, uncompromising 
emphasis on the importance of continuity within his work: 
 
I do not think that it would be useful, or even possible, to insert into my meditations 
the answers to the objections that may be made to them. That would interrupt the 
flow and even destroy the force of my arguments.
193
 
 
It is interesting that even regarding the Objections and Replies – which form 
an important part of the Meditations as a whole – Descartes is hostile to the idea of 
interrupting the flow of the text. The implication of this, of course, is that the order of 
the Meditations is key, and the ‘flow’ of the arguments clearly of vital importance to 
Descartes in the Meditations; the text would seem to derive its very intelligibility 
from the cumulative way in which the process is carried out. 
 
 The third effect of the present tense that I will consider is that of vividity. It 
has been established, in the previous two points, that the present tense creates a sense 
of inclusion and of continuity, thereby aiding the central cumulative element of the 
Meditations; and it has become clear that reader involvement is vitally important. 
This third aspect will therefore consider how else Descartes ensures that the reader is 
involved, and experiencing continuity, in order for the process to be an activity. 
 
 As alluded to in the first chapter, Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises are highly 
imagistic: he draws on the application of all the senses in order to render the 
exercises involving; the scenes imagined are made vivid in this way. A clear example 
of this is found in the Fifth Exercise of the First Week: the ‘contemplation of hell’.194 
Each of the five senses is called upon, and the creation of such a vivid scene ensures 
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the total participation of the retreatant. Firstly, the retreatant is instructed to ‘see with 
the imagination the large fires burning in hell’; secondly, to ‘hear with the 
imagination lamentations, cries, screams’; thirdly, ‘to smell smoke, sulphur’; 
fourthly, ‘to taste the most sour things’; and fifthly, ‘with the sense of touch to feel 
those same fires that consume souls enveloped in them.’195 
  
As explored in the first chapter, Ignatius places a premium on the value of the 
senses in the exercise of meditation, understanding the ‘application of the senses’ to 
play a key role in the exercises: ‘it is good to exercise the five senses of the 
imagination’.196 Canavan captures well the significance of sense and setting in the 
Spiritual Exercises: 
 
The power of the Exercises often resides not so much in what they say but rather in 
the surroundings in which they place the Exercitant, thus forcing upon him in a vivid 
human way the importance and urgency of that life in which he stands, the heavy 
responsibility which overshadows that game of consequences wherein he dices with 
the world, the flesh and the devil. He is put kneeling at the foot of the Cross; he is 
bade to stand before the whole court of heaven; he is told to see himself as an exile 
in a vast and dreary wilderness, as a soldier in combat, as sick and lying on his 
deathbed.
197
 
 
On the contrary, Descartes’ attitude of suspicion towards the senses – at least 
in the first few meditations – preclude the possibility of their being used to ensure the 
vividity of the reader‘s experience. However, this is not to say that Descartes’ 
Meditations lack the vividity of Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises: far from it. What 
Ignatius does by the invocation of the senses, Descartes achieves by (an arguably 
conscious) effective use of the present tense. 
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The doubt which pervades the First Meditation is depicted – and 
communicated – very vividly by Descartes. Scene-setting, for example, is done with 
detailed description, for which the use of the present tense is vital: 
 
There are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though 
they are derived from the senses – for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, 
wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in my hands...
198
 
 
The reader cannot help but be drawn in, by the vivid portrayal of this almost 
tangible encounter. The reader can sit by the fire, wear the dressing gown, hold the 
paper in their hands; it is a very ‘real’ scene.  In this way, Descartes ensures that the 
reader is actively involved in this reasoning process, and can draw the conclusions 
from themselves, thereby participating in the progression of reasoning, under the 
guiding hand of the narrator. 
 
 Indeed, Descartes uses this technique – employing the present tense to its full 
potential – to introduce and explore the ‘dream argument’ of the First Meditation: 
 
How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events – that I am 
here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire – when in fact I am lying undressed in 
bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece 
of paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do 
so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such 
distinctness to someone asleep...
199
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He goes on to suggest:  
 
Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars – that my eyes are open, 
that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands – are not true. Perhaps, 
indeed, I do not even have such hands or such a body at all...
200
 
 
This is an effective way of instilling doubt in the reader’s minds, in making 
them feel it for themselves, and thereby encouraging them to question their own 
individual, ‘real time’ experiences in the present. In such a way, the reader’s 
involvement has become totalising.  Essentially, what Descartes has done here, with 
the use of the present tense, is to employ a meditational principle – that the process 
of thinking and reasoning is, necessarily, a vivid activity – and expresses it in a novel 
way. Although they express it in slightly different ways, both Ignatius and Descartes 
understand their meditational exercises to be an activity, and build their texts around 
this central principle. 
 
The Importance of Individual Effort and Participation 
 
Individual Effort as the Driving Force of Meditation 
 
To read the Meditations in this way – as an activity, a ‘thinking in progress’ – 
requires a great deal of self-motivation and self-effort. This part of the chapter 
centres on exploring an aspect of the Ignatian and Cartesian meditations which is so 
strikingly paralleled between the two works –that of their emphasis on the effort 
required of each individual reader – and what light this can shed on their respective 
projects. Furthermore, such a comparison is part of the wider consideration of 
whether in reflecting important elements of the Spiritual Exercises Descartes hoped 
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to echo the Ignatian meditational process, and therefore made a conscious decision to 
emulate aspects of the mode. 
 
Descartes demands of his reader the willingness ‘to join [him] in meditating 
and giving the subject attentive consideration’, so that the reader can ‘derive the full 
benefit from [his] work’. Descartes actively discourages anyone who is not willing to 
make a huge personal effort to embark on this process; he claims he is  
 
Right to require particularly careful attention from my readers; and the style of 
writing that I selected was one which I thought would be most capable of generating 
such attention. I am convinced that my readers will derive more benefit from this 
than they will themselves realise ... I think it is fair for me to reject out of hand, and 
despise as worthless, the verdict given on my work by those who refuse to meditate 
with me and who stick to their preconceived opinions.
201
 
 
 Dedication to the task of the Meditations is something which Descartes views 
as requiring great discipline and an ‘attentive’ attitude. As such, Descartes states that 
‘the style of writing that I selected was one which I thought would be most capable 
of generating such attention.’202 From the outset, the reader is made aware that 
Descartes has little time for those who do not come to the project ready to give close 
consideration to each individual part of the text; and therein lies the challenge of the 
Meditations: he requires only those readers who are capable of approaching his work 
in the desired way: ‘I reckon that both the overall and the detailed scrutiny is 
necessary if the reader is to derive the full benefit from my work.’203 
 
His choice of style reflects the emphasis on effort that characterises the 
Ignatian meditational style; the demands made by both writers, regarding attitude, are 
strikingly similar and they hold similar expectations of their readers, shown by clear 
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‘attitudinal directives’. That their work is so clearly aligned, in this respect, could 
indeed arguably constitute grounds on which to make the case for an Ignatian-
Cartesian connection. 
 
 In the Second Week of the Spiritual Exercises, Ignatius makes an interesting 
distinction between three different kinds of men, in terms of their attitude towards 
the task at hand, which is the detachment of the self from ‘inordinate attachments’ in 
order to progress with the exercises in a constructive fashion; that is to say, with the 
right state of mind, self-motivation and high levels of effort.
204
 The first kind of man 
‘wishes indeed to be free from attachment ... in order to be reconciled with God ... 
but, during his entire lifetime, he does not take the necessary means or accept the 
necessary help.’ The second man ‘also desires to remove this disorderly attachment, 
but in the meantime he obstinately clings to the thing; he rather wants to draw God to 
his wish, instead of removing the impediment and aiming at Him by a more suitable 
way of life.’ The third ‘is equally ready to get rid of or keep the thing, according to 
what he will have perceived through divine inspiration or the counsel of reason ... he 
only considers and looks for such a service’. 
 
This allegory, distinguishing between different attitudes towards the task at 
hand, serves to highlight the importance with which Ignatius regards the issue of 
attitude among retreatants, and therefore tells us something about his wider project, 
framed in terms of the reader needing an attitude of self-effort and self-responsibility, 
if the reader is to reap the reward of the meditational process. That this is a 
requirement shared by both Ignatius and Descartes, is shown by quoting both writers 
directly alongside each other. Descartes states that 
 
The judgement of many people is so silly and weak that, once they have accepted a 
view, they continue to believe it, however false and irrational it may be ... those who 
do not bother to grasp the proper order of my arguments and the connection between 
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them, but merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion, will not get 
much benefit from reading this book.
205
 
 
This is a striking echo of Ignatius, who writes that  
 
The person who gives to another a method and order for meditation ... must 
faithfully narrate the story to be meditated on ... by merely passing through the 
principal points and adding only brief clarifications; so that the one who is going to 
meditate, after having first accepted the basis of historical truth, will then go over it 
and consider it by himself ... he will harvest a more delightful taste and more 
abundant fruit than if the same thing had been more extensively narrated and 
explained by someone else.
206
 
 
Here is evidenced an interesting paralleling of the conception of the task from 
Ignatius and Descartes; the emphasis is clearly on the need for individual effort and 
right attitude. That their aims are understood in terms of reaping rewards – deriving 
‘benefit’ from the activity, and ‘harvest[ing] ... abundant fruit’ – points to an 
alignment of aim between the two writers; thus, to associate himself with the 
meditational genre in this way allows Descartes to communicate clearly what he 
expects of the reader in line with his conception of the project. 
 
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on the importance of individual effort in the 
activity of meditation is also expressed by way of both writers’ acknowledgement of 
the difficulties involved in the task, for which self-effort and correct motivation is 
essential. Such an attitude is therefore required, in part at least, because of the 
arduous nature of the task ahead. Neither writer makes any secret of the challenging 
character of the meditational journey; the way they present it ensures that any 
individual enters the process unaware of the difficulties they could – indeed, almost 
certainly will – encounter. To convey this aspect clearly to the reader acts as a 
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method of simultaneously preparing the meditator for the challenges ahead, by 
issuing something of a warning; and to ensure that the meditator is of a suitable 
character to begin with. This is why the instructions to the reader provided at the 
outset are issued in a rather formidable way. 
 
A Formidable Task 
 
Although Ignatius and Descartes have high expectations of their readers, as 
seen above, they do openly acknowledge the difficulties that are likely to be 
encountered when embarking on their challenging programmes; they are therefore 
realistic about what to expect. Ignatius, for example, acknowledges that 
 
It is easy and light to complete a contemplation for an entire hour when consolation 
abounds. On the contrary, it is very difficult when desolation occurs.
207
 
 
An echo of this can be identified in Descartes’ statement that 
 
I do know that even those who do concentrate, and earnestly pursue the truth, will 
find it very difficult to take in the entire structure of my Meditations, while at the 
same time having a distinct grasp of the individual parts that make it up.
208
 
 
These acknowledgements give the texts a very human touch, and we are 
reminded of the experiential tenor which characterises both works. Indeed, this 
intensely personal tenor resounds throughout the Meditations.  Take, for example, 
the aforementioned expression of near-despair uttered by Descartes at the beginning 
of the Second Meditation, when he is struggling against the seemingly overwhelming 
force of the doubt he evoked in the previous meditation: 
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So serious are the doubts into which I have been thrown as a result of 
yesterday’s meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any 
way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep 
whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor 
swim up to the top.
209
 
 
The dramatic imagery employed here makes Descartes’ situation here appear 
very real, and the reader is thereby drawn into the situation, as though they were 
experiencing it for themselves for the first time. The honesty displayed by Descartes 
here is involving and gives weight to Descartes’ claim that he understands the 
difficulty of the task undertaken in the Meditations. 
 
 That said, both Ignatius and Descartes follow their acknowledgements of the 
difficulty of the task with a demonstration of resilience, so as to show to their reader 
the attitude of self-effort that is required for any gain to be made from the process of 
meditation. Whilst the portrayal of despair is very involving, what is important is 
how the meditator moves beyond this point and, by virtue of this perseverance, 
begins to reap the rewards of his effort. When a point of ‘desolation’ is reached in the 
Spiritual Exercises, the reaction of the individual is vital to the continuation of the 
meditational process, because ‘self-initiated and self-sustained activity throughout 
the retreat is the best and ultimately the only human guarantee of the continuing 
efficacy of the Exercises’:210 
 
Thus it is always necessary to combat this temptation and this desolation in order to 
prevail, by extending the Exercise beyond the decided hour. In this manner, we learn 
not only to resist the adversary, but also to defeat him.
211
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Similarly, it is the reaction to this sense of despair that is the crucial moment 
for Descartes in the Meditations. Although he feels a sense of disorientation, panic 
and despair, it is important that he reacts with a strong statement to the contrary, and 
thereby reiterates his aim: ‘nevertheless I will make an effort and once more attempt 
the same path which I started on yesterday.’212 It clearly takes a significant, 
conscious effort for Descartes to continue on his quest for the Archimedean point, 
‘just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable.’213 The reader is 
thereby implicitly expected to demonstrate a similar spirit of resilience. 
 
 This concept of the reader being expected to react in similar ways to the 
narrators of the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations respectively is best expressed 
on two levels. Firstly, on one level, the intensely personal nature of the experiences 
depicted expresses the autobiographical aspect to their writing; both texts are, 
crucially, based on the personal experience of the writer, before being extended to a 
wider readership. Secondly, and relatedly, this experiential aspect informs how the 
reader should approach the texts, too. By bringing the autobiographical element to 
the presentation of the exercises, both Ignatius and Descartes lead by example. They 
use their particular experiences to relay to their reader how best to undertake the 
activity of meditational thinking, which lends a further dimension to the oft-quoted 
Cartesian dictate: ‘I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are 
able and willing to meditate seriously with me’.214 In such a way, Descartes, as an 
echo of Ignatius, 'has the leading part of the director of the retreat, outlining the 
subject and order of the meditations but leaving to the novice the actual task of 
meditating and drawing his own conclusions.’215 
 
In such a way, the participation of the reader becomes a central element in the 
text, as has become clear in the discussion of meditation as a ‘thinking in progress’, 
and as will gain further clarity in the discussion of ‘meditation as transformation’, 
later on in this chapter. Descartes achieves this partly by his use of the “I” form in his 
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writing. Both the quotation above, concerning the despair at the opening of the 
Second Meditation, and the establishment of the cogito, for example, use the first 
person pronoun, which has an involving function, making the reader feel as if they 
are living it themselves, and for the first time. Consequently, the ‘I’ ‘persona has a 
universal as well as a singular value. The reader identifies himself with the persona 
in order to live the experiment.’216 It is important to both Ignatius’ and Descartes’ 
respective projects that the reader – or retreatant – is ‘no mere observer but an agent 
in the same process’,217 and therefore participating fully in the process. Descartes 
uses the first person pronoun to create this element of reader participation, and it is 
one which is vital to his project; this emulates the Ignatian emphasis on participation, 
something which has become clear in the course of this discussion regarding 
individual effort and attitude. If the importance of participation can be emphasised, 
‘the retreatant himself, in his vulnerability as well as in his dignity, is assumed to be 
the sovereign, integrating centre of theological meaning and experience.’218 Ignatius 
and Descartes therefore need to provide ‘explicit directives that urge self-initiated 
and total participation in the complex reflective processes that are to follow’,219 in 
order to ensure the right attitude is present and maintained. It is worth quoting Valéry 
at length here as he phrases so eloquently the effect of the use of the first person 
pronoun on the reader: 
 
Never before Descartes had any philosopher so deliberately displayed himself upon the 
stage of his thought, showing himself off, daring to use the first personal pronoun 
throughout whole pages. And never, as Descartes above all did with great brilliance of 
style when he wrote his Meditations, had any philosopher so gone out of his way to 
convey to us the details of his mind, to make those details our own, to make us like unto 
him, to make us, like him, uncertain and then certain, after we have followed him and, as 
it were, wedded ourselves to him in his course from doubt to doubt and finally to that 
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purest, that least personal of I’s which must be the same in all men, the universal in each 
of us.
220
 
 
What this section has established is that individual effort and the role of 
participation are elements of central importance to Descartes, and that the way in 
which he conveys these emphases is informative for our understanding of both his 
motivations, and what he hopes to achieve in his project. The clear affinities with the 
Spiritual Exercises, regarding ‘attitudinal directives’ evidence some significant 
textual connection between the two meditational works, and the influence of Ignatius 
upon Descartes’ writing is evident. It will become even more evident as we move 
into the next section of this chapter, which focuses on what could be considered a 
further directive to the reader, the role of solitude and catharsis in the meditational 
process. 
 
Solitude and Catharsis 
 
‘The Strategic Value of Solitude’ 
 
I was, at that time, in Germany ... the onset of winter held me up in quarters in 
which, finding no company to distract me, and having, fortunately, no cares or 
passions to disturb me, I spent the whole day shut up in a room heated by an 
enclosed stove, where I had complete leisure to meditate on my own thoughts...
221
 
 
This part of the story, recounted in the Discourse on Method, is well known. I 
quote it here because the situation described is a key factor in assessing Descartes’ 
relationship to the genre of meditational writing. That Descartes’ experience results 
from a period of intense solitude, whereby he can concentrate without distraction, 
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leads him to implicitly recommend to his reader the value of being alone with one’s 
thoughts. That he has achieved the ‘general demolition of [his] opinions’, and the 
rebuilding of the edifice of knowledge, in an atmosphere of solitude, means that he 
emphasises the importance of being alone in order to harvest any fruit from 
philosophical investigation. This aspect of his thought is strikingly similar to that of 
Ignatius’ in the Spiritual Exercises; Ignatius explicitly recommends to his reader the 
value of solitude, in order to persuade them of the benefits available to be gained 
from the exercises performed within such an environment of contemplation in 
solitude. What this shows is that both Ignatius and Descartes place a premium on the 
value of creating the right environment in which to carry out their meditations. 
Furthermore, and important to the investigation of this thesis, ‘the privacy that 
Descartes habitually cultivated had characteristics that were in many respects similar 
to those of an extended retreat experience’,222 thereby giving possible grounds for 
establishing a further connection between the two writers. This part of the chapter 
will, therefore, explore the shape this similarity takes, regarding their emphasis on 
solitude, and assess how Descartes channels this Ignatian influence into his 
Meditations. I will argue that the element of solitude is key to the project of the 
Meditations, and this becomes particularly clear when the cathartic element of 
solitude is considered. 
  
 Both Ignatius and Descartes strongly recommend a withdrawal into solitude 
as the ideal environment for meditational activity. Ignatius, for example, writes that  
 
If someone is freer from usual business and wishes to obtain the greatest possible 
spiritual fruit ... he will derive all the greater benefit in his spiritual life because he 
will separate himself more from his friends and acquaintances and from all human 
concerns, for example, by leaving his home for another one or a more retired room 
where he will be freely and safely able to attend Holy Mass or Vespers as he desires, 
without being prevented by any person of his acquaintance.
223
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This is strikingly similar to Descartes’ requirement of solitude in the Meditations: 
 
Today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myself a clear 
stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely 
and without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions.
224
 
 
What is more, in terms of the motivations behind this advocacy of solitude, there 
is a clear alignment of aim between Ignatius and Descartes. To explore this, it is 
helpful to consider the three reasons Ignatius gives the retreatant to explain why 
solitude is so important to meditation.
225
 Firstly, solitude is portrayed as for a worthy 
cause, and from which one ‘merits no small favour from God.’ Secondly, by  
 
All his mind concentrating and reflecting upon only one matter, which is to honour God 
his Creator and to care for the salvation of his soul, he can apply his natural energies 
more freely and faster for whatever he desires so much to achieve.  
 
This reasoning, rooted in the basic need for focus and lack of distraction in order 
to achieve the aim of the exercise efficiently and effectively, is also identifiable in 
the Meditations, as the scene in the stove heated room shows; Descartes evidences a 
need to be in solitude in order to concentrate, and focus on the task. It seems that 
only when he is ‘quite alone’ can he ‘devote [him]self sincerely and without 
reservation’ to his project,226 the aim of which he claims, like Ignatius, to be ‘the 
glory of God.’227 The third reason Ignatius cites is that to be alone and focusing on 
this task means that the soul is closer to the divine, and thereby it is better ‘disposed 
to receive the gifts of Divine Goodness.’ Essentially, solitude is required in order for 
the retreatant to reap benefit from the exercises; for Ignatius, benefit is perceived to 
be in the form of proximity to, and experience of, the influence of the divine in one’s 
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life. These reasons, considered alongside the Meditations, show that Ignatius and 
Descartes had a similar conception of task, and similar requirement in order to 
achieve the goal of their respective exercises. 
 
‘Inordinate Attachments’ 
 
Furthermore, the issue of solitude is very closely related to the emphasis of both 
writers on what Ignatius terms ‘inordinate attachments’.228 For Ignatius, spiritual 
exercises are defined in terms of  
 
Preparing and disposing the soul to remove all inordinate attachments and, after they 
have been removed, searching and finding the will of God about the management of 
one’s life and the salvation of the soul.229  
 
Being purged of these inordinate attachments, which hold the retreatant back, 
allows the retreatant to progress on this spiritual journey with greater chance of – 
using Ignatius’ words – harvesting valuable spiritual fruit. A similar understanding of 
‘inordinate attachments’ can be found in the Meditations as well, suggesting that 
Descartes was influenced by the Ignatian concept. For Descartes, however, the 
inordinate attachments are one’s reliance on the senses: 
 
Once the foundations of a building are undermined, anything built on them collapses of 
its own accord; so I will go straight for the basic principles on which all my former 
beliefs rested. Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired from 
the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses 
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deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even 
once.
230
 
 
In this way, Descartes goes straight to the heart of the issue, and identifies 
reliance as the cause for his concern. His project thereby becomes aligned with 
Ignatius’, as he feels a similar need to rid himself of ‘inordinate attachments’ –those 
things upon which one has, up until now, relied. To be free of these attachments 
means, for both writers, the opportunity to start afresh and reap the benefits of a 
rightly-centred spiritual journey, reliant not on inordinate attachments but on that 
which is worthy of pursuit. Indeed, the element of purgation, as ‘catharsis’ or 
‘detachment’ was an important element of traditional meditative writing.231 
 
For Descartes, this means not being reliant on sense perception as the basis of 
knowledge, as has previously been the case: 
 
Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses 
or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it 
is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once.
232
 
 
His consequent attitude of suspicion towards the senses is an important part of 
applying doubt, in order to tear down the old edifice and build a new one. In this 
way, whilst he reflects the Ignatian ideal of freedom from unhelpful attachments, he 
simultaneously transforms this concept by applying it directly to the senses. That he 
employs the Ignatian meditational technique of the purging of inordinate 
attachments, therefore, is interesting; it reminds us that how he uses this traditional 
meditational genre is characterised by subtlety, evasion of expectations, and – largely 
– a process of transformation. Descartes gives the age-old genre a new dimension. 
                                                             
230
 Descartes, ‘First Meditations, Meditations, 12 
231 See A. Oksenberg Rorty, ‘The Structure of Descartes’ Meditations’, in  A. Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), 
Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, 10 
232 Descartes, ‘First Meditation’, Meditations, 12 
112 
 
 
Creating a Suitable Environment 
 
Ignatius’ and Descartes’ shared emphasis on the importance of freeing oneself 
from inordinate attachments, and their view that the pursuit of solitude is key to 
achieving this, suggests that an environment of solitude allows for the necessary 
‘catharsis’ of inordinate attachments and beliefs which rest on insecure bases; as 
such, the cathartic element characteristic of meditation is central to their respective 
systems. As Clarke writes, 
 
The Spiritual Exercises that Descartes practiced at La Flèche were designed by Saint 
Ignatius as a way of breaking habitual patterns of thinking, and of redirecting a 
Christian’s attention to episodes in the life of Christ and to the moral and religious 
implications that may be drawn from them. Descartes seems to have understood the 
principal obstacle to doing metaphysics in similar terms.
233
 
 
 This cathartic element to the art of the meditation appears to have influenced 
Descartes to a great extent, expressed particularly clearly in the First Meditation; 
furthermore, the retreat into solitude provides the right arena for the cathartic 
function of doubt to play its role. How does the pervasive doubt of the opening 
meditation come about? Once Descartes has identified the uncertainty of sense 
perception as the source of his concern for the existing edifice of knowledge, he must 
find a way of ridding himself of these attachments in order to find a point of certainty 
from which he can start to rebuild the edifice. Treating the senses with suspicion, 
therefore, he applies a rigorous doubt to these former beliefs in order to seek what is 
properly foundational and known with certainty. Indeed, it is for this reason that he 
specifically demands that his reader be ‘able and willing to meditate seriously with 
me, and to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived 
opinions.’234 Freeing oneself from reliance on sense perception is at the heart of the 
                                                             
233
 Clarke, 208 
234 Descartes, ‘Preface to the reader’, Meditations, 8 
113 
 
opening meditations of the text, and it is, essentially, the driving force behind the 
discoveries of the Meditations. Descartes therefore applies to his beliefs a totalising 
doubt which pervades all his former opinions; he states that 
 
Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from opinions which are 
not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are 
patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find 
in each of them at least some reason for doubt.
235
 
 
As Kenny notes, ‘we cannot, of course, test each belief in turn to see whether it 
admits of doubt; but we can examine the foundations on which our beliefs in general 
depend.’236 This examination of the foundations of beliefs leads Descartes to employ, 
firstly, the ‘dream argument’, and then the hypothesis of the ‘evil demon’; this 
demonstrates the extent of his doubt, and emphasises his need to find a fixed point of 
certainty – which he thinks he does, of course, with the establishment of the cogito. 
The application of a radical doubt – targeting first of all the questionable 
trustworthiness of the senses – involves, effectively, discarding the external in favour 
of a turn inward, to discover what Descartes argues is innately known to every 
human mind; this introspection will be the way by which anything can be known 
with certainty. In this way, it could be understood that  
 
The doubts form themselves form a kind of discipline. By entertaining them and making 
them vivid to ourselves Descartes hopes that we may prepare our minds for the 
metaphysics that is to come. In particular he means us to reduce our susceptibility to 
prejudice and to make us use our minds independently of what he calls ‘the senses’.237 
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 The uncompromising goal of the doubt in the First Meditation – which carries 
on into the Second Meditation – is to doubt everything until something solid is 
found, even if that means discovering that there is nothing solid: 
 
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it 
to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognise something certain, 
or, if nothing else, until I at least recognise for certain that there is no certainty.
238
 
 
 Hence the establishment of the cogito arises from the totalising doubt of the 
first meditation: ‘as a preliminary help to dispose man for correct reasoning, the 
methodic doubt has a distinctly purgative purpose.’239 In this way, the cathartic 
techniques of the Ignatian meditation play an important role in Descartes’ project, as 
they allow the mind to focus only on what can be intuitively known, with certainty. 
The formation of the cogito is therefore  
 
Not the product of a logical inference. Rather, it is something that lies dormant in the 
mind and is realised after the mind is freed from the senses and imagination by ways of a 
cognitive exercise.
240
 
 
That the doubt has a cathartic function – in freeing himself from his previous 
reliance on the uncertain beliefs created by erroneous sense perception – aligns it 
closely with Ignatius’ emphasis on the need for the rejecting ‘inordinate 
attachments’, leaving the individual with an unclouded mind, in order to harvest any 
fruit from the process. In the same way, Descartes’ doubt in the First Meditation 
functions similarly to an Ignatian meditation; Kenny is right to state that ‘the doubt 
is, above all, a meditative technique, a form of thought therapy to cure the mind of 
excessive reliance on the sense.’241 This alignment of the texts demonstrates how 
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centrally important the cathartic element of meditation is, as it plays out to great 
effect in both the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. 
 
 Therefore, the importance of solitude, and its accompanying cathartic 
function, demonstrates why Descartes employed this meditational method in his 
Meditations; a significant parallel of aim and method has been established between 
Descartes and Ignatius, and so the Ignatian technique sheds light on the meditative 
process in the Meditations. What has become clear is that  
 
Retirement from the commonplace and routine patterns of life was not merely a 
propaedeutic to Cartesian reflection; it was increasingly to become an integral 
element, even a dominating factor, in the context of that reflection.
242
 
 
The requirement for a certain environment shows that a central element of 
meditation is its emphasis on setting, for the reasons explored above. Furthermore, it 
also plays the role of creating an arena in which the transformative work of 
meditation can take place; the combination of ‘right attitude’ (as explored in the 
previous section) and ‘right environment’ create a setting in which meditation can 
take place, to its full effect. It is this idea of ‘meditation as transformation’ that will 
inform the final part of this chapter. 
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An Epistemological Salvation? Meditation as Transformation 
 
 A further reason why such personal effort, and a specific setting, are required 
is rooted in a central tenet of both the Ignatian and the Cartesian meditational texts: 
that the goal of the exercise is the transformation of the individual, as they go 
through a profound change over the course of the exercise. Indeed, this is where it all 
culminates: ‘the guidance of the will is the ultimate objective of meditation’.243 The 
idea that exercises such as these would hold as their aim personal transformation is a 
definitive principle of the Ignatian meditational genre; Hill observes that meditations 
such as these 
 
Were concerned with transforming the self. The exercises were meant to change the 
individuals who followed them; to make them perceive themselves differently, to 
achieve a different way of being. They were not activities that had an external social 
or material significance, but concentrated instead on the inner life on the 
individual.
244
 
 
So the term ‘meditation’ denotes the concept of a transformational change in 
the individual, holding at its centre ‘self-knowledge, self-consciousness, 
subjectivity’.245 The Ignatian exercises are envisaged as a ‘formidable task of self-
reformation’, of which the task is to, firstly, remove all ‘inordinate attachments’, and 
subsequently ‘searching and finding the will of God about the management of one’s 
life and the salvation of the soul’. It is this activity which constitutes the core of 
‘spiritual exercises’.246 This teleological character of meditation, holding as its only 
aim the fulfilment of man’s ‘end’ – ‘to praise the Lord his God, and revere Him, and 
by serving Him be finally saved’ – demonstrates why the focus is on the 
transformation of the self, as it is geared to a higher purpose. 
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We also see this idea of teleologically minded meditation reflected in the 
Meditations; indeed, it can be identified as the driving force behind the process that 
plays out in the text. As a result, the issue of transformation forms one of the clearest 
connections between the Ignatian and Cartesian texts, built on this pivotal concept; it 
proves especially clear in his dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne. Referring to ‘the 
glory of God, to which the entire undertaking is directed’, Descartes is looking to 
achieve a similarly conceived goal, but the crucial difference is that instead of 
pursuing this through explicitly religious devotional exercises, he pursues it by way 
of metaphysical discovery: his project is  
 
To inquire ... how God may be more easily and more certainly known than the things 
of this world ... there can be no more useful service to be rendered in philosophy 
than to conduct a careful search, once and for all, for the best of these arguments, 
and to set them out so precisely and clearly as to produce for the future a general 
agreement that they amount to demonstrative proofs.
247
 
 
Kosman’s conception of the issue of transformation is helpful to draw on 
here: he writes that  
 
The recognition of the fact that traditional meditative literature and Cartesian 
meditative literature are “isomorphic” and the understanding that religious salvation 
and epistemic salvation are versions of a deeper structure of salvation, are important 
and of interest.
248
  
 
Indeed, taken from the Ignatian meditational style, Descartes uses, adapts and 
transforms this Ignatian teleological character in the Meditations, giving it a 
characteristically Cartesian edge: 
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Meditational literature was concerned with inner, self-transformation. Descartes, we 
may infer, was aiming not just to relate to us his metaphysics, but also to 
progressively transform our minds to make that metaphysics more acceptable to 
us.
249
 
 
If the question is posed, therefore, how Descartes achieves this self-
transformation in relation to his metaphysics in the Meditations, the answer is far 
from a single, monolithic one. This transformational change requires the aspects of 
meditation that we have been considering over the course of this chapter, such as 
self-motivation, total participation, the cumulative building up of ideas through an 
active process. Hence, for example, Descartes’ emphasis on his reader being of the 
right character to embark on this process – that he ‘would not urge anyone to read 
this book except those who are able and willing to meditate seriously with [him], and 
to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived opinions’250 – is a 
way of ensuring that his reader is prepared to embark on a process of metaphysical 
discovery that will simultaneously be one of personal transformation. Someone who 
cannot relinquish their preconceived opinions, and who relies too heavily on the 
perception and experience of the sense, cannot reap the same benefit from the 
process as those who are willing to undergo change. Therefore, Descartes encourages 
only those who are capable of becoming clean slates; those who are open to being 
transformed.  
 
One cannot be transformed without total participation in the process; as the 
reader takes the mantle of metaphysical discovery upon themselves, follows the 
process as laid out by Descartes, and forms the ideas as if they were their own and 
being discovered for the first time – all of which Descartes takes great pains to 
recommend to his reader – active participation necessarily prevails over complacent 
passivity. Descartes’ project revolves around the destruction and rebuilding of the 
edifice of knowledge, and if the reader is enacting it in the right way, their high level 
of involvement in the cumulative building up of ideas creates a sense of the constant 
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and active transformation of the individual meditator; as the edifice is rebuilt, so is 
the person. To reiterate, therefore, the centrality of the element of participation in the 
Cartesian project cannot be underestimated. 
 
 The intense and concentrated subjectivity of the journey of the Meditations 
means the reader is being changed by the very act of reading, by following the 
formation of metaphysical ideas as if it were their own discovery. To find such 
theories palatable – indeed, favourable – by the end of the process (as Hill suggests) 
seems inevitable. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Descartes places such a great 
emphasis on how his work should be read: as has been a central tenet of this thesis, 
how the Meditations is read – experientially – is key to its very purpose, meaning 
and existence. As such, ‘the written word ... here becomes the actual vehicle of 
epistemic salvation’.251 Kosman, who makes us think afresh about Descartes’ 
relationship to the traditional meditational genre, frames the issue in terms of 
reflexivity, as a way of understanding how the text’s emphasis on subjectivity allows 
for the self-transformation of the individual. I think that what he writes encapsulates 
the heart of the issue of meditation as transformation: 
 
One of the characteristics of the genre of meditational literature is that it is about 
reflexive awareness, about self-consciousness and self-examination. The Meditations 
therefore announces itself as a work within that reflexive tradition, as a work about 
self-discovery and self-knowledge. That it is within the tradition of meditational 
literature keeps this fact focused for us ... the central issues must remain self-
knowledge, self-consciousness, subjectivity: those issues traditionally central in so 
much of meditational literature.
252
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The Twin Peaks 
 
 What is more, meditation, envisaged as a process of transformation, involves 
– for Ignatius and Descartes alike – the idea of a choice. To be fully participating, an 
active choice is needed, in order to reflect the active character of the process. 
Furthermore, it cultivates the key element of personal responsibility, when the 
meditation ‘becomes a personal story for retreatants when the time comes for them to 
make an Election or correct their life.’253 
 
 The concept of choice, or ‘Election’, is central to the Spiritual Exercises, and 
there seems to be an identifiable point of culmination, the product of which must be a 
decision, in order to effect the personal transformation which is the goal of the 
Spiritual Exercises as a whole. The Election in the Second Week is centred around 
the ‘Meditation of the Two Standards’, consisting of drawing contrasts between 
‘Jesus Christ, our supreme sovereign’ and ‘Lucifer, the greatest enemy of 
humanity’.254 The retreatant is encouraged to consider the contrast between the two 
figures, culminating in an active choice of one over the other. Interestingly, it does 
not seem to be the decision itself that is the challenging part – indeed, the retreatant 
is left in no doubt about which ‘way’ to choose; ‘in order to choose properly ... we 
should consider with a pure and simple eye why we have been created, that is, for 
God’s praise and our salvation’255 – rather, it is the significant effect it will have on 
the retreatant’s life, and the sense of personal responsibility which accompanies it: ‘I 
would make myself act according to the way I would recommend to somebody else 
... if death suddenly came ... I would easily understand that I should choose this way 
now.’256 Furthermore, Ignatius’ use of the first-person here serves to emphasise the 
importance and immediacy of this decision-making moment; by endowing the 
moment with vividity – the retreatant is living the moment just as Ignatius himself 
did – the Election acts as a pivotal moment within the Spiritual Exercises. The Third 
Week then begins, as a new spiritual exercise, with fresh concerns; yet it is in the 
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secure knowledge of the individual retreatant’s vital decision made in the previous 
exercise, and this serves to inform the tone and motivation for the remaining 
exercises. 
 
 The Meditations lacks any obviously climactic moment of decision-making. 
However, this is not to say that there is not one; simply that it is expressed in a far 
subtler way, and one that is fitting to the progression of the meditational activity. 
This comes as no real surprise; Descartes’ use of the Ignatian meditational style is 
characteristically subtle, as has become increasingly clear throughout the discussion 
in this thesis. For Descartes, his debt to the meditational genre is best read in terms of 
implicit connections, rather than explicit imitation. The colloquy at the end of the 
Third Meditation was discussed in the first chapter; at this point, it can be identified 
as a key decisive moment in the Meditations. It is the moment at which the tone and 
wording of the text is closely aligned with Descartes’ statement of intent in his 
dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne; the colloquy is concerned with the glorification of 
God, ‘reflect[ing] on his attributes ... gaz[ing] with wonder and adoration on the 
beauty of this immense light’, just as his project was originally set out – as 
aforementioned – to be concerned with ‘the glory of God.’257 The reason why this 
colloquy acts as a climactic, decisive moment, however, is its placing within the text; 
the reader will have just encountered the first, ‘trademark’, argument for the 
existence of God, as the culmination of the meditational activity of the first three 
meditations. For the reader to then reflect on these arguments and come to a personal 
decision creates a sense of immediacy that precludes abstraction; as such, the reader 
is given individual responsibility to decide how to proceed. In this way, the colloquy 
at the end of the Third Meditation acts as a pivotal moment of choice, in essentially 
the same vein as Ignatius’ in the Spiritual Exercises.  
 
Furthermore, it is a widely held opinion in Cartesian scholarship that the 
Meditations can be viewed as consisting of two ‘parts’; the first three meditations, 
and the second three meditations. In this way, the colloquy at this point serves both 
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as a boundary and a connection between the two parts. As a boundary, it forces the 
reader to pause and reflect, before making a considered decision to proceed. As a 
connection, it has a linking role provided by the post-decision continuation of the 
text. The final three meditations are, of course, concerned with the further building of 
Descartes’ new epistemic world. The Third Meditation may act as the culmination of 
rapid building of the first three meditations, but this is not to say that the building 
stops: quite the contrary. From this point, Descartes works to establish the nature of 
‘truth and error’,258 ‘the essence of material things’,259 the second proof for the 
existence of God,
260
 and the mind-body distinction.
261
 
 
‘Fix it more deeply in my memory’: Meditation as a Method of Engraining 
Knowledge in the Mind 
 
Another key feature of the emphasis on the transformational quality of 
meditational writing is that it is something of a ‘once for all’ experience. If the reader 
is transformed by the process in the way that is envisaged by the author, what is 
effected is a permanent change in the individual, which will impact on their 
worldview and subsequent decision-making. The newly acquired knowledge needs to 
be engrained in the mind; meditating on a topic is a way in which this can be 
achieved.
262
 A clear example of this is at the end of the Second Meditation. 
Reflecting on the conclusions drawn from the day – the establishment of the cogito – 
Descartes takes a while to ensure that the knowledge is engrained in his mind: 
 
Since the habit of holding on to old opinions cannot be set aside so quickly, I should like 
to stop here and meditate for some time on this new knowledge I have gained, so as to 
fix it more deeply in my mind.
263
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What is more, Descartes transforms the genre of meditation by giving this aspect 
of engraining a double function, so that there is a two-way process between 
engraining and individual transformation. Firstly, engraining the conclusions in the 
mind brings about a (permanent) transformation, as the reader has been profoundly 
changed by their experience and discovery. Secondly, the transformation itself – as 
the goal, the end result – holds within it the key to engraining the new-found 
knowledge in the mind; the holistic reading of the text, as a totalising, subjective 
activity, leaves the reader changed such that the knowledge itself is part of their very 
– transformed – being. It would seem that the process acts as some sort of 
‘guarantee’. 
 
In terms of technique, Ignatius uses repetition as a way of engraining knowledge 
in the mind – and does so to great effect: ‘frequent repetitions of material previously 
considered are to be conducted in order to consolidate those gains already made.’264 
He encourages his readers to keep doing the exercises, giving them the maximum 
chance of absorption and retention, in order to proceed to the other exercises: 
 
A repetition has to be made of the previous Exercises, as a kind of rumination over the 
same subjects on which I meditated previously, so that, by this exercise of memory, my 
intellect can reflect more easily about them without digressions.
265
 
 
For Descartes, his use of the technique of repetition is, once again, more subtly 
expressed than in Ignatius’ text. Rather than exhorting his readers to repeat the 
exercises, he is constantly recapping what has been established, in order to ensure a 
cumulative building up of knowledge, which relies on creating a vital sense of 
continuity. In this way, his readers keep time with him, so to speak, whilst actually 
working through the meditational process at their own pace. The opening lines of the 
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Fourth Meditation, for example, remind the reader what has been established up to 
this point, and where the meditation will go from here: 
 
During the past few days I have accustomed myself to leading my mind away from 
the senses; and I have taken careful note of the fact that there is very little about 
corporeal things that is truly perceived, whereas much more is known about the 
human mind, and still more about God ... and now, from this contemplation of the 
true God, in whom all the treasures of wisdom and the sciences lie hidden, I think I 
can see a way forward to the knowledge of other things.
266
 
 
His use of repetition is inextricably tied into his conception of the project of 
the Meditations. As has been stressed throughout this thesis, the project relies on 
connectives, continuity and a cumulative building of knowledge; and repetition is a 
way of providing these vital elements. It is probably that Descartes’ use of repetition 
is derived from Ignatius’ use of it in the Spiritual Exercises; however, this claim 
belongs within the context of this discussion of meditation as transformation, in 
terms of engraining knowledge in the mind to both effect the transformation, and as a 
product of that transformation. Stohrer sums up well the importance of repetition as a 
technique for both writers: 
 
For Descartes and Ignatius, continuous and uninterrupted thought process, careful 
formulation of complete summaries, frequent repetitions of earlier reflective 
experiences, and careful notation of where and why deeper insight was achieved, are 
among the primary means for achieving greater mental development and spiritual 
maturity. Both men consider these techniques of resumé to be more than merely 
supplementary or arbitrary devices. Rather, these procedural components are integral 
to and constitutive of their respective methods.
267
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 What has been established in this section of the chapter is that the term 
“meditation” denotes the concept of a transformational change in the individual. 
Considering the features of the Spiritual Exercises, the ways in which the issue of 
transformation plays out in the Meditations have been explored, by engaging with the 
teleologically minded character of meditation; the importance of participation; the 
concept of choice; and the idea of meditative methods as a way of engraining 
something in the mind, in order to fully effect a transformation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the second chapter was concerned with Descartes’ choice of 
‘meditation’ as a viable alternative to ‘disputation’, this third and final chapter shifts 
to a more positive consideration of what it means for the Meditations to be so titled. 
Why Descartes might have actively chosen the meditational genre in itself to 
influence his writing. This chapter had a dual concern, exploring how, and why, the 
Meditations bear significant relation to the Ignatian meditational tradition. These are, 
of course, necessarily interrelated, as the one informs the other; this aspect of 
exploration has become clear throughout this chapter. 
 
 Picking up afresh the strand of Ignatian meditation which informed the first 
chapter, this third chapter drew on what Stohrer termed ‘identifiable issues of mutual 
concern’ in Ignatius’ Spiritual Exercises and Descartes’ Meditations. Opening with a 
consideration of meditation as ‘thinking in progress’, these ‘identifiable issues’ 
included the emphasis placed by both writers on the importance of individual effort – 
which ties in with the larger theme of ‘participation’ running through the thesis – the 
value of solitude; and the importance of creating an  environment conducive to 
meditational thought. The chapter culminated in a focus on ‘meditation as 
transformation’; it was established that both Ignatius and Descartes hold as their goal 
a change of will in the individual, through experiencing a process of significant 
change during the meditation. 
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It has become increasingly clear in this chapter that there is an Ignatian 
influence identifiable in the Meditations, but not in any simplistic or superficial 
sense; rather, it is found within the multi-layered character of the text. This chapter 
offers a speculative reconstruction of what the Meditations would look like if viewed 
from a meditational perspective, by looking at the subtler hints at genre found in 
Descartes’ text. This comparison of the two texts has proved highly illuminative and 
useful for our understanding of the Meditations; taking this fresh approach to reading 
the Meditations draws attention to the significance behind key moments in the text, 
and also makes demands of the reader. Just as in the Spiritual Exercises the 
individual effort and the participation of the retreatant are expected, so in the 
Meditations, the reader opens themselves up to the possibility – indeed, the aim – of 
being ‘transformed’ by the text and the way it is read. 
 
 This chapter demonstrates what the Meditations might look like if 
approached from a meditational perspective, appropriating the textual connection 
between the Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations. As such, this acts as the 
culmination of the thesis; it has been established that to view the Meditations as 
‘meditation’ is central to the very meaning and purpose of the text. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis opened with Descartes’ warning to his reader about the challenges 
involved in reading the Meditations: 
 
 I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me…268 
 
 This thesis set out to explore the significance of the title of the Meditations, 
examining what it means to ‘meditate’ with Descartes; and how this might illuminate 
our understanding of the text. By asking questions about the nature and extent of the 
meditational genre on the Meditations, it has become clear that to view the 
Meditations as a text influenced by meditational writing is vitally important for a 
fuller interpretation. What has been established in the course of this discussion is that 
a consideration of Descartes’ use of the meditational genre takes us to the root of the 
issue of why Descartes wrote the Meditations in the way that he did; and why he 
wrote it at all. I can therefore conclude that to approach this text from a meditational 
perspective is highly illuminative for a deeper understanding of the Meditations, thus 
rendering the title hugely significant. 
 
Having identified particular shortcomings within some current scholarship on 
the Meditations – namely, the issue of the compartmentalisation of ‘problems’ and 
‘issues’ within the text; and the sidelining of ‘literary’ concerns in favour of 
‘philosophical’ concerns – the thesis held as its premise the need to find a fresh 
approach to the text. This would involve the rejection of the perceived dichotomy 
between ‘literary’ and ‘philosophical’ approaches, and suggest that an integrated 
approach is the way forward. As a result, the thesis has not been concerned with 
solving Cartesian ‘problems’ – although I have suggested ways that these areas of 
difficulty within the Meditations could be approached more sympathetically, by 
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being aware of their proper role and context within the whole text – but rather with 
attentiveness to the way the text hangs together as a whole, and therefore the 
importance of the way that it is read. Considering the significance of the title of the 
Meditations, reading the text as a piece of writing influenced by the meditational 
tradition has been shown to be highly illuminative for our understanding. 
 
Indeed, what is clear from this discussion is that the way the text is read is 
crucial in shedding light on the multi-layered and complex meaning of the 
Meditations, Descartes’ motivation for writing it, and the transformative effect it can 
have on the reader. Furthermore, the way in which reading is, for Descartes, an act of 
participation means that to read the text is an experience which impacts on the 
reader. He invites his readers to meditate with him, thereby inviting them to be 
involved in the text’s very development. This was emphasised most strongly in the 
third chapter – by a consideration of meditation as an act of transformation – but it 
also constituted a key thread running throughout the thesis, expressed as the idea of 
reader participation. 
 
To summarise in broad terms what has been explored in this thesis, it first of 
all examined the history of the genre of meditational writing, in order to establish a 
basic historical-biographical connection between Ignatius and Descartes. It then drew 
on Vendler’s presentation of various parallels between the Spiritual Exercises and 
the Meditations, in order to demonstrate the danger of overstating the textual 
connection. The second chapter shifted the focus to giving Descartes a ‘voice’; 
examining the Objections and Replies correspondence between Descartes and his 
contemporaries proved illuminating as to why Descartes chose to so title the 
Meditations. The third and final chapter was more constructive in character, focusing 
on a consideration of why Descartes might have actively chosen the meditational 
genre; it simultaneously explored how the Ignatian meditational genre plays out in 
the Meditations. It became increasingly clear that the title of the Meditations is 
highly significant, and approaching the text from this meditational perspective 
revealed the text to have a powerful, transformative effect on the reader.  
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 A look back at the findings of each individual chapter indicates the 
conclusions which can be drawn from this thesis as a whole. Chapter One, therefore, 
outlined the history of the tradition of meditational writing, from Marcus Aurelius’ 
Meditations, through St. Augustine’s Confessions, culminating in the introduction of 
the figure of St. Ignatius of Loyola, and his influential meditational writing, the 
Spiritual Exercises. Charting the development of this tradition emphasised that 
although Descartes is influenced by the genre of meditation in a very particular way, 
he is still a product of the tradition; as such, his work must be viewed in this context 
of the evolution of this meditational tradition. However, as becomes increasingly 
clear in the course of the thesis, by integrating this spiritual tradition into his 
philosophical work, Descartes is also a transformer of genre. The chapter went on to 
consider how Descartes would have been familiar with Ignatius’ work, suggesting 
that it would have been a result of his Jesuit education, and his experience of the 
Ignatian style of religious retreat. Noting some key features of the Spiritual Exercises 
at this stage informed later discussion of if, and how, parallels can be drawn between 
Ignatius’ text and the Meditations. 
 
The critique of Vendler’s article, regarding possible parallels between the 
Spiritual Exercises and the Meditations, demonstrated the risk of misrepresentation 
entailed by drawing superficial or tenuous connections between the texts. Vendler’s 
overstatement of the connection was shown to oversimplify both the texts, and the 
complex relationship between them. This warning was used as a springboard into the 
thesis’ concern of appropriating the connection between the Meditations and the 
Ignatian meditational genre, in order to yield fruitful interpretation. That the opening 
chapter drew attention to this problematic approach to making the textual connection 
was important for informing the findings of the rest of the thesis. This became 
particularly clear in the third chapter, when the strand of Ignatian meditation was 
picked up again more specifically; having established at an early stage that an 
overstatement of the connection risked misrepresenting both Ignatius’ and Descartes’ 
projects, the third chapter was able to appropriate the connection. It was with this 
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warning in mind that the final chapter was able to present a speculative 
reconstruction of what the Meditations might look like when viewed from a 
meditational perspective, thereby demonstrating the significance of the influence of 
the meditational genre on the text. However, Vendler did draw attention to an 
important point; that there does seem to be some degree of connection between the 
two texts. As such, much of the remainder of the thesis was concerned with 
appropriating this connection. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter briefly focused on a consideration of the 
foundationalist and coherentist elements of the Meditations; it was suggested that the 
Meditations evidences a shift between foundationalism and coherentism, as 
epistemological options. This was not found to be problematic; indeed, this laid the 
groundwork for Chapter Three’s sympathetic response to the charge of circularity. 
This further highlights the interdependency of elements within the Meditations, 
thereby drawing attention once again to the importance of considering the way the 
text is approached. 
 
Chapter Two shifted the focus to giving Descartes a ‘voice’, by examining his 
comments on why he titled his work Meditations. His reasons were framed by a 
general distaste for the dominant mode of philosophising of his day, ‘disputation’. 
‘Meditation’ is presented as a viable alternative, it would seem, not a reason in itself. 
The challenge presented by this, therefore, was to unpack what Descartes meant by 
this; a key part of this was to contextualise the meditation-disputation dichotomy 
within the wider epistemological distinctions considered by Descartes at the time of 
writing. This challenge proved fruitful; it led to a discussion of the distinction 
between analytic and synthetic reasoning, and of the role of syllogism and intuition 
in Descartes’ thought, in order to build a picture of the epistemological system at 
work in the text.  
 
These considerations built up into a consideration of the cogito section of the 
Meditations, implementing the chapter’s findings in a case study. This demonstrated 
131 
 
how the aforementioned epistemological aspects of Descartes’ writing come together 
in an important moment of the Meditations. The implications of this for the charge of 
circularity commonly levelled at the Meditations were that this difficult part of the 
text was found to be less problematic – less ‘viciously’ circular – when viewed in the 
context of the chapter’s important epistemological findings. Consequently, this 
chapter demonstrated how a consideration of why Descartes employed ‘meditation’ 
rather than ‘disputation’, for example, can illuminate the Meditations more widely, 
and bring about a more sympathetic interpretation of seemingly problematic parts.  
 
The third chapter built on the findings of the second chapter, by asking why 
Descartes might have actively chosen the meditational style for his work, rather than 
employing it merely as a viable alternative to disputation. This final chapter picked 
up again the strand of Ignatian meditation introduced in the first chapter, considering 
what form this textual connection might take, and how the meditational influence 
might play out in the Meditations. As such, it constitutes a more ‘constructive’ part 
to the thesis, as a speculative reconstruction of what the text might look like when 
approached from a meditational perspective. In response to the opening questions – 
how could have the Spiritual Exercises have informed the Meditations; and why 
would Descartes have sought this affinity? – what became increasingly clear in this 
chapter was that the meditational genre not only clearly informed his work, but 
shaped it. 
 
To meet the aim of establishing possible reasons why Descartes would have 
chosen the (Ignatian) meditational genre to inform his Meditations, the chapter drew 
on what Stohrer termed ‘identifiable issues of mutual concern’ to the Spiritual 
Exercises and the Meditations. This section of the paper considered some areas of 
affinity between the texts, focusing also on the literary techniques used to achieve 
these important features. Meditation as an active ‘thinking in progress’ – the idea that 
reading the text involves a ‘doing’ – was shown to be important; the act of reading is 
not passive, but necessarily active. This fed into a more detailed discussion of the 
importance of individual effort and participation in reading the Meditations, a theme 
that ran throughout the thesis. The factors of the need for solitude, and the idea of 
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meditation as catharsis, demonstrated the authors’ similar concerns about the 
importance of creating an environment conducive to productive meditational 
thought. This was shown to involve the shunning of ‘inordinate attachments’, as a 
key stage in the cathartic function of meditational thought. The reader must undergo 
a cathartic experience of ridding themselves of inordinate attachments before the 
constructive work of meditational thought can be done. Finally, the vision of 
‘meditation as transformation’ is so clearly a driving force for both Ignatius and 
Descartes: the goal of both texts is, uncompromisingly, the transformation of the 
individual. Again, the total participation of the reader is assumed, in order to reap the 
transformative benefits of such exercises. 
 
Despite some differences, due to the particularity of each respective text, there 
are certainly identifiable echoes of Ignatian concerns and emphases in the 
Meditations. It is important to understand that this chapter was not concerned with 
parallels drawn on the basis of superficial and tenuous similarities (as was critiqued 
in the first chapter), but focused rather on more implicit, and subtler, connections 
between the texts. It is on this basis that the influence of the Ignatian meditational 
genre on the Meditations can be most effectively assessed. This final chapter presents 
a picture of what the Meditations look like when read from a meditational 
perspective, and this proves to be highly illuminative for a deeper and fuller 
understanding of its contents. 
 
The findings of this thesis are hopefully significant for the future of the 
Meditations’ reception. In this project, the Meditations has been reconsidered, in 
light of the significance of the influence of meditation in interpreting the text, and 
this has been shown to be illuminative. Furthermore, the way that this ‘meditational’ 
approach to the text has enabled classic Cartesian ‘problems’ to become less 
threatening to his system demonstrates that considerations of style and genre 
(informed by close attention to the work’s title) can alter the way we interpret, and 
thereby judge, the Meditations. To echo the introduction to this thesis, the lasting 
impression I want to give to the reader is of the importance of being attentive to the 
title of Descartes’ work, as reading from the Meditations from this perspective 
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creates a much-needed fresh approach. The approach suggested here highlights the 
importance of reading the Meditations from a meditational perspective, thereby 
illuminating the very act of reading. 
 
Furthermore, the findings can be applied more generally to philosophical and 
theological texts. The results yielded by applying the above approach to the 
Meditations emphasise the vital importance of participation; the reader does not 
merely ‘read’ the Meditations, but actively participates in it. Only in this way is the 
reading of the Meditations a transformative experience. Whilst the findings of this 
thesis regarding the influence of the genre of meditation on the Meditations cannot, 
of course, be applied indiscriminately to other texts, what is valuable to take away 
from the thesis is how the way in which a text is read can be highly illuminative as to 
its very meaning and purpose. By demonstrating that ‘philosophical’ and ‘literary’ 
approaches to analysing a text are not mutually exclusive, but rather necessarily 
interrelated and interdependent, a fresh approach to a text, attentive to considerations 
of style and genre, can yield fruitful interpretation; this says something important 
about how we approach complex texts. 
 
It was suggested in the introduction that we cannot talk of a ‘meditational aspect’ 
or a ‘meditational element’ to the Meditations. It has become clear, in the course of 
this discussion, that meditation holds a central position in the Meditations; it informs 
and shapes the very nature, purpose and meaning of the text.  
 
I will close with a reflection from St. François de Sales: 
 
Every meditation is a thought, but every thought is not a meditation … when we thinke 
of heavenly things, not to learne them but to love them, that is called to meditate.
269
 
 
                                                             
269 St. François de Sales, ‘Treatise on the Love of God’ (1616) 
134 
 
What ‘meditation’ means to the Meditations is not about merely ‘reading’ the 
text, but rather experiencing it. In this way, one man’s search for certainty and truth 
communicates itself to the reader as the possibility for a transformative act of 
reading. It is central to the vitality of the text that a consideration of the Meditations 
begins with its telling title. 
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